[FRIAM] Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Russ Abbott russ.abbott at gmail.com
Mon Oct 5 11:30:43 EDT 2020


Good, but ...

Identifying manipulation targets then becomes a nearly impossible task.
What's going on inside a person so that a trigger results in one action
rather than another? In many cases one would have to know the complete
history of a person--from his childhood family and environment to whether
someone gave him the finger for no apparent reason earlier in the day--to
know how he is going to react to any particular triggering event.

A probabilistic version of LaPlacian causality may be more or less correct,
but the number of levels at which one has to apply it in any complex
situation makes it virtually impossible to use. An approximate
approach like Glen suggests may be the best we can do--at least for now.

-- Russ

On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 7:29 AM uǝlƃ ↙↙↙ <gepropella at gmail.com> wrote:

> Yes! The manipulationist conception of fault (cause) can help rescue the
> thread.
>
> Progress targets a higher order intervention than justice targets.
> Establishing which of us machines premeditates then murders *seems* to be
> the first step. Then a progressive intervention attempts to mitigate with
> systemic intervention whereas a justice intervention acts more locally on
> the particular machine, hoping for some occult percolation out to other
> machines.
>
> But the manipulationist conception admits that we have to intervene
> upstream to establish the initial categorization in the first place. The
> sub-thread about intent, outcome, naive cause-effect, etc. is a distraction
> from the main point, which is *how* to establish the category of
> things/behaviors you want to punish/avoid. If the "organic correlate" is a
> pathological "lesion" that *spans* the human body, say to the parents or
> being a member of the People of Praise cult, then EEG and fMRI indicators
> are obviously inadequate because they artificially slice the lesion into
> two parts and ignore the part outside the one machine. If the organic
> correlate is clearly, statistically, establishable by comparing
> individuals, then maybe EEG/fMRI type locales are adequate.
>
> The manipulationist conception helps demonstrate category errors with
> cautionary tales like Minority Report <
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minority_Report_(film)>. Justice
> approaches, which try to bound the lesion to being inside human skin (often
> artificially) avoid punishing things like "the ability to premeditate" and
> rightly focus on punishing actual murder. It's fine to think whatever you
> want. Just be careful what premeditation you *act* on. I think a useful
> line between progressive vs justice approaches is drawn by the *permanence*
> of the consequences. If an intervention is irreversible, then maybe it's
> best to take a small-scoped justice approach. If it's reversible, then you
> can try out a systemic intervention as long as you also install measures
> for backing out of it if it goes horribly wrong.
>
>
> On October 4, 2020 9:48:35 PM PDT, Russ Abbott <russ.abbott at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >One obvious quibble is to ask whether "A  determines the probability
> >density over ..." isn't just a way of substituting the word *determines
> >*for
> >*causes*.
> >
> >On the other hand, I like this approach. Another way to think about is
> >that
> >changing A results in a change in B (or a change in the probability of
> >B).
> >It's like A is something like a remote control for B.
> >
> >What's especially interesting about this approach is that one is not
> >obligated to show how that change happens -- just that it does.
>
>
> - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
> un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/attachments/20201005/71f9eaa5/attachment-0001.html>


More information about the Friam mailing list