[FRIAM] Dope slaps, anyone? Text displaying correctly?

[Nicholas Thompson]

Dear EricS, Glen, and anybody else who is following.

Thank you so much for pitching in.   As I have often said, I am incapable
of thinking alone, so your comments are wonderfully welcome.  And thank you
also for confirming that what I wrote was readable.  I am having to work in
gmail at the moment, which is , to me, an unfamiliar medium.

First, Eric:  I am trying to talk math-talk in this passage, so poetry is
not an excuse if I fail to be understood by you.

*FWIW: as I have heard these discussions over the years, to the extent that
there is a productive analogy, I would say (unapologetically using my
words, and not trying to quote his) that Peirce’s claimed relation between
states of knowledge and truth (meaning, some fully-faithful representation
of “what is the case”) is analogous to the relation of sample estimators in
statistics to the quantity they are constructed to estimate. We don’t have
any ontological problems understanding sample estimators and the quantities
estimated, as both have status in the ordinary world of empirical things.
In our ontology, they are peers in some sense, but they clearly play
different roles and stand for different concepts.*

I like very much what you have written here and think it states, perhaps
more precisely than I managed, exactly what I was trying to say.  I do want
to further  stress the fact that if a measurement system is tracking a
variate that is going to stabilize in the very long run, then it will on
average approximate that value with greater precision the more measures are
taken.  Thus, not only does the vector of the convergence constitute
evidence for the location of the truth, the fact that there is convergence
is evidence that there is a truth to be located.   Thus I agree with you
that the idea behind Peirce's notion of truth is the central limit theorem.

Where  we might disagree is whether there is any meaning to truth beyond
that central limit.  This is where I found you use of "ontology" so
helpful. When talking about statistics, we are always talking about
mathematical structures in experience and nothing beyond that.  We are
assuredly talking about only one kind of thing.  However, I see you
wondering, are there things to talk about beyond the statistical structures
of experience?   I hear you wanting to say "yes" and I see me wanting to
say "no".

God knows ... and I use the term advisedly ... my hankering would seem  to
be arrogant to the point of absurdity.  Given all the forms of discourse in
which the words "truth" and "real" are used, all the myriad language games
in which these words appear as tokens, how, on earth, could I (or Peirce)
claim that there exists one and only one standard by which the truth of any
proposition or the reality of any abject can be demonstrated?  I think I
have to claim (and I think Peirce claims it) that whatever people may say
about how they evaluate truth or reality claims, their evaluation always
boils down to an appeal to the long run of experience.

Our difference of opinion, if we have one, is perhaps  related to the
difference of opinion between James and Peirce concerning the relation
between truth as a believed thing and truth as a thing beyond the belief of
any finite group of people.  James was a physician, and presumably knew a
lot about the power of placebos.  He also was a ditherer, who famously took
years to decide whom to marry  and agonized about it piteously to his
siblings.  James was fascinated by the power of belief to make things true
and the power of doubt to make them impossible.  Who could jump a chasm who
did not believe that he could jump a chasm!   For Peirce, this sort of
thinking was just empty psychologizing.  Truth was indeed a kind of
opinion, but it was the final opinion, that opinion upon which the
operation of scientific practices and logical inquiry would inevitably
converge.

EricC, the Jamesian, will no doubt have a lot to say about this, including
that it is total garbage.

As for Fefferman,  my brief attempt to learn enough about Fefferman to
appear intelligent led me to the website,
http://www.vipfaq.com/Charles%20Fefferman.html, which might be the weirdest
website I have ever gone to.   I don't THINK that a language-free language
is my unicorn, but Glen NEVER says something for nothing, so I am
withholding judgement until he boxes my ears again.  I think my unicorn may
be that all truth is statistical and, therefore, provisional.  Literally:
a seeing into the future.

Thanks again for helping out, you guys!

Nick



Consider, for a moment, the role of placebos in medicine.

Consider the ritual of transubstantiation.  At the moment that you sip it,
is the contents of the chalice Really "blood."

*Peirce writes, "Consider what effects, which may have practical bearing,
the object of your conception to have.  Then our conception of those
effects is our whole of our conception of the object.*

"The Whole"?!  Really?  Now somebody of  Peircean Pursuasion would point
out that, if a parishionner were to burst a blood vessel, and a doctor with
a transfusion kit were present, NObody would conceive that the patient
should b transfused with communion wine.  Since causing instant death upon
tranfusion is not one of the conceivable consequences of the chalice
containing blood (leave aside immunity issues ), and is a conceivable
consequence of transfusing communion wine, we are warranted to say that,
despite what the  practice of communion implies, the stuff in the challice
is wine not blood.

But it's entirely conceivable that some parissioners, at theinstant of
communion, do conceive of the wine as blood, and experience changes of
themselves and teh world around them as a consequence of receiving
communion.

Fork 1 here "The Whole"?!  Really? Consider the phenomenon of a
_________________ effects.

The juice here is what we think we are estimating.  Are we estimating the
true state of affairs in some world we cannot more directly access or are
we estimating the final resting place of the statistic we are measuring.
My point, here, is that the latter is  all we have.  To the extent that
anything in experience is non-random (ie, some events are predictive of
other events), any mechanism that homes on these contingencies will be
selected if the consequences are of importance to reproduction of the
organism. we live in a mostly random world  and to the extent that our
methods of inquiry are useful, further inquiry will probably narrow our
estimate of some property within finer and finer limits.  This is a process
I would call inductive.

Now I think, in your latter comments, you are getting at the fact that this
is only one kind of convergence,and is dependent on a prior convergence
concerning what identifies a substance as lithium.  Before we can determine
the boiling point of lithium we have first to agree upon which substances
are lithium and which operations constitute "boiling".   These are
decisions that are abductive in nature, and, to that extent are less
straight-forward.    Lets say we are interested in determining the boiling
point of Li and we are sent looking for some li to biol.   We come accross
a lump of grey metal witha dark finish in our lab drawer and we want ot
know if this is lithium.   The logic here (light grey substance with dark
finish =? lithiumisthe logic ofabduction.  That this first test is positive
will lead you toperform yet another abductive lest: is it noticeably light
when youbalance it in yourhadn, can you cut it withthe plasticknife you
brought home with your take-out lunch , etc.  These tests are similarly
abductive (Li is light, theis substance is light, this sjumbstance isli;Li
is soft, this substance is soft, this substanve is Li. When enough of these
tests have come up positive you will declare the substance to be Li an
procede to measure its boiling point.  (A similar series of abductions
willbe require to agree upon what constitutes "boiling".

*Lithium* (from Greek <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_language>: λίθος,
romanized <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romanization_of_Greek>: *lithos*,
lit. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Literal_translation> 'stone') is a chemical
element <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_element> with the symbol
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbol_(chemistry)> *Li* and atomic number
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_number> 3. It is a soft,
silvery-white alkali metal <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alkali_metal>.
Under standard conditions
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_temperature_and_pressure>, it is
the least dense metal and the least dense solid element. Like all alkali
metals, lithium is highly reactive
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reactivity_(chemistry)> and flammable, and
must be stored in vacuum, inert atmosphere, or inert liquid such as
purified kerosene or mineral oil. When cut, it exhibits a metallic luster
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luster_(mineralogy)>, but moist air corrodes
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corrosion> it quickly to a dull silvery
gray, then black tarnish. It never occurs freely in nature, but only in
(usually ionic) compounds <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_compound>,
such as pegmatitic <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegmatite> minerals,
which were once the main source of lithium. Due to its solubility as an
ion, it is present in ocean water and is commonly obtained from brines
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brine>. Lithium metal is isolated
electrolytically <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electrolysis> from a
mixture of lithium chloride <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium_chloride>
and potassium chloride <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potassium_chloride>.

On Sun, Jan 8, 2023 at 3:21 AM glen <gepropella at gmail.com> wrote:

> This smacks of Feferman's claim that "implicit in the acceptance of given
> schemata is the acceptance of any meaningful substitution instances that
> one may come to meet, but which those instances are is not determined by
> restriction to a specific language fixed in advance." ... or in the
> language of my youth, you reap what you sow.
>
> To Nick's credit (without any presumption that I know anything about
> Peirce), he seems to be hunting the same unicorn Feferman's hunting,
> something like a language-independent language. Or maybe something
> analogous to a moment (cf
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment_(mathematics))?
>
> While we're on the subject, Martin Davis died recently:
> https://logicprogramming.org/2023/01/in-memoriam-martin-davis/ As terse
> as he was with me when I complained about him leaving Tarski out of
> "Engines of Logic", his loss will be felt, especially to us randos on the
> internet.
>
> On 1/7/23 15:20, David Eric Smith wrote:
> > Nick, the text renders.
> >
> > You use words in ways that I cannot parse.  Some of them seem very
> poetic, suggesting that your intended meaning is different in its whole
> cast from one I could try for.
> >
> > FWIW: as I have heard these discussions over the years, to the extent
> that there is a productive analogy, I would say (unapologetically using my
> words, and not trying to quote his) that Peirce’s claimed relation between
> states of knowledge and truth (meaning, some fully-faithful representation
> of “what is the case”) is analogous to the relation of sample estimators in
> statistics to the quantity they are constructed to estimate.
> >
> > We don’t have any ontological problems understanding sample estimators
> and the quantities estimated, as both have status in the ordinary world of
> empirical things.  In our ontology, they are peers in some sense, but they
> clearly play different roles and stand for different concepts.
> >
> > When we come, however, to “states of knowledge” and “truth” as “what
> will bear out in the long run”, in addition to the fact that we must study
> the roles of these tokens in our thought and discourse, if we want to get
> at the concepts expressive of their nature, we also have a hideously more
> complicated structure to categorize, than mere sample estimators and the
> corresponding “actual” values they are constructed to estimate.  For sample
> estimation, in some sense, we know that the representation for the
> estimator and the estimated is the same, and that they are both numbers in
> some number system.  If we wish to discuss states of knowledge and truth,
> everything is up for grabs: every convention for a word’s denotation and
> all the rules for its use in a language that confer parts of its meaning.
> All the conventions for procedures of observation and guided experience.
> All the formal or informal modes of discourse in which we organize our
> intersubjective experience pools and
> > build something from them.  All of that is allowed to “fluctuate”, as we
> would say in statistics of sample estimators.  The representation scheme
> itself, and our capacities to perceive through it, are all things we seek
> to bring into some convergence toward a “faithful representation” of “what
> is the case”.
> >
> > Speaking or thinking in an orderly way about that seems to have many
> technical as well as modal aspects.
> >
> > Best,
> >
> > Eric
> >
> >
> >> On Jan 7, 2023, at 5:05 PM, Nicholas Thompson <thompnickson2 at gmail.com
> <mailto:thompnickson2 at gmail.com>> wrote:
> >>
> >> */The relation between the believed in and the True is the relation
> between a limited function and its limit. {a vector, and the thing toward
> which the vector points?]   Ultimately  the observations that the function
> models determine/**/the limit, but the limit is not determined by any
> particular  observation or group of observations.  Peirce believes that The
> World -- if, in fact, it makes any sense to speak of a World independent of
> the human experience -- is essentially random and, therefore,  that
> contingencies among experiences that lead to valid expectations are rare.
> The apparition of order that we experience is due to the fact that such
> predictive contingencies--rare as they may be-- are extraordinarily useful
> to organisms and so organisms are conditioned to attend  to them.  Random
> events are beyond experience.  Order is what can be experienced. /*
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