[FRIAM] This makes me think of this list...

Tue Aug 27 11:55:20 EDT 2024

You can derive anything from P ^ ~P because
F -> X where F means false is always True regardless of the truth value of
X.

The "truth table" for implication, A -> B, is

A  B   A -> B
T   T      T
T   F       F
F   T      T
F   F      T

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

On Tue, Aug 27, 2024, 7:17 AM glen <gepropella at gmail.com> wrote:

> Both your and Jon's responses are helpful. I'm still very confused about
> the difference between triviality and degeneracy. FWIW, I dug up the
> concept of "degeneracy pressure" <
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Degenerate_matter>. Am I talking about
> that? I think so, in some weird way. Claiming you can derive anything from
> P^¬P seems similar (if opposite) to collapsing into a singularity. And I
> apologize for my sloppy words. By "1 group" I do mean C₁ or the zero group.
> I should have said something like "1 element symmetry" or "group of size 1"
> or somesuch. Sorry.
>
> Anyway, I'm glad Eric took it back to telicity and cause. The distinction
> between "always observed" and scoped counterfactuals might be what I'm
> looking for. But I have nothing further I can contribute. I did need to
> post the apology and thanks for the help, though.
>
> On 8/23/24 17:21, Santafe wrote:
> > Reply is to both Jon and Glen, though I seem to have deleted Glen’s post
> in scurrying around trying to shovel the lahar of whichever day it was (are
> there even different days, or is it just one long day run together?)….
> >
> >
> > Again, I feel like I am not tracking the language here, so I don’t know
> if I am getting the point or not.  I don’t know what a 1 group symmetry is,
> though can guess.  Also, whether that “1 group” is a reference to the
> "trivial group" (I would not have guessed that it was).
> >
> >
> > So, admitting that I am responding through my own guesses, I think that
> Glen’s comment about "Degenerate constructs like a 1 group symmetry feel,
> to me, like metaphysical commitments…” is close to part of my reason in the
> original reply (nominally to/for Nick), which I didn’t articulate then:
> >
> > This was why the tenor of the original conversation made me think the
> right reply was to emphasize that laws are descriptions that can be made
> within the bounds of almost-entirely-incomplete characterizations of
> nature.  “Very partial” or however I said it.
> >
> > I think this is why the term “cause” often enters people’s informal
> perception, though I think that is a misappropriation of the term as we
> have learned to use it technically, and I think the technical usage should
> expand to become the default one.
> >
> > What is a “cause”, technically?:  In Pearl’s formulation (which is close
> enough for what I want here), causes are associated with some kinds of
> “enclosing boundaries” that “screen off” an external world from some
> enclosed variables we call the “system” and whose behavior we want to
> anticipate or control.  The causing boundary is the thing on whose state
> the internal state depends, conditionally independent of the environment’s
> state given the state of the boundary.  Glen’s page on causal reasoning is
> just the right source to grind all this out didactically.
> >
> > When people see that there is some “law” of nature, and that the law’s
> users claim that they can say things from the law, ignoring lots of other
> stuff about nature, in the common reflex it feels as if the law is somehow
> “enclosing” or “screening off” the values of the property-of-interest (a
> momentum in the future: will it be the same as a momentum now?), from all
> sorts of other distinctions that one could try to make (are we referring to
> the momentum of a hockey puck or an evangelical etc.)  So in a sense
> common-language impressionists are not vacuous in trying to put this under
> the broad umbrella-term “cause”.  I get why they imagine a family
> resemblance (Vygotskian term).  But compared to “cause” as the term works
> in dynamics (or even in Darwinism with selection being the
> cause-by-filtering for adaptation), the laws aren’t determining one outcome
> among many that could be possible, which all the “real” (IMO) notions of
> cause are doing.  Rather it is describing a pattern (unchanging momentum
> along trajectories under conditions with translation symmetries etc.) that
> is always witnessed.  This is why I prefer the characterization of it as a
> description of the standard scientific kind.  It would be like the
> statement that a boundary “has a causal relation” to an interior is the
> descriptive part — always true of that boundary in relation to that
> interior — whereas the particular values taken by the boundary actually
> *cause* the taking of the resulting values in the interior.
> >
> > Small points of sentence semantics, but I think they allow the sentences
> to conduct a coherent train of thought, rather than cross-cut it.
> >
> > But just my preferences, I guess.  ymmv.
> >
> > Eric
> >
> >
> >
> >> On Aug 24, 2024, at 5:52 AM, Jon Zingale <jonzingale at gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> "Degenerate constructs like a 1 group symmetry feel, to me, like
> metaphysical commitments..."
> >>
> >> Glen,
> >>
> >> In an attempt to understand Eric's response to me, I got to reading
> this group-theory dense paper reasoning with kernels and strata about
> spontaneous symmetry breaking[1]. It got me understanding your skepticism
> toward the trivial group as an instance of the no-hiding theorem. Can
> anyone ever really crumple up a napkin to the point that it becomes
> different in kind? I am in San Diego staring at the ocean, watching it
> tirelessly produce and destroy novelty all along the shore.
> >>
> >> [1]
> https://www.ihes.fr/~vergne/LouisMichel/publications/SponSymBr.1985_1.pdf
>
>
> --
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