[FRIAM] tolerance of intolerance

[glen]

Because feelings are higher order emotions, and empathy is *being in* the same higher order state as another, it's not *necessary* that the lower order states match. I.e. person A feels X as a higher order state of Y. But person B feels X as a higher order state of Z. Empathy's a form of robustness (multiple generator states result in the same/similar phenomenon).

This makes your phrasing "slightly less convincing" important. As an example, in a meeting the other day, somebody asserted that "women experience pain differently from men". In that context, it was a fine thing to say ... a recognition of diversity. But it's not only unsubstantiated, it's probably false. That's because the inter-individual variation in *expressions* of pain (we can't measure experience, only behavior while experiencing) absolutely swamps inter-group variation. I.e. the difference between how any 2 men or any 2 women "experience" pain is much higher than any difference between that of all women vs. all men or the average woman or the average man, etc.

Granted pain is, I think, more of an emotion than a feeling, at least acute pain, maybe not chronic pain. But the point still stands. When can we be wrong about our assessment of others feelings? And to what extent do we have fine-grained control over feelings? There seems to be a subset of researchers who think empathy requires person B feel *both* their own idiogenic feelings *and* person A's feelings in order for to be called "empathy". I.e. empathy isn't *being in* that exogenous high order state so much as being in an even higher order state where you feel both (your own and their) feelings ... what? ... simultaneously maybe?

That has to be the case for your story, here. And if so, then I agree. It should be easier to regulate a 2nd order state than a 1st order state. And the higher the order, the easier it would be to be disciplined about it ... I guess up to a point, like where the inferential chain is so long and wobbly it tricks you into believing pseudo-profound bullshit.

p.s. Sorry for all the emphasis marks (*). Sometimes I can't help it.

On 10/17/24 09:47, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> I think my gating is dynamic.   For example, a week ago a guy didn’t look and pulled in front me on my bicycle when I had the right of way.  I hit him hard enough to break bones.  He circled back and seemed fearful and contrite.   Had his emotions been even slightly less convincing, and especially if I thought he could absorb the cost, I would have made an example out of him.  That’s a combination of mentalizing and empathy.  But like a strong immune response, I will sometimes drive the empathy to zero in seconds.   It just doesn’t make sense to me why people would not discipline their feelings in such situations.
> 
> *From: *Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> on behalf of glen <gepropella at gmail.com>
> *Date: *Thursday, October 17, 2024 at 9:18 AM
> *To: *friam at redfish.com <friam at redfish.com>
> *Subject: *Re: [FRIAM] tolerance of intolerance
> 
> Yes. The model need not be structurally analogous to the referent. And the proof is in the pudding. If your estimator works better than those around you, as Eric seems to say, your cup's plenty full. But for me, there's a kind of frustration. I have friends who skillfully use filter bubbles. They may still, sporadically, have to interact in some relatively deep way with some outsider who doesn't have access to the lessons a failed prediction can teach. And they have coping mechanisms for those interactions (e.g. a Peter Principle boss or co-author). For some reason, I don't have the facility with the filter bubble. Or maybe I'm addicted to chaos <https://youtu.be/ntrMqThnzTU?si=pzlZj0OFd_rDjnf1 <https://youtu.be/ntrMqThnzTU?si=pzlZj0OFd_rDjnf1>>.
> 
> But there's still something there. Art like The Curse <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Curse_(American_TV_series <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Curse_(American_TV_series>)> seem like genius to me. They're little more than a derivation from things like Jackass <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jackass_(franchise <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jackass_(franchise>)>. But these things dig at something deep. Some of us, for whatever reason, experience empathy (which I'll define as "experiencing another's feelings", where feelings are higher order emotions). This trait seems distinct from mentalizing (modeling another's mind).
> 
> I'm pretty good at mentalizing, say, a Trump supporter. I don't have empathy for the Trump supporters I've met, though. And that seems important. It suggests to me that my estimator *could* be more accurate and efficient if I could somehow feel what they feel, especially if I could turn it on and off at will.
> 
> On 10/16/24 11:53, Marcus Daniels wrote:
>> I take the asocial view:  Reliable, rapidly retargetable prediction methods are all that matter.   Can one anticipate what will happen in the world and get ahead of it?
>> 
>> With that capability, there is no need to use truth as a cudgel.    The power the prediction methods provide are a deeper source of power.   Sure, the truths can be high order stabilities.  Who cares?
>> 

-- 
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