[FRIAM] projection propaganda

[glen]

OK. I kinda appreciate the attempt at a typology ... like the ontology trees rooted in "thing". It doesn't give me any sense of what y'all would admit is *not* a metaphor (or any conjugate or qualified version of it). At the very least, we could resort to something like semiotics where, given 1 triad, we can say things like "in this triad, the sign is not the object and the interpretant is not the sign and the object is not the interpretant". I mean, that's not very satisfying. But it would be better.

Another fix would be to identify if "metaphor" is really a usage mode, not an ontological property. Then we could say things like "left-brain" is being *used* as a metaphor for System 2. A role is a different thing from a thing playing a role. We could form other types of sentence that way, too, like "this coffee mug is being used as a rock" or "think of this coil of wire as if it were bookshelf".

Another thing that would help me is to draw a detailed distinction between a metaphor and an analogy. I've got a rich conceptual structure around analogies. But the way the token "metaphor" is used seems hopelessly sloppy to me.

But to start, it would be useful to get a couple of lists: 1) things that are not metaphors and 2) things that are metaphors. If we can't even do that, then it is truly hopeless and I'll continue avoiding the token and suspecting those who use it of bad faith.

On 7/16/25 9:43 AM, Prof David West wrote:
> I think we are using 'metaphor' in an inconsistent fashion.
> 
> My viewpoint begins with W. V. O. Quine:
> 
> /"Along the philosophical fringes of science, reasons may be found to question basic conceptual structures and to search for ways to reshape them. Old idioms are bound to fail, and only metaphor can begin to limn the new order"/
> 
> Then add McCormac's "lifecycle."  First is the *epiphor, *e.g., an atom is like a solar system, nucleus and orbiting electrons.
> 
> The familiar side of this relation suggests referents/aspects that can be looked for on the unfamiliar side.
> 
> If these referents/aspects are confirmed the paraphor evolves to be a lexical term.
> 
> If they are not confirmed, the metaphor becomes a dead metaphor and is discarded.
> 
> There are some special cases: the Bohr model of an atom as solar system, persists, not because referents/aspects are confirmed on both sides—quite the opposit—but because it is a useful tool for teaching elementary chemistry.
> 
> In my CS Masters Thesis and first professional publication, I coined the term, paraphor for a metaphor—specifically the brain-computer / computer-brain metaphor—where the referents are consistently contradicted but the metaphor persists because it fits a prevailing paradigm of thought about the subject area.
> 
> I am sympathetic to the assertion by Nick, et. al., "that it is all metaphor." but on very different grounds. In my case the "all is illusion" and antipathy to the verb to be.
> 
> davew
> 
> 
> On Wed, Jul 16, 2025, at 10:53 AM, glen wrote:
>  > I had intended to only address Dave's assertion "trapped within a
>  > narrowly defined model". But I'll try to tackle 2 objections at the
>  > same time. Again, my target is this "everything's a metaphor" bullshit.
>  >
>  > "Familiar" is a problematic term, here. Both Dave and Steve invoke the
>  > "definite" (ala Feferman's "what is definite"). When we use formal,
>  > schematic systems to translate a method from one domain to another,
>  > it's fine to call that "metaphor" at a cocktail party. But it's just
>  > not. Unbound/a-semantic terms are not metaphorical terms.
>  >
>  > Now, Steve's right to separate (A) from (B) because "explaining" is
>  > different from translation, at least in the naive science/knowledge
>  > sense. (In the less bound/grounded statistics sense, they're closer to
>  > the same concept. But it seems Steve means the science/knowledge
>  > sense.) And when we explain things this way (by allowing some flex and
>  > slop in some of the terms of the model so someone from another domain
>  > can do the mapping themselves), we're relying on the audience to have a
>  > bushy *context* so they can/could bind all the terms as concretely
>  > (definitely) as we've done in the source domain. If the 2 contexts
>  > (person modeling in the source domain & person modeling in the target
>  > domain) aren't equivalently rich, then "explanation" fails.
>  >
>  > And this is where Dave's wrong about multiscale modeling. The context
>  > at the large scale can be wildly different from the context at the
>  > meso- or micro-scales, similar between meso- and micro-scales. It
>  > hinges on whatever is meant by "narrow", of course. But multi-modal
>  > modeling not only exists, but is fairly common. There are even toolkits
>  > for doing it without giving it too much thought. All that's needed is
>  > to define (or even loosely describe) couplings between the modes so
>  > that they can sync up in time and space. Within the components,
>  > anything goes.
>  >
>  > On 7/15/25 2:27 PM, Steve Smith wrote:
>  >>   Literary metaphor is the tool which literary practicioners use to formalize (less rigorously by design?) their own models of their observation of the world.  Somewhere in between or elsewhere (to invoke a spatial metaphor?) lies the conceptual metaphors I claim we all use all the time to A) apply our intuitive experience/understanding in one familiar domain to another less familiar one; B) to explain things we (think we) understand in a domain we are familiar with to someone else who is more familiar with another domain.   Yes there is lossy compression and distortion involved in thee processes when used in good faith. When used in bad faith (e.g. political rhetoric), this becomes a feature (of the persuasion) not a bug (of the understanding/communication).
>  >>
>  >> </mansplainery>
>  >>
>  >>
>  >> On 7/15/2025 2:52 PM, Prof David West wrote:
>  >>> I like your framework and it has some direct relevance to the other part of this thread about McGilchrist.
>  >>>
>  >>> I would add multi-disciplinary ("broadly skilled") modelers to multiscale modelers and actually think them more important. Multiscale modelers might be able to avoid composition fallacies but will still be trapped within a narrowly defined model.
>  >>>
>  >>> I would also go out on a limb and claim that metaphor and metaphoric reasoning is key to being able to select a model that best fits.
>  >>>


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