[FRIAM] Mysticism: still effing the ineffable?

[glen]

Re the dig about non-existent communication: Yes, exactly. The reification of "thoughts" is exactly the kind of thing I'm targeting by claiming communication does not exist. Here you make the point again when talking about intention ("stick is only a lever when used as a lever") or efficient cause. It doubles down on the mind v body separation, albeit made subtle/complicated by swapping out other terms for "mind" and "body".

But if we take thoughts to be behaviors and only behaviors, then levers are just as real as sticks. The difference, I think, lies in whether and how much one "unrolls" or flattens the agent. We, on this list, have this conversation a lot. But we never resolve it. Teleonomy is compositional. And there's a good argument that it's a continuous composition. E.g. the agency of E. coli is just as much agency as that of a human. If there's a difference, it's one of degree, not kind.

There is an interesting edge case, though. We might imagine (fictitiously, in my opinion) a person has a thought that is *never* expressed, never "eff'd", even indirectly. It's purely a blip between neurons and never makes it out of the statistical blanket. Then we might suggest that if we omnisciently observe the exact same blip in someone else's head, then it's intersubjective without being participatory.

But I don't think that holds any water (even if it weren't fictitious) because those 2 people are evolved and developed in such a similar fashion that it's a no-brainer that similar blips will happen amongst similarly structured agents. (To those with opposable thumbs, every stick looks like a lever.) So, zoom out the scope and intersubjective becomes participatory. The only thing that changes is the scope.

Now, maybe that's what you mean by "context". And if so, that's great. But as your writing ticks on in the post, "context" seems to be beefed up with an assertion that intersubjective is a difference in kind from participatory. It could be as simple as changing the word. Instead of using "context", use something like "scope" or "scale" ... or maybe "logical depth" to indicate that what happens inside an organism is *very derived*, inferred, "down stream", or whatnot.

So a fully flattened agentic system effs a participatory X. But a fully rolled-up agentic system experiences an ineffable Y, but then effs X. Neither X nor Y are more or less real, or exhibiting different kinds of realness worthy of different qualifiers. But occult behaviors like Y can be (are) schematically re-bound to X, as the behaviorists want to do.

Some of us actively disbelieve agents can be unrolled/flattened. And using false/convenient preemptive registration enables them ... and, worse, enables those who still believe in the mind-body duality. I say make them do their own homework. Don't obey in advance.

On 6/30/25 9:19 AM, steve smith wrote:
> 
>> This might be worth hashing out. Or maybe I'm just posting it in lieu of journaling. I apologize for the length.
>>
> Thanks for noodling here...   I would claim what we are doing here is *attempting* the co-munication you often suggest doesn't exist ;)
> 
> 
>> Precision, prediction, repetition are all contextualized by the stigmergic stew ... just like intersubjectivity and participatory are.
>>
>> I think I'm trying to make the argument that intersubjectivity and participatory are the same thing and the only informal things are metaphysical/horizon things that can be practically dealt with by proxy, using observable stand-ins for the informal parts.
> 
> I distinguish participatory and intersubjective only in the context: Participatory (ala Wheeler et-al) suggests that the "intersubjectivity" applies to what we otherwise regard as an entirely objectively independent reality from observers in the physics/physical sense... matter and energy roughly. Intersubjective in my parlance is that which agential beings engage in.  "I am who you think I think I am" and "Your opinion of me is none of my business" and "Is that piece of paper with the writing (in cyrillic) stating '100 Rubles' an 'IOU' or a 'UoweMe'?".
> 
> Humans (and other agentic beings) operate on the symbolic emergent affordances of the emergent entities *as if* they are as "real" as physical objects and energetic relations as sticks and stones, even levers and missiles.   a stick is only lever when "used as a lever" and a stone is a ballistic missile only when used with that intention? And in fact they "are real" to the agentic beings because that is the universe of discourse they live in (right up until the ballistic missile crushes their head?)
> 
> The intersubjective is so pervasive (among humans and our familiars) IMO that we take it to be fundamental ground truth. The participatory appears to be the same at a whole different level of abstraction, but I suppose that pan-consciousness resolves that distinction?
> 
> I should also acknowledge your use of "the formal" and the intersubjectivity implied by "precise, predictable, repeatable" enough for what purpose and within what community of use/study.
> 
> I conjured my 7 modes of reality because I felt they held "differences that made a difference"  but as this discussion unfolds it is also fair to note where the differences make no difference?
> 
> It is effing hard to eff the ineffable...
> 
> 
>>
>>
>> On 6/27/25 3:53 PM, steve smith wrote:
>>> I find "intersubjective" particularly useful and "participatory" particularly compelling and agree that the more these are *formalized* the more useful/compelling they might become, but I don't see their subjectivity and contingency collapsing into the same kind of ontic/objectivity that Scientific Realism is grounded in?
>>>


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