[FRIAM] Will it have free will?
Pieter Steenekamp
pieters at randcontrols.co.za
Wed Mar 5 21:18:54 EST 2025
First, a quick note on biological computing—it’s a fascinating field. Note
to self: keep an eye on its development.
Now, back to the question: Will it have free will?
I assume this question is based on the premise that humans possess free
will. Personally, I doubt that we do (see the appendix below for Grok’s
take on free will).
However, if humans do have free will, then I believe both silicon-based and
biological computers will eventually develop it as well. While I can’t
prove it, I see no reason to believe that the human brain and mind possess
some uniquely special quality that cannot be replicated—whether in silicon
or artificial biology.
Appendix, Grok's take on free will:
Prompt: Please take a deep dive into free will.
Grok's reply: (https://x.com/i/grok/share/y64vGpfh7PGGYQlos6M7TjrUg)
Key Points
- Research suggests free will is complex, with debates on whether we can
make choices independently of prior causes.
- Some believe free will exists and is compatible with determinism,
while others argue it’s an illusion if everything is predetermined.
- Neuroscience shows brain activity may precede conscious decisions, but
interpretations vary, fueling controversy.
- The concept impacts morality and law, with no clear consensus, making
it a deeply debated topic.
Definition and Philosophical Debate
Free will is generally seen as the ability to make choices not fully
determined by past events or external forces. Philosophers are divided into
two main camps:
- Compatibilists argue that free will can coexist with determinism,
meaning our choices are free if they align with our desires, even if those
desires are caused by prior events. For example, choosing ice cream because
you love sweets is free will, even if your love for sweets was shaped by
upbringing.
- Incompatibilists believe free will requires choices not determined by
prior causes. They split into:
- Libertarians, who think free will exists and determinism is false,
suggesting some indeterminacy allows free choices.
- Hard determinists, who say if determinism is true, free will is an
illusion, as all actions are the result of prior causes.
Key arguments include the Consequence Argument, which says if determinism
is true, we can’t choose otherwise, and the Origination Argument, which
claims free will needs us to be the ultimate source of our actions, not
external causes. Compatibilists counter with ideas like Frankfurt’s
argument, showing moral responsibility without the ability to do otherwise,
and Strawson’s reactive attitudes, suggesting our moral judgments persist
regardless of determinism.
Scientific Insights
Neuroscience, particularly studies like Benjamin Libet’s, shows brain
activity (readiness potential) often precedes conscious decision-making,
suggesting decisions might be determined before we’re aware. However, this
is debated: some see it as evidence against free will, while others argue
we can still veto actions, preserving some freedom, especially for
significant decisions. Recent research, like a 2023 study challenging
Libet’s paradigm, suggests these findings may not fully disprove free will,
as experimental procedures can influence results (Neuroscience News
<https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/>).
Implications and Conclusion
The debate affects how we view morality and law—do we hold people
responsible for crimes if their actions were determined? While no consensus
exists, it seems likely that free will is a useful concept for society,
even if its reality is uncertain. The evidence leans toward a compatibilist
view for practical purposes, but the controversy ensures the discussion
continues.
------------------------------
A Comprehensive Exploration of Free Will: Philosophical, Scientific, and
Societal Dimensions
Free will, the notion that individuals can make choices independently of
deterministic forces, is a cornerstone of philosophical inquiry, scientific
research, and societal structures. This exploration delves into its
definitions, historical debates, scientific findings, and broader
implications, offering a detailed survey for those seeking a deeper
understanding.
Historical and Philosophical Context
The concept of free will has roots in ancient Greek philosophy and has
evolved through centuries of debate. At its core, free will is often
defined as the capacity to make decisions not wholly determined by prior
events or external influences, allowing for the possibility of choosing
otherwise in identical circumstances. However, this definition varies,
leading to divergent philosophical positions.
Key Philosophical Positions
Philosophers are broadly divided into compatibilists and incompatibilists,
each with nuanced subcategories:
- Compatibilism: This view posits that free will is compatible with
determinism. Compatibilists argue that freedom lies in acting according to
one’s own desires and preferences, even if those are determined by prior
causes. For instance, choosing to eat ice cream because you enjoy sweets is
considered free, even if your preference was shaped by upbringing.
- Hierarchical View: Proposed by Harry Frankfurt, this suggests free
will involves a harmony between first-order desires (what we want) and
second-order desires (what we want to want). If these align, we have free
will, regardless of determinism (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
<https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/>).
- Reasons-Responsive View: John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza argue
that free will is present if an agent can respond to reasons for action,
such as deciding to walk a dog based on the need for exercise, even in a
deterministic framework.
- Incompatibilism: This stance holds that free will cannot coexist with
determinism, splitting into two camps:
- Libertarianism: Advocates believe free will exists and requires
indeterminism, suggesting that some choices are not fully determined,
possibly due to quantum mechanics. They argue for a non-physical
aspect to
decision-making, allowing genuine freedom.
- Hard Determinism: This position accepts determinism and concludes
free will is an illusion, as all actions are the inevitable
result of prior
causes, leaving no room for alternative choices.
The debate hinges on definitions of freedom. Incompatibilists often define
free will as the ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same
circumstances, while compatibilists argue that “same circumstances”
includes internal states, allowing for different choices if those states
differ.
Major Arguments
To illustrate, consider the following table summarizing key arguments from
both sides, drawn from philosophical literature:
*Position*
*Main Arguments*
*Key Details and Examples*
*References/URLs*
Against Free Will (Incompatibilism)
-
Consequence Argument
: If determinism is true, no one has a choice about the future (Section 4a).
- Based on fixed past and laws of nature; uses modal operators ☐
(necessary) and N (no choice); concludes no free will if determinism is
true (e.g., Lincoln's assassination fixed).
Ginet (1966), van Inwagen (1983)
-
Origination Argument
: Free will requires being the originator of actions; determinism prevents
this (Section 4b).
- Valid argument: Premises 1 (free will needs origination), 2 (determinism
means external causation), 3 (no origination if externally caused);
concludes no free will if determinism is true (e.g., brainwashing vs.
self-origin).
Kane (1998)
For Free Will (Compatibilism)
-
Rejecting Incompatibilist Arguments
: Denies Origination Argument's premise 1 using hierarchical or
reasons-responsive views (Section 5a).
- Hierarchical view (Frankfurt, 1971): Free will is 1st/2nd-order desire
mesh, compatible with determinism. Reasons-responsive view (Fischer and
Ravizza, 1998): Free if responsive to reasons, e.g., Allison's dog walk
decision.
Frankfurt (1971), Fischer and Ravizza (1998)
-
Frankfurt’s Argument
: Moral responsibility possible without ability to do otherwise (Section
5b).
- Example: Allison decides to walk dog, chip ensures decision if she
didn't, but chip unused; still morally responsible despite no alternative
(Section 5b).
Frankfurt (1969), Widerker and McKenna (2003)
-
Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes
: Moral responsibility based on reactive attitudes, unaffected by
determinism (Section 5c).
- Reactive attitudes (gratitude, resentment) persist despite determinism;
not undermined for moral agents (e.g., bumping into someone vs. being
pushed); supports compatibilism.
P. Strawson (1963)
Pessimism
- Free will impossible whether determinism or indeterminism is true
(Section 3c).
- If determined, no control; if indeterministic (e.g., reasons occur
randomly), control still lacking, e.g., Allison's dog walk decision based
on chance.
Broad (1952), G. Strawson (1994)
The Consequence Argument, for instance, uses modal logic to argue that if
determinism is true, the past and laws of nature fix the future, leaving no
room for choice (e.g., Lincoln’s assassination was inevitable). The
Origination Argument adds that free will requires being the source of
actions, which determinism undermines, as seen in cases like brainwashing,
where actions are externally caused.
Compatibilists counter with Frankfurt’s thought experiment, where an agent
is responsible for a decision even if a device ensures the outcome, but
doesn’t intervene, showing responsibility without alternative
possibilities. Peter Strawson’s reactive attitudes further support this,
arguing that our natural responses like resentment or gratitude persist
regardless of determinism, maintaining moral responsibility.
Scientific Investigations
Scientific research, particularly in neuroscience, has added a new
dimension to the debate. Benjamin Libet’s 1983 study, using
electroencephalography (EEG), found that brain activity (readiness
potential) precedes conscious awareness of deciding to move, suggesting
decisions might be determined before we’re aware (Neuroscience of Free Will
Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will>). This
has been interpreted as evidence against free will, supporting hard
determinism.
However, criticisms abound. Recent research, such as a 2023 study by Dmitry
Bredikhin, challenges Libet’s paradigm, finding that readiness potential
may not correlate directly with decisions and that experimental procedures
can influence results, suggesting Libet’s findings may not conclusively
disprove free will (Neuroscience News
<https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/>). Additionally, some
argue that even if brain activity initiates actions, we can veto them,
preserving a form of free will, especially for significant decisions like
choosing a career over a trivial finger movement.
Other studies, like Uri Maoz’s 2019 research, explored meaningful choices,
such as deciding which nonprofit receives a $1,000 donation, finding that
brain activity patterns differ for decisions with real consequences,
potentially supporting free will in important contexts (The Johns Hopkins
News-Letter
<https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will>).
Conversely, neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky argues comprehensively that free
will doesn’t exist, viewing actions as the sum of biology and environment,
with no room for independent choice (New Scientist
<https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/>).
Societal and Practical Implications
The debate has profound implications for morality, law, and personal
identity. If free will is an illusion, can we hold criminals responsible
for their actions, or should we see them as products of their
circumstances? Psychological experiments show that undermining belief in
free will can increase cheating behavior, suggesting its belief is crucial
for social order (The Atlantic
<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/>).
Conversely, believing in free will supports systems of reward, punishment,
and personal responsibility, deeply embedded in legal and ethical
frameworks.
Quantum Mechanics and Beyond
Some speculate that quantum indeterminacy, where events are probabilistic
rather than deterministic, could provide a basis for free will, allowing
for non-determined choices. However, this is debated, with critics arguing
that randomness doesn’t equate to freedom, as it lacks control. This
remains a speculative area, with no consensus, adding another layer to the
complexity.
Conclusion
The question of free will remains unresolved, with philosophical arguments
like the Consequence and Origination supporting incompatibilism, and
compatibilist responses like Frankfurt’s and Strawson’s offering a middle
ground. Scientific findings, while challenging, do not conclusively
disprove free will, with recent research suggesting room for freedom in
meaningful decisions. Given its societal importance, it seems likely that
free will, even if partially illusory, is a valuable concept for
maintaining moral and legal systems. The controversy ensures the debate
will continue, reflecting humanity’s enduring quest to understand our
agency in a potentially deterministic universe.
Key Citations
- Free Will Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
<https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/>
- Free Will Is Only an illusion if You Are, Too Scientific American
<https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/free-will-is-only-an-illusion-if-you-are-too/>
- There's No Such Thing as Free Will The Atlantic
<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/>
- Neuroscience of Free Will Wikipedia
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will>
- A Fresh Look at Free Will: Challenging the Libet Paradigm Neuroscience
News <https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/>
- Science supports the existence of free will The Johns Hopkins
News-Letter
<https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will>
- Why free will doesn't exist, according to Robert Sapolsky New Scientist
<https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/>
On Wed, 5 Mar 2025 at 21:18, Marcus Daniels <marcus at snoutfarm.com> wrote:
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