[FRIAM] Subjectivity as a spectrum

Marcus Daniels marcus at snoutfarm.com
Sun Aug 30 16:18:23 EDT 2026


It depends on the context of the prediction, the utility of the prediction, and the cost of not having a quality model. I don’t think sharing or a notion of an agent plurality is needed for all use cases. An objective model needn’t be deeply explanatory if it is fit to purpose; a black box model can still be objective. 

From: Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> on behalf of Steve Smith <sasmyth at swcp.com>
Date: Sunday, August 30, 2026 at 11:03 AM
To: friam at redfish.com <friam at redfish.com>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity as a spectrum 


On 8/30/26 10:00 am, Marcus Daniels wrote: 

Agreed-upon -> model that makes predictions that can be observed and repeated. 
No human social system need be involved in that. 

https://arstechnica.com/ai/2026/08/anthropics-new-hardware-standard-lets-ai-agents-control-the-physical-world/ <https://arstechnica.com/ai/2026/08/anthropics-new-hardware-standard-lets-ai-agents-control-the-physical-world/> 

shared by whom, repeated by whom, and how are predictions compared and verified and by what principles? 
<ducking incoming shoes> 
But as I hope I conceded to EricS, I *can* invert the whole thing and (by faith) declare objectivity to be the fundament and everything else rubbings and shadows and derived therefrom. This is where my earliest linguistic training by my parents and peers steers me, not to mention a modest education in scientific and generally western thought and a lifetime of practice. 
So why invert it as I have (contingently? provocatively?) 
<more shoes> 



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