[FRIAM] Narrating Complexity

uǝlƃ ☣ gepropella at gmail.com
Tue Dec 19 16:18:13 EST 2017


Well, my point was that I think we *think* in complex adaptive systems (aka our bodies).  So, we don't think in narratives or signs, as far as I'm concerned.  But we can infer that Walsh (at least) does NOT claim "everything is a narrative" from the category on slide 60: "Narrative cognition (relation to other modes of cognition)".  Clearly narrative is just one mode for him.  I think it's safe to say that Stepney would agree, based on her "non-standard computation" page.

The real question is whether narrative is incapable of well-representing CAS, which is the "narrating complexity" premise.


On 12/18/2017 08:08 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> I would say that the idea of "narrative" is awfully close to Peirce's idea of sign.  So to a baseball player, a bat is for hitting baseballs; to a Klansman, it's for smashing heads.   Each of these "meanings?" evokes a distinct mini-story in different kinds of people.  When people say everything is a narrative, they are saying something very close to Peirce's "we think in signs."  All statements of meaning, implication, etc. are tripartite, requiring the mention of an interpretant, i.e. a conception from the point of view of which the thing means what it is said to mean  

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☣ uǝlƃ



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