[FRIAM] Why depth/thickness matters

[Stephen Guerin]

The opening of this article would be a complete counter position for an
Ecological Psychologist:

  "Students of perception often claim that perception, in general,
estimates the truth. They argue that creatures whose perceptions are more
true are also, thereby, more fit. Therefore, due to natural selection, the
accuracy of perception grows over generations, so that today our
perceptions, in most cases, approximate the truth."


As an alternative to the Evolutionary Psychology perspective bias of this
paper, Eric Charles may chime in on how Ecological Psychology and the
Neo-Gibsonians (Michael Turvey et al) would be aligned with your stance as
they also seek to minimizing the reliance on internal representations of
"the truth"/reality when explaining perception and action.

I'd further be interested to think about how Eric's example of the Aikido
perspective (which Critchlow would appreciate) in his paper could be
applied to responding to alt-right attacks in contrast to direct
confrontation:
  https://www.researchgate.net/publication/44571452_
Ecological_Psychology_and_Social_Psychology_It_is_Holt_or_Nothing

Not sure what Holt would say about Rosen's modeling relation.

-S

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On Wed, Feb 8, 2017 at 1:05 PM, glen ☣ <gepropella at gmail.com> wrote:

>
>   Natural selection and veridical perceptions
>   Justin T. Mark, Brian B. Marion, Donald D. Hoffman
>   http://cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/PerceptualEvolution.pdf
>
> > For the weak type, X ⊄ W in general, and g is a homomorphism. Perception
> need not faithfully mirror any subset of reality, but relationships among
> perceptions reflect relationships among aspects of reality. Thus, weak
> critical realists can bias their perceptions based on utility, so long as
> this homomorphism is maintained.
>
> To me, this evoked RRosen's "modeling relation", wherein he assumes the
> structure of inferential entailment must be similar to that of causal
> entailment (otherwise "there can be no science" -- Life Itself, pg. 58).
>
> > For the interface (or desktop) strategy, in general X ⊄ W and g need not
> be a homomorphism.
>
> This more closely resembles what I (contingently) believe to be true.
> Hoffman goes on to define and play some games, the results of which (he
> thinks) show that the interface strategy, under evolution, can demonstrate
> how fake news might dominate.  But my interest lies more in the idea that
> one's internal structure does matter with respect to whether or not one's
> likely to _believe_ false statements.  And I'm arguing that flattening that
> internal structure in a kind of holographic principle simply doesn't work
> with this sort of machine.
>
> An interesting potential contradiction in my own thought lies in:
>
> 1) I reject Rosen's assumption of the modeling relation (i.e. inference ≉
> cause), and
> 2) I still think intra-individual circularity is necessary for biomimicry.
>
> --
> ☣ glen
>
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