[FRIAM] Any non-biological complex systems?

[Nick Thompson]

SS, 

 

I was going to let this go, but now see that I can’: 

 

.  I did hear Nick ask if a system could (somehow?) choose it's own boundaries and dismissed it as (yet another) distraction

 

I hate anthropomorphism in all its forms, so despite the plain meaning of these words, I did not mean this anthropomorphically. 

 

My “high bit” as Owen used to say, is distinguishing between the thing we are explaining and the thing we are explaining it WITH.  If I have anything to contirubute to this conversation it is to make you all aware that you keep sliding back and forth between those two things. So when I asked SG if a system “get’s a voice” in whether it is a system or not, I was only asking if there was a “thing-with-properties” out there that we are curious about before we begin bring to bear all the heavy weaponry of complexity talk.  My candidate for the “thing that excites our curiosity” is multilevel systems, whether or not they involve organisms.  I promise I have NO INTENTION of asking a huriicane if it is a system, and I wouldn’t trust the answer if I got one. 

 

Also, I don’t one understands what philosophy can do for science if you call it sophistry.  If you were happily painting the floor of a room and I pointed out that you had neglected to leave yourself a way out of the room, you wouldn’t call that sophistry, no matter how well the painting was going at the moment or how beautiful the painted floor looked.  That’s the role of philosophy in science. 

 

Nick  

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] On Behalf Of Steven A Smith
Sent: Monday, May 29, 2017 12:02 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam at redfish.com>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Any non-biological complex systems?

 

Glen -

> I think the sophistry around the defn of "model" is important, but a 

> distraction from this conversation.  (I've got a few publications that 

> target it almost directly if anyone cares.)

Yes, it was an aside, but I think an important one to help Nick follow/focus with us.

>    As Russ and Nick point out, this conversation is about the boundary and its ontological status.  Russ is leaping a bit further ahead and focusing on an _effect_ of the boundary while Nick (and I) are focusing on the prerequisite for symbol machines.

I appreciate your stating it this way.  I did hear Nick ask if a system could (somehow?) choose it's own boundaries and dismissed it as (yet 

another) distraction but would now like to hear more.   It felt like an 

anthropomorphism to suggest a system could "choose" it's own boundaries, but I'm open to having that explored if anyone can/will.

 

Similarly, your and Stephen's sparring about boundaries (compartments in 

a refrigerator?) and the distinction of systems/subsystems, etc.    was 

not something I felt able to parse out completely, so I'm hoping your post here leads to more elaboration of that question.

 

> 

> My claim is that Stephen's 3 examples are _not_ systems, much less complex systems at all because they are idealized out of their context.  In order to be systems, they have to have some sort of objectively determined boundary (like a petri dish).  Any bounded gob of goo can be thought of as a system.  An agent, however, must be _closed_ under some operation.  Hence, all agents are systems.  But not all systems are agents.  Whether the agent's boundary is loopy, self-defining, or not is the subject of Rosen's work (from which Kauffman's is derivative).

> 

> Whether a symbol machine can be merely a system (with an objectively determined boundary) or must be an agent (with some form of closure) is an important question.

I'm waiting with 'bated breath, and trying to guess if this is directly relevant to Russ's comment/question about "living in two worlds" of symbol AND energy processing (if I understood his point correctly).

 

I wish I had more to contribute myself, perhaps I should study Rosen again, some more.

 

- Steve

> 

> 

> On 05/28/2017 08:40 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:

>> [NST==>Ok, but the question before us is, Does the system itself “get 

>> to participate” in determining its own boundaries.  <==nst]

> On 05/28/2017 08:35 AM, Russ Abbott wrote:>

>> Symbolic processing, including computers, is a step beyond switches. 

>> Half a century ago Newell and Simon defined computers as physical symbol machines.

>> We and many biological organisms are  physical symbol machines also. 

>> I think that's an important way to look at it.

>> 

>> The thing about physical symbol machines is that the rules of 

>> causation they follow are more complex than those of physics.

> 

 

 

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