[FRIAM] better simulating actual FriAM

thompnickson2 at gmail.com thompnickson2 at gmail.com
Mon Jul 20 15:38:46 EDT 2020


Nick (to Jon)
Re Gen Phen: That's the Whole Point, here.  There are two different
distinctions, here, one apparently arising form computation (?) and one
arising from biology.  Glen originally mentioned a GENerator/ PHENomenon
distinction which seems to be the broader of the two and does not forbid
downward causation.  More recently we have been talking about the
GENotype/PHENotype distinction which is narrower and does -
historically-forbid downward causation.  So, I think we need to spell the
words out completely from now on, so we know which game we are playing. 

Your reference to language games raises the question of what sort of "game"
are we playing when we talk about causation.  One rule of that game, I
think, which I may have violated myself in this discussion, is that things
cannot cause things.  Only events can cause events.   The reason is that the
notion of cause involves temporal order and things (as opposed to the
arrival of things or the placement of things or the removal things) cannot
be in a temporal order.  I am wondering if adherence to this discipline
might make the whole problem of downward causation disappear?  So, the
addition of the 5th stick (an event) to previous four sticks CAUSES the
other 4 sticks not to rotate (an event) and CAUSES the structure to be
strong (another event).  Notice that this formulation appears to forbid us
to say that the constraints on the rotation of the other four sticks
provided by the fifth stick CAUSES the strengthening of the structure
because those two events are temporally inextricable.  What IS the relation
between those two facts if not a causal one?  I think I would argue that
it's a constitutive relation; ie, the rotational constraints constitute the
greater strength of the square with the fifth stick.  

Nick
ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
 
Jon to Nick 


-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> On Behalf Of Jon Zingale
Sent: Monday, July 20, 2020 11:07 AM
To: friam at redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] better simulating actual FriAM

Maybe I am misremembering (which clearly happens), but didn't the discussion
of gen-phen-like maps arise in the context of goal-function distinctions? In
this latter class, we included the thermostat system where constraining
systems to Weismann's doctrine would not be meaningful. Clearly, in the
goal-function system, an individual that changes the thermostat dial because
they prefer the house to be at 60 degrees rather than 80 degrees (a
variation on function) performs downwardly to affect the tolerance of the
piece of metal or mercury switch (a variation on goal). Are we breaking the
semantic game by now demanding that our admissable gen-phen-like maps
preserve Weismann's doctrine? I understood Glen's evocation to not be so
constrained.



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