[FRIAM] Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve

[uǝlƃ ☣]

Thanks. I've read the Chemero one. And I've read something by Hutto, but I don't think it was that. Regardless, my (maybe testable) hypothesis is what I'm interested in:

If a black box demonstrates behavior that can't be captured by any (known) algorithm, then that would be an indication that something (unmodelable) was happening inside the black box. And that unmodelable thing might be called "thinking".

We can extend that, I think, to "surprising behavior", which I think gets at what we usually mean by "thinking". If a black box demonstrates a long memory with not-quite-but-almost predictable behavior, then we might accuse it of thinking.

Both would be counter-examples to Dave's assertion.

On 5/5/20 2:55 PM, Eric Charles wrote:
> So, there are a few varieties of that right now, that are trying to get along well together. Emobidied Cognition, Enactivism, Ecological Psychlogy, Extended Cognition, etc. As a starting point for that work, especially for the more mathematically inclined, I recommend "Radical Embodied Cognitive Science" by Tony Chemero <http://psychsciencenotes.blogspot.com/2011/02/new-reading-group-chemero-2009-radical.html>, for the more philosophically inclined, I recommend "Radicalizing Enactivism" by Dan Hutto <https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/radicalizing-enactivism>, and for the more general thinker interested in an overview of cool ideas I recommend "Beyond the Brain" by Louise Barrett <http://fixingpsychology.blogspot.com/2012/01/beyond-brain-review-out.html>. 

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