[FRIAM] Movement vs. Behavior, and what's in the Black Box

[Eric Charles]

Frank,
So far as I can tell, no one is denying thought. I'm certainly not. There
are phenomenon at play, and one of the things that happens when you science
a phenomenon is that you end up with descriptions of the phenomenon (and
explanations for the phenomenon) that don't match mundane intuitions about
things,. We should expect that the science of psychology defines its
subject matter different from mundane intuitions in the same way that the
science of physics and the science of biology did for their respective
subject matters: Sometimes those definitions end up pretty close to the
mundane intuitions of a given era, other times you end up with definitions
that are radically different.

In these contexts, I like to remind people how mindbogglingly unintuitive
Newtonian momentum is. When was the last time you moved an object and it
didn't come to rest? Aristotle's system is much more intuitive.

-----------
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist
American University - Adjunct Instructor
<echarles at american.edu>


On Sun, May 10, 2020 at 10:46 AM Frank Wimberly <wimberly3 at gmail.com> wrote:

> As I said to Nick approximately a dozen years ago, people who deny thought
> must not have it.  I don't mean that as an insult.  It's that for me
> thought is the one thing I can't deny because it's the first *experience*
> At that point Nick dismisses me as a Cartesian.
>
> ---
> Frank C. Wimberly
> 140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
> Santa Fe, NM 87505
>
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>
> On Sun, May 10, 2020, 8:34 AM uǝlƃ ☣ <gepropella at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Ha! Well, by ignoring the poignant example, you've ignored my entire
>> point. And it's that point by which I can't agree with the unmoored
>> distinction you're making. The celery example isn't about being alive.
>> Sorry for injecting that into it. The celery example is about *scale*.
>> Celery's movement *is* movement. An antenna's behavior *is* its movement. I
>> introduced antennas' behavior in order to help demonstrate that behavior is
>> orthogonal to life.
>>
>> Now, the distinction you're making by saying that behavior is a proper
>> subset of movement, would be fine *if* you identify some movement that is
>> *not* behavior. I didn't see that in the Old Dead Guy text you quoted ...
>> maybe I missed it?  Anyway, that's the important category and celery and
>> antennas fit right in.
>>
>> But the behavior/movement discussion (including observer-ascribed
>> intention) is a bit of a distraction. What we're actually talking about is
>> *hidden* states (a.k.a. "thinking", maybe extrapolated to "consciousness").
>> So, the examples of light-following or higher order objective targeting is
>> like trying to run before you can walk. Why do that? Why not talk about,
>> say, the hidden states of an antenna? If we could characterize purely
>> *passive* behavior/movement, we might be able to characterize *reactive*
>> movement. And if we do that, then we can talk about the complicatedness (or
>> complexity) of more general *transformations* from input to output. And
>> then we might be able to talk about I⇔O maps whose internal state can (or
>> can't) be estimated solely from their I&O.
>>
>> We don't need all this philosophical rigmarole to talk about the
>> complexity of I⇔O maps.
>>
>> On 5/9/20 6:17 PM, Eric Charles wrote:
>> > Ok, so it sounds like we agree there is a distinction can be made
>> between behavior and "mere movement". So what is that difference? I would
>> argue, following E. B. Holt, that it is the presence of intentionality.
>> Note crucially that the directedness of the behavior described below is
>> descriptive, /not /explanatory. The intention is not a force behind the
>> behavior, it is a property of the behavior-to-circumstance mapping that can
>> be demonstrated by varying conditions appropriately.
>> > [...]
>> > P.S. I'm going to try to ignore the celery challenge, because while we
>> recognize plants as living, we do not typically talk about them as
>> behaving. And I think the broad issue of living vs. not-living is a
>> different issue. We probably should talk about plants behaving a bit more
>> than we normally do, but I think it is worth getting a handle on what we
>> mean in the more normal seeming cases before we try to look for
>> implications like those.
>>
>>
>> --
>> ☣ uǝlƃ
>>
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