[FRIAM] hidden

Tue May 19 20:31:47 EDT 2020

You may consider the question closed as soon as you tell me the name of my
6th grade classmate. :-)

On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 6:28 PM Frank Wimberly <wimberly3 at gmail.com> wrote:

> My mind doesn't feel trivialized, Jon.  I like being an example--of most
> things that I am.
>
> Frank
>
> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 5:56 PM Jon Zingale <jonzingale at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> EricS,
>>
>> Philosophically, I most closely identify with what I perhaps could call
>> phenomenological-materialism. For me all ideas we have, we have exactly
>> because they are *afforded* by the world. There may not be unicorns, but
>> horses and animals with horns do exist. Unicorns then are *afforded*.
>> The role of
>> the trump card in a game of bridge† is nowhere to be found in the atomic
>> structure of the card, but the role is *afforded* by our world. Straight
>> lines
>> and symmetry groups may be nowhere measured, but are exactly accessible
>> to us because we exist in a world which *affords* them. For me, this is
>> how I
>> thinly justify not needing a spiritual or platonic meta-physics. Also on
>> a personal
>> level, I *do* believe that mind is public. I am interested in following
>> this line, in part,
>> because I wish to understand exactly how wrong I am.
>>
>> While Tononi (in the development of his IIT)
>> <https://www.academia.edu/39597783/Integrated_information_theory_of_consciousness_an_updated_account>
>> aims to be very clear about
>> the *reducibility floor* of consciousness, he also puts forth positive
>> assertions
>> about what consciousness is/isn't. For example, Tononi claims that
>> *The internetis not conscious exactly because it isn't fully integrated*.
>> The technical details of
>> his concept of *fully integrated* can be summarized as the observation
>> that when I
>> go to a wikipedia page there aren't bits of my email and other webpages
>> mixed in.
>> He, like I believe we are attempting here, is working to develop a formal
>> model of
>> consciousness. It may be that we are committing the sin of naming things
>> and
>> abstracting, and that we will ultimately have in our hands nothing but a
>> silly-horribly-
>> wrong tool. I feel that doing this kind of work is a wonderful break from
>> binge
>> watching another season of 'Eureka'.
>>
>> Frank,
>>
>> You and Nick have been arguing for and against (respectively) the private
>> nature
>> of mind as long as I have known you both. I apologize if placing you in
>> these
>> examples was in bad taste. I certainly believe you have a rich and
>> beautiful
>> mind, and I will be careful in the future to not trivialize it by using
>> your
>> mind in examples. For the record, anything I had said in regards to your
>> mind,
>> I meant to say about my mind as well.
>>
>> Glen, Steve,
>>
>> If I understand Glen's comprehension of strings example, there are many
>> arbitrary
>> functions which can act as a *choice of representative* for a given
>> *extensional*
>> transformation. To some limited extent, the claim that *the mind is not
>> opaque* may
>> be the claim that there are more structured categories than Sets with
>> arbitrary
>> functions which are applicable to the mind/behavior problem. If we had
>> such a
>> category, I might go so far as to define a fiber over each point on the
>> holographic
>> surface and consider liftings to a bundle or sheaf. Now while
>> simultaneously **ducking**
>> fistfuls of hay from various strawman arguments posed, I suggest that it
>> may be
>> reasonable to define a connection (damn, are we back to covariance) on
>> the bundle.
>> Doing so could be one meaningful way to interpret *tracing a thought*.
>>
>> With regards to the discussion about our holographic surface, I could use
>> more
>> clarification on the lossy/lossless property. I assume we agree that
>> sorting is
>> not dual to shuffling. For instance, defining the type of a shuffling
>> algorithm
>> does not require Ord
>> <http://zvon.org/other/haskell/Outputprelude/Ord_c.html> to be a class
>> constraint, where it *is* required for sorting.
>> If we are claiming that the information found on our holographic surface
>> is
>> complete, I would like to think we are claiming it to be lossless‡. At
>> the end
>> of the day, it may be the case that we will never know the ontological
>> status of
>> information reversibility through a black hole. Am I wrong about this? If
>> our
>> holographic surface isn't reversible, is hashing perhaps a better analogy?
>>
>> If in the limit of behavioral investigation we find no more semantic
>> ambiguity than
>> the semantic ambiguities we experience when attempting to understand an
>> others
>> language, I may wish to consider the question closed in favor of the mind
>> being
>> public. I do suspect we would run into many many more (perhaps
>> unresolvable)
>> problems along the way, but this exercise is exactly an exercise to me.
>> Learning
>> the nature of these problems is reward enough.
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> †) This example coming from Rota's lectures on 'The end of objectivity
>> <https://www.worldcat.org/title/end-of-objectivity-a-series-of-lectures-delivered-at-mit-in-october-1973/oclc/32972152>
>> '.
>>
>> ‡) Bzip is a great example of a seemingly lossy algorithm that amazingly
>> enough
>> is not. The fact that the Burrows-Wheeler
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burrows%E2%80%93Wheeler_transform>
>> transform is invertible and is statistically useful
>> more-often-than-it-is-not provides a high bar for what can be
>> accomplished with data
>> compression.
>> -- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. .
>> ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
>> un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
>>
>
>
> --
> Frank Wimberly
> 140 Calle Ojo Feliz
> Santa Fe, NM 87505
> 505 670-9918
>

-- 
Frank Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz
Santa Fe, NM 87505
505 670-9918
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/attachments/20200519/106758ed/attachment.html>