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Tue May 19 20:28:06 EDT 2020

My mind doesn't feel trivialized, Jon.  I like being an example--of most
things that I am.

Frank

On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 5:56 PM Jon Zingale <jonzingale at gmail.com> wrote:

> EricS,
>
> Philosophically, I most closely identify with what I perhaps could call
> phenomenological-materialism. For me all ideas we have, we have exactly
> because they are *afforded* by the world. There may not be unicorns, but
> horses and animals with horns do exist. Unicorns then are *afforded*. The
> role of
> the trump card in a game of bridge† is nowhere to be found in the atomic
> structure of the card, but the role is *afforded* by our world. Straight
> lines
> and symmetry groups may be nowhere measured, but are exactly accessible
> to us because we exist in a world which *affords* them. For me, this is
> how I
> thinly justify not needing a spiritual or platonic meta-physics. Also on a
> personal
> level, I *do* believe that mind is public. I am interested in following
> this line, in part,
> because I wish to understand exactly how wrong I am.
>
> While Tononi (in the development of his IIT)
> <https://www.academia.edu/39597783/Integrated_information_theory_of_consciousness_an_updated_account>
> aims to be very clear about
> the *reducibility floor* of consciousness, he also puts forth positive
> assertions
> about what consciousness is/isn't. For example, Tononi claims that
> *The internetis not conscious exactly because it isn't fully integrated*.
> The technical details of
> his concept of *fully integrated* can be summarized as the observation
> that when I
> go to a wikipedia page there aren't bits of my email and other webpages
> mixed in.
> He, like I believe we are attempting here, is working to develop a formal
> model of
> consciousness. It may be that we are committing the sin of naming things
> and
> abstracting, and that we will ultimately have in our hands nothing but a
> silly-horribly-
> wrong tool. I feel that doing this kind of work is a wonderful break from
> binge
> watching another season of 'Eureka'.
>
> Frank,
>
> You and Nick have been arguing for and against (respectively) the private
> nature
> of mind as long as I have known you both. I apologize if placing you in
> these
> examples was in bad taste. I certainly believe you have a rich and
> beautiful
> mind, and I will be careful in the future to not trivialize it by using
> your
> mind in examples. For the record, anything I had said in regards to your
> mind,
> I meant to say about my mind as well.
>
> Glen, Steve,
>
> If I understand Glen's comprehension of strings example, there are many
> arbitrary
> functions which can act as a *choice of representative* for a given
> *extensional*
> transformation. To some limited extent, the claim that *the mind is not
> opaque* may
> be the claim that there are more structured categories than Sets with
> arbitrary
> functions which are applicable to the mind/behavior problem. If we had
> such a
> category, I might go so far as to define a fiber over each point on the
> holographic
> surface and consider liftings to a bundle or sheaf. Now while
> simultaneously **ducking**
> fistfuls of hay from various strawman arguments posed, I suggest that it
> may be
> reasonable to define a connection (damn, are we back to covariance) on the
> bundle.
> Doing so could be one meaningful way to interpret *tracing a thought*.
>
> With regards to the discussion about our holographic surface, I could use
> more
> clarification on the lossy/lossless property. I assume we agree that
> sorting is
> not dual to shuffling. For instance, defining the type of a shuffling
> algorithm
> does not require Ord
> <http://zvon.org/other/haskell/Outputprelude/Ord_c.html> to be a class
> constraint, where it *is* required for sorting.
> If we are claiming that the information found on our holographic surface is
> complete, I would like to think we are claiming it to be lossless‡. At the
> end
> of the day, it may be the case that we will never know the ontological
> status of
> information reversibility through a black hole. Am I wrong about this? If
> our
> holographic surface isn't reversible, is hashing perhaps a better analogy?
>
> If in the limit of behavioral investigation we find no more semantic
> ambiguity than
> the semantic ambiguities we experience when attempting to understand an
> others
> language, I may wish to consider the question closed in favor of the mind
> being
> public. I do suspect we would run into many many more (perhaps
> unresolvable)
> problems along the way, but this exercise is exactly an exercise to me.
> Learning
> the nature of these problems is reward enough.
>
> Jon
>
> †) This example coming from Rota's lectures on 'The end of objectivity
> <https://www.worldcat.org/title/end-of-objectivity-a-series-of-lectures-delivered-at-mit-in-october-1973/oclc/32972152>
> '.
>
> ‡) Bzip is a great example of a seemingly lossy algorithm that amazingly
> enough
> is not. The fact that the Burrows-Wheeler
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burrows%E2%80%93Wheeler_transform>
> transform is invertible and is statistically useful
> more-often-than-it-is-not provides a high bar for what can be accomplished
> with data
> compression.
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-- 
Frank Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz
Santa Fe, NM 87505
505 670-9918
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