[FRIAM] Dennett on agency

[Eric Charles]

"I intend to check the mail in a few minutes.  I am not doing it now.
Nobody else knows of my plan until you read this.  Why can't I validly say
that I have that intention?"

You CAN say that you have that intention. The Big Questions are 1) To what
are you referring when you say that. 2) Could you be in error regarding the
thing being referred to?

Once we work out the answer to Question 1 we will, Nick and others of his
ilk would assert, find that it would be more grammatically clean to not use
the word "have", because that implies a thing that can be possessed. I *have
*a bank account; I *do *my morning exercises. Of course, some other
languages don't distinguish those verbs in exactly the way English tends
to... and English varies from place to place... so your mileage may vary.
For example, under some circumstances "I am going to have tea" could be
synonymous with "I am going to do high-tea."

At any rate, some of us would assert that when you say "I intend to check
the mail in a few minutes" you are predicting/asserting things you will do
in the future (barring some dramatic change in circumstances) and that you
are an imperfect predictor of such things. To reify that
pattern-of-future-behavior as a thing you "have" now is, at the least, some
sort of category error.

And, of course, if you aren't trying to do philosophy of psychology or
scientific psychology, then your using vernacular phrasing is no worse than
similar things that people in other sciences might object to. For example,
you can find physicists who will get snippy over whether it is correct to
say that you add cold to something (vs. take away heating), but, like, if
it's a cooking show or a casual conversation, it really doesn't matter
much.
<echarles at american.edu>


On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 4:55 PM Frank Wimberly <wimberly3 at gmail.com> wrote:

> I intend to check the mail in a few minutes.  I am not doing it now.
> Nobody else knows of my plan until you read this.  Why can't I validly say
> that I have that intention?
>
> ---
> Frank C. Wimberly
> 140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
> Santa Fe, NM 87505
>
> 505 670-9918
> Santa Fe, NM
>
> On Tue, Oct 20, 2020, 2:27 PM <thompnickson2 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Russ,
>>
>>
>>
>> I have not had time to follow this thread, but just want to remind you
>> what my first response to your question would be.  Intentions are not the
>> sorts of thing we “have”.  They are things that we do.  They are of a
>> higher order than knee jerks, or even apple bites,  but they are patterns
>> in behavior all the same.
>>
>>
>>
>> I have busy because I signed up to do all sorts of things in September
>> because I had nothing to do, and to my horror and surprise, every thing I
>> signed up for, bore fruit and now I am overwhelmed.   I have a prejudice
>> against Dennett.  I think he worries too much about his standing with the
>> Big Kids at Harvard and trying NOT to violate vernacular ways of thinking
>> so much as to dent his royalties.   And I am jealous of him.
>>
>>
>>
>> So there.
>>
>>
>>
>> Hope you are well
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick
>>
>>
>>
>> Nicholas Thompson
>>
>> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
>>
>> Clark University
>>
>> ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com
>>
>> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> *On Behalf Of *Russ Abbott
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 20, 2020 12:07 PM
>> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
>> friam at redfish.com>
>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Dennett on agency
>>
>>
>>
>> Not sure what the point is. Larger systems can exploit information and
>> "pick of scars." Cells in that sense are larger systems. I'm confused about
>> what that is supposed to add to the discussion.
>>
>>
>>
>> Computer programs can certainly be described using intentional language.
>> Does that mean that a computer program can have intention? If so, that
>> seems to degrade the notion of intent.
>>
>>
>>
>> -- Russ Abbott
>> Professor, Computer Science
>> California State University, Los Angeles
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 9:23 AM jon zingale <jonzingale at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> ... and why tornados fail to have it. A key feature appears to be that
>> agents
>> have a history that makes a difference, can exploit information the way a
>> thermostat can. Electrons or molecular motors, for instance, don't pick up
>> scratches or scars. Sean Carroll adds that agents participate in the arrow
>> of time.
>>
>> Queued up to the relevant part of the discussion:
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8yZw4wxvnVQ&ab_channel=SeanCarroll&t=1670s
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
>>
>> - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
>> un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
>>
>> - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
>> un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
>>
> - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
> un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/attachments/20201021/c5330f64/attachment.html>