[FRIAM] Free Will in the Atlantic

[Marcus Daniels]

The "in principle" is really a social qualifier.   What it would look like to meaningful talk about or analyze free will?   In absence of an agreement about acceptable metaphysics, concepts like punishment lack any substance.  It is just stuff people with power do to people with less power.

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> On Behalf Of jon zingale
Sent: Friday, April 2, 2021 2:00 PM
To: friam at redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Free Will in the Atlantic

Along similar lines as DaveW, I make no case for *free will*. I wish to point out where metaphysical appeals are introduced in the process of establishing determinism. It appears to me that ours is one where we need to wait for the future to happen before we can account for it. Whenever we guess correctly, we are impressed or amazed by the accuracy of the prediction. The universe hasn't unfolded and so we create models that, rather than *anticipating* the arrival of phenomenal differences, perpetually update priors post hoc. 

Objects, themselves, are defined by what one can think to do with them. As the universe unfolds, all objects are rewritten. A trained model may be determined, but whether training itself is determined is what is at stake. A metaphysical assumption is made when we posit the existence of a global state of affairs, one that we know we cannot know. The *in principle* brackets the undecidability associated with determining the actual function, while still not providing a satisfactory mechanism accounting for the changes we must introduce to the determination of said function. Faith in the existence of such a function is a fine metaphysical belief.



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