[FRIAM] Free Will in the Atlantic

[jon zingale]

Along similar lines as DaveW, I make no case for *free will*. I wish to point
out where metaphysical appeals are introduced in the process of establishing
determinism. It appears to me that ours is one where we need to wait for the
future to happen before we can account for it. Whenever we guess correctly,
we are impressed or amazed by the accuracy of the prediction. The universe
hasn't unfolded and so we create models that, rather than *anticipating* the
arrival of phenomenal differences, perpetually update priors post hoc. 

Objects, themselves, are defined by what one can think to do with them. As
the universe unfolds, all objects are rewritten. A trained model may be
determined, but whether training itself is determined is what is at stake. A
metaphysical assumption is made when we posit the existence of a global
state of affairs, one that we know we cannot know. The *in principle*
brackets the undecidability associated with determining the actual function,
while still not providing a satisfactory mechanism accounting for the
changes we must introduce to the determination of said function. Faith in
the existence of such a function is a fine metaphysical belief.



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