[FRIAM] the cancellation arc

Thu Sep 16 14:41:31 EDT 2021

Glen, 

Are we mixing up monadism with monism?  I think the epistemic/ontological distinction fails under monism.  Either everything is ontological or everything is epistemic, and in any case there is no in-principle distinction to be made between them.  

Under peirce's triadic monism all experience is cognition (yes, even body experiences) and all cognition is in signs, themselves having always three "arguments".  (Sorry, =? Variables, things-you-have-to-have-there-or-the-expression-is-incomplete. ) So, not only is there a point of view in every proposition, the proposition is incomplete until the point of view is made explicit, or at least well understood between the propositor and the propositee.   Asserting that the phenomenon/epiphenomonon distinction is relative to a point of view is no challenge to that distinction.  The whole discussion concerns the shifting of frames and the search for a frame that will hold them both.  So, I don't dispute your relativism;  I just insist that it's already built into my line of thought.  And sometimes I sense that you NEED ME TO BELIEVE that there is only one reality and that it is mine.  That's not what a Peircean monism asserts.  Even mine.  

Since  you assert that you disagree and yet there is no way I can steel-man your position that is incompatible with this relativistic monism, I need to talk to you.  So, tomorrow, around ten am your time, I will extricate myself from the Mosquito Infested Bog, and try to reach Vfriam from my car.   We'll see how that goes.  

If we can get beyond a "relativisticker that thou" pissing contest, I would like to go on and discuss this difference between body knowledge and brain knowledge as if the brain were not, after all, a part of the body.  (Sorry, that was a bit of straw=manning, for which I need to apologize, but for clarity, need not delete).  Your actual distinction was between Cognitive knowledge and Body knowledge.  Many people (perhaps not you) want to treat this as an entirely different kind of knowledge, and I think a lot of evil can spring from such a radical differentiation.  For me, it is once again an instance of frame shifting and the search for a frame that will embrace both the "cognitive" and the "somatic" frame.  I would frame them both as modes of experience, say, urgent and reflective.  Which of these modes of experience "proves out" then becomes an empirical question.  Writing this, I now see that built into my thinking is the idea that a kind of hyper-reflective experience (science?) is the ultimate test of the truth of all experience.  Dave, I guess will challenge this with all his will.  But I will counter that it is not that dreams cannot reveal truths, it is that, a dream that has revealed a truth, will prove out in the long run.  Thus, if you dreamt of unicorns in your flower beds last night, you will either find unicorn foot prints in the soft turf around your petunias when you wake up or recognize that petunias make you horny.  Either of those, for me, would constitute a truth, one about unicorns, the other about you. 

Of course we can always fall back on the Shirley/Kaye distinction, that I valorize the search for stability while you valorize embracing chaos.  I would of course try to find a stable frame that would embrace these both (the Apollonian/Dionesian distinction, for instance) which effort, I guess, you would have to resist. 

Hope to see you tomorrow.    

Nick 
Nick Thompson
ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> On Behalf Of u?l? ?>$
Sent: Thursday, September 16, 2021 1:40 PM
To: friam at redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] the cancellation arc

Since I'm bored with this webinar, I figured I'd type up some more troll food:

The _epi-_ prefix basically means "near". So a phenomenon is, somehow, ontologically localized and an epiphenomenon is epistemically distant. But that "secondary" phenomenon need not be ontologically distant, which is where the causality problems with epiphenomena enter the discussion. Frank raised these causal problems nicely awhile back with the discussion of colliders and forks.

Being agnostic, in contrast to a metaphysical commitment to, say, reductionism or monism, I defer judgement on the modeling relation, the strength of the map between epistemic and ontological structures. This is why Nick's attempt to "turn the tables" on me, by suggesting that my rejection of epiphenomena is, itself, a perspective, fails. The admission that any 1 ontology can submit to analysis by multiple epistemic structures allows me to tolerate monists. And the admission that any 1 epistemic structure might effectively analyze multiple ontological structures, allows me to tolerate pluralists.

A rejection of epiphenomena is a preservation of decoupled epistemology and ontology. An acceptance of epiphenomena is a registration, a parsing of the world according to a scoped epistemic structure. I go just a tad further and argue that such registration is preemptive in that it precludes the analysis of that same ontology by alternative epistemic structures.

I'd be OK if someone objected to the preemptivity assertion. Some people are open-minded and cognitively endowed enough to swap their frames in and out at will. But *I* am neither that open-minded, nor cognitively endowed. I'm an agnostic *because* I recognize that limitation in myself. But I've never seen someone successfully argue that their, singular, identified epistemic frame is The capital T way to register/parse the world.

On 9/16/21 8:59 AM, uǝlƃ ☤>$ wrote:
> Ha! You are the worst type of troll. Why we keep feeding you is a question for the age. 
> 
> Obviously, I haven't claimed there are no phenomena. I've claimed there are no epiphenomena.
> 
> On 9/16/21 8:56 AM, thompnickson2 at gmail.com wrote:
>> Ok.  Iff so, there are no phenemona, just apparent phenomena.  I'm ok 
>> with that.  n
>>
>> Nick Thompson
>> ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com
>> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> On Behalf Of u?l? ?>$
>> Sent: Thursday, September 16, 2021 11:10 AM
>> To: friam at redfish.com
>> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] the cancellation arc
>>
>> I'm not talking about observations, or your observations. I'm talking about the classification of a phenomenon as secondary or non-causal. There are no secondary or non-causal phenomena. There are no epiphenomena, only apparent epiphenomena.
>>
>>
>> On 9/16/21 7:54 AM, thompnickson2 at gmail.com wrote:
>>> Glen,
>>>
>>> All observations are myopic.  All observations are from a point of view.  All propositions are three-valued.  So, what is this universal point of view from which you hold my observations to be myopic?  Eh?   Even back on my meds I can see that there is something wrong with that. 
>>>
>>> n
>>>
>>> Nick Thompson
>>> ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com
>>> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> On Behalf Of ? glen
>>> Sent: Thursday, September 16, 2021 5:31 AM
>>> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
>>> <friam at redfish.com>
>>> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] the cancellation arc
>>>
>>> Both EricC's and Marcus' responses say what I'm about to say, but in different language.
>>>
>>> There is no such thing as 'epiphenomena'. When you see something you *think* is epi, it means you've imputed your preconceived function. It's myopic preemptive registration.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On September 15, 2021 8:24:49 PM PDT, thompnickson2 at gmail.com wrote:
>>>> Hi, everyone [who is still following this thread].  
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Before I go back on my meds, I just thought I would send along this link <https://www.huffpost.com/entry/compass-pleasure_b_890342> .  I should perhaps be embarrassed at sending a HuffPost link, but the summary of the old Olds/Milner research seems accurate enough and it is very succinct.   On my account we have been talking all along about the epiphenomenal relation and in particular, that version of it which relates goals to functions.  Functions are epiphenomenal with respect to the goals that serve them.  The function of a pleasure (ie, a goal system) is to get us to do stuff that urgently needs doing.  What happens when we access the goal system directly and make it possible to do essentially nothing and achieve the goal?   Dave says, having learned what it had to teach him, he would put the device on a shelf.  But how would he do that and WHY would he do that?  What other goal-pleasure would be sufficient to mobilize and direct him in the putting of the device on the shelf.  
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Ok.  Best be done for a bit.  Let’ see.  One tablet a day by mouth.  Sorry to bother you all.  I do learn a lot from these exercises, even if nobody else does.  And then later I write something good, and that pleases me.  
>>>>
> 
> 

--
"Better to be slapped with the truth than kissed with a lie."
☤>$ uǝlƃ

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