[FRIAM] description - explanation - metaphor - model

[Eric Charles]

"Absent a "true" description at its root, a theory becomes a Jenga tower of
speculation"

Ah, I see you've been to an American Psychological Association conference!

That aside... ;- ) .... thank you for this excellent critique! I will
endeavor to do it justice in reply when I get to a real computer.

Best,
Eric

On Tue, Dec 24, 2019, 7:26 AM Prof David West <profwest at fastmail.fm> wrote:

> Lacking the wit tore- weave the  argument that has unraveled into several
> threads and posts; an attempt to begin afresh from one of the points of
> origin - the Introduction to a book by Nick and Eric.
>
> First a common ascription: " A description is understood as a simple
> statement of a fact, whereas an explanation is an interpretation. A
> description simply says what happened, whereas an explanation says why it
> happened."
>
> Followed by an argument that description and explanation are pretty close
> to the same thing:  all descriptions explain; all explanations describe,
> and both are in some sense, interpretations.
>
> Then a discussion that leads right back to the same distinction:
> "Descriptions are explanations that the speaker and audience take to be
> true for the purpose of seeking further explanations. Conversely,
> explanations are descriptions that the speaker and audience hold to be
> unverified under the present circumstances."
>
> There is, however, a (in my mind) subtle error here, in that the assertion
> just quoted uses the word "true" as if it was the same thing as "assumed
> for the purposes of argument" — the conclusion of the argument about
> differences — which it is not.  Similarly, "unverified" is not the same as
> "contested absent further information;."
>
> I presume that this error? was intentional, as they need descriptions and,
> later, models to have this "truthiness" quality.
>
> The discussion of explanations as models with 'basic" and "surplus"
> implications (surplus being divided into "intended" and "unintended")
> parallels and, except for vocabulary, duplicates McCormac's discussion of
> the evolution of metaphor from epiphor to either "lexical term" or "dead
> metaphor." [Unlike Glen, I have no difficulty with metaphor as a kind of
> philosopher's stone for sense-making in science.]
>
> The discussion of levels of explanations is where the need for "truthy"
> descriptions comes back into play.  Somewhere in our hierarchy of models is
> the need for a "true" purely descriptive model. Even within any given model
> there is a need to accept the "Basic Meaning" as being "true" and purely
> descriptive, so we can go about researching and verifying (or not) the
> intended "surplus meanings."
>
> Although it is evident how and why they need "truth" in order to proceed
> with their discussion and argument, I am unwilling to grant it. For me,
> both explanations and descriptions are "interpretations" with no
> qualitative differentiation.
>
> Their goal is to be "scientific" and so "truthy" models must remain and
> become fundamental to the evaluation of explanations. Evaluation is taken
> to be a two step process, with each step having three aspects.
>
> Specify the explanation:
>   1. find the foundational (root of the theory) "true" description.
>   2. expose the model - i.e. the metaphor.
>   3. expose the intended surplus implications such that research can begin
> to verify/disprove them.
> Evaluate the explanation
>   1. discard the explanation if there are no surplus implications exposed
> for investigation.
>   2. confirm the basic implications
>   3. prove some number of the intended surplus implications to be "true."
>
> Nice and tidy - except it does not / cannot work this way. Just like the
> "scientific method" in general, this construct can serve, at best, as an
> after the fact rationalization of a course of investigation.
>
> Absent a "true" description at its root, a theory becomes a Jenga tower of
> speculation.
>
> "Confirmation" of basic implications is too often a "political" exercise —
> so too any "proving" of surplus implications as "true" — witness the
> Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Physics. (Or, in the case of 'proving"
> things, the fact that string theory and many other quantum theories
> generate no testable intentional surplus implications.)
>
> It is far too easy to move inconvenient (i.e. unprovable) "intended
> surplus implications to the "unintended' category — witness Artificial
> Intelligence and the mind-is-computer-is-mind model/metaphor.
>
> The "unintended" surplus implications might, more often than not, be more
> important than the "intended" ones — witness epigenetics.
>
> Reliance on models, even structured models like those proposed, eliminates
> "context" because all models are, if not abstractions, simplifications;
> focusing only on what is deemed 'relevant."
>
> This last point makes me want to read the rest of Eric's and Nick's book,
> because I suspect I would find agreement with the last point of my
> argument. I surmise this from the all to brief mention that: "we will find
> that the problem Darwin’s theory does suffer from is that it is wrong.
> Yes…Wrong! Darwinian Theory is wrong in a much more limited sense –
> empirical evidence shows that a comprehensive explanation for adaptation
> will require the inclusion of other explanatory principles, to complement
> the explanatory power of natural selection. "
>
> Which brings me to a concluding question: can 'broken-wing' behavior
> convey an evolutionary advantage to the Killdeer absent a mechanism the
> maintains the gullibility of the Fox? It would seem to me that Foxes whose
> behavior ignored the Killdeer feint would be better fed (eggs and
> nestlings) than those that were fooled and therefore obtain an evolutionary
> advantage that would, eventually make the Killdeer seek an alternative
> strategy.
>
> An off-hand BTW — I much prefer postmodern methods of deconstruction as a
> methodology; not to find "Truth" which does not exist, IMO, but simply to
> keep the investigation lively and honest.
>
> davew
>
>
>
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