[FRIAM] description - explanation - metaphor - model

[Steven A Smith]

Dave (et al) -

I haven't had the bandwidth/focus to follow this line of discussion
closely nor well, much less stick my fat foot in the middle of it,
however your synopsis/redux/refactor here is very well presented and
while I have some pause with some of your assertions/conclusions,
overall rings "true" (Oupsie!)... 

In any case, I've started the force on my annual solstice narcissus
bulbs and lit my solstice ("magical luck reversing") candle (ritually
purchased at pojoaque village market in lieu of one of the many saints I
could choose from) and am trying to refocus my "self" toward a future
(path through the multiverse of adjacent possibles?) which
simultaneously embraces the unknowable whilst maintaining enough of a
rationalization of the path of (apparently adjacent) events strung out
behind me in my (imaginary) rear-view mirror, stretching back to some
aft-horizon roughly correlated with the degree of my neurological
senescence or perhaps the degree of reinforcement from my extended
context (retelling all my old stories at holiday meals?).  All this to
frame the issue of "objective reality" and "truth" in terms of my own
decisions in the light of my beliefs (models?) and memories.

I am (willfully?) unable to either confirm or deny your assertion that
there is no qualitative distinction between description and
explanation.   Or more to the point, I feel a need to embrace both, to
whatever extent such is possible.   I find the distinction incredibly
useful for relating to others...  it is incredibly convenient to share a
sense of an objective reality which allows for a style of relating
through the (illusory?) shared physical (by agreement?) reality... in
fact, it is downright "convenient" to treat other people as if they have
an objective reality and their nature is immutable and more than simply
"my interpretation" of the various sensory inputs that impinge on me
"from" their behaviour.

On the other hand, of course, I understand both practically and
philosophically that for everything I think I *know* to be "true", that
there is at the very least a fuzzy haze - a distribution of alternative
explanations for my perceptions.  I also recognize that the models (or
metaphors) I live by are inherited from A) my physiology (ala Lakoff and
Nunez) and B) my cultural embedding (nuclear family, regional
distinctions, ethnosocial subcultural embedding, etc.   I feel blessed
to be somewhat aware of this "duality" (in a different sense than we
have bandied about here methinks?) through a lot of my life... and
therefore am like the Red Queen, able and willing to "think six
impossible thoughts before breakfast", and yet apparently/conveniently
able to proceed as if there were a (shared with others) objective reality.

But (BUT) what I think I find disturbing about the truism (oupsie!) that
"everything is interpretation" is so often used as the sophists entree
into a manipulation, into a switcharoo where the "everything is
interpretation" suddenly becomes "let me give you my interpretation in a
compelling way that has you acting as if it is somehow 'more true' than
the one you started with".   My oldest friend by most measures carried
this acutely as a young man...   always pretty sure of the things he
thought he believed in as if he had strong evidence for believing them
(and denying other's beliefs) but when confronted with fairly damning
evidence against his pet-ideas had the pat phrase "you never know!"
which he could never muster nor allow when *others* had pet-beliefs that
opposed his.   I last saw him in person after his wife (also a friend
from HS) died and I went to the funeral... his young-adult daughter (who
I had not seen since she was a baby) referred to him (fondly?) as her
"fox news-father" because A) anything you might have an idea or opinion
about he had an answer to which had the tone and in fact likely specific
scripting straight from Fox-News; and B) he never turned off his TV...
and it was tuned *only* to Fox-News... as if leaving it running when he
was gone made what they spewed "more true" or making sure he didn't
forget to turn it on when he got home again, or ????    Granted, I have
plenty of friends who act vaguely the same way with PBS/NPR and in fact
have a whole cohort of very liberal/progressive *younger* friends who
are all but literally *allergic* to NPR/PBS because *their parents*
(from my cohort) ran it 24/7 during their upbringing.

Regarding the "wit to re-weave"... my elderdotter weaned herself off
smoking through knitting which became a near compulsion... it was
something she could do with her hands whilst reading technical papers on
her kindle.. she became (as her personal blog is titled) a "yarn
harlot", but at one point she realized that no matter how many skeins of
yarn she bought (at the store, or yard sales), there was no such thing
as "enough" yet she also had "too much".   To curb that ,she began a new
obsession, that of finding high quality, but often mildly stained or
damaged wool sweaters at the thrift store and un-ravelling/re-knitting
them, sometimes with bits of "new" yarn for color/accent...   I very
much appreciate when someone (Glen is also prone to this) backs up,
unravels (or simply picks up the unraveled bits available) and re-ravels
a tapestry for us that includes (some if not all of) the elements from
the original(s).

Sappy Solstice!

 - Steve





On 12/24/19 5:26 AM, Prof David West wrote:
> Lacking the wit tore- weave the  argument that has unraveled into several threads and posts; an attempt to begin afresh from one of the points of origin - the Introduction to a book by Nick and Eric.
>
> First a common ascription: " A description is understood as a simple statement of a fact, whereas an explanation is an interpretation. A description simply says what happened, whereas an explanation says why it happened."
>
> Followed by an argument that description and explanation are pretty close to the same thing:  all descriptions explain; all explanations describe, and both are in some sense, interpretations.
>
> Then a discussion that leads right back to the same distinction:  "Descriptions are explanations that the speaker and audience take to be true for the purpose of seeking further explanations. Conversely, explanations are descriptions that the speaker and audience hold to be unverified under the present circumstances." 
>
> There is, however, a (in my mind) subtle error here, in that the assertion just quoted uses the word "true" as if it was the same thing as "assumed for the purposes of argument" — the conclusion of the argument about differences — which it is not.  Similarly, "unverified" is not the same as "contested absent further information;."
>
> I presume that this error? was intentional, as they need descriptions and, later, models to have this "truthiness" quality.
>
> The discussion of explanations as models with 'basic" and "surplus" implications (surplus being divided into "intended" and "unintended") parallels and, except for vocabulary, duplicates McCormac's discussion of the evolution of metaphor from epiphor to either "lexical term" or "dead metaphor." [Unlike Glen, I have no difficulty with metaphor as a kind of philosopher's stone for sense-making in science.] 
>
> The discussion of levels of explanations is where the need for "truthy" descriptions comes back into play.  Somewhere in our hierarchy of models is the need for a "true" purely descriptive model. Even within any given model there is a need to accept the "Basic Meaning" as being "true" and purely descriptive, so we can go about researching and verifying (or not) the intended "surplus meanings."
>
> Although it is evident how and why they need "truth" in order to proceed with their discussion and argument, I am unwilling to grant it. For me, both explanations and descriptions are "interpretations" with no qualitative differentiation.
>
> Their goal is to be "scientific" and so "truthy" models must remain and become fundamental to the evaluation of explanations. Evaluation is taken to be a two step process, with each step having three aspects.
>
> Specify the explanation:
>   1. find the foundational (root of the theory) "true" description.
>   2. expose the model - i.e. the metaphor.
>   3. expose the intended surplus implications such that research can begin to verify/disprove them.
> Evaluate the explanation
>   1. discard the explanation if there are no surplus implications exposed for investigation.
>   2. confirm the basic implications
>   3. prove some number of the intended surplus implications to be "true."
>
> Nice and tidy - except it does not / cannot work this way. Just like the "scientific method" in general, this construct can serve, at best, as an after the fact rationalization of a course of investigation.
>
> Absent a "true" description at its root, a theory becomes a Jenga tower of speculation.
>
> "Confirmation" of basic implications is too often a "political" exercise — so too any "proving" of surplus implications as "true" — witness the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Physics. (Or, in the case of 'proving" things, the fact that string theory and many other quantum theories generate no testable intentional surplus implications.)
>
> It is far too easy to move inconvenient (i.e. unprovable) "intended surplus implications to the "unintended' category — witness Artificial Intelligence and the mind-is-computer-is-mind model/metaphor.
>
> The "unintended" surplus implications might, more often than not, be more important than the "intended" ones — witness epigenetics.
>
> Reliance on models, even structured models like those proposed, eliminates "context" because all models are, if not abstractions, simplifications; focusing only on what is deemed 'relevant."
>
> This last point makes me want to read the rest of Eric's and Nick's book, because I suspect I would find agreement with the last point of my argument. I surmise this from the all to brief mention that: "we will find that the problem Darwin’s theory does suffer from is that it is wrong.  Yes…Wrong! Darwinian Theory is wrong in a much more limited sense – empirical evidence shows that a comprehensive explanation for adaptation will require the inclusion of other explanatory principles, to complement the explanatory power of natural selection. "
>
> Which brings me to a concluding question: can 'broken-wing' behavior convey an evolutionary advantage to the Killdeer absent a mechanism the maintains the gullibility of the Fox? It would seem to me that Foxes whose behavior ignored the Killdeer feint would be better fed (eggs and nestlings) than those that were fooled and therefore obtain an evolutionary advantage that would, eventually make the Killdeer seek an alternative strategy.
>
> An off-hand BTW — I much prefer postmodern methods of deconstruction as a methodology; not to find "Truth" which does not exist, IMO, but simply to keep the investigation lively and honest.
>
> davew
>  
>
>
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