[FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us

Wed Feb 19 19:35:50 EST 2020

David, 

I immediately got snarled up in writing you a long, turgid response, so
figured I better write you a short one first, lest I never respond at all.
See larding below. 

n

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/D

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 8:48 AM
To: friam at redfish.com
Subject: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us

Politically charged question to follow. Unlike my usual wont, I am not
trying to be provocative. I pick a difficult example for my question in the
hope that it will generate enough heat to produce light with the hope that
the light will illuminate clarity.

Pierce said:

"Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these
effects is the whole of our conception of the object."

The Donald is our object

[NST===>] It might be argued that the whole project is ill-founded because
"the Donald" is an individual, and therefore, by definition, not a general.
Abduction is to generals.  I think this is a cheap response, because, while
The Donald is not a general in the same way "cat" is a general, it is still
a lower level general.  "Is it true that The Donald is over 6' tall" is a
reasonable question to ask in the same way that "how many angels..pin?" is
not a reasonable question to ask. So, then, by definition, The Donald is a
real  

1- Can we enumerate the "effects with conceivably practical bearings" we
expect our object to have?[NST===>]  Eric might help us here, but basically,
I have to agree with you the Maxim is faulty at this point.  It seems to me
a monstrous category error.  Objects are just not the sorts of things that
have effects.  Events have effects.  Actions have effects.  Thanks reminding
me of this problem.  I always supply words when I read the maxim, such as
effects. of conceiving of the object in the way we do, as opposed to some
other way. The effects under consideration are the expectations that would
arise from conceiving of the object way.  So, if we conceive of DT as  a
liar, then many effects follow from that conception, and those effects are
the meaning of the conception, and it has no other meaning.  

2- Must the enumeration include both "positive" and "negative" effects?

  2a- does the answer to #2 depend on the definition of "our?" If 'our' is
defined inclusively the answer to #2 would seem to be yes, but if 'our' is
exclusive or restricted to only those with pro or anti
perspectives/convictions, maybe not.[NST===>]  

[NST===>] well, we have to remember that the Maxim is a thesis about
meaning, and so I think the maxim can be applied relatively-i.e., If [to me]
a unicorn is a white horse with a narwhale horn in the middle of his
forehead, then that is [to me] the meaning of unicorn.  

3- Must the effects we conceive have some threshold measure of a quality we
might call 'truthiness', 'likelihood', 'believe-ability', reality'? [T
becoming a dictator.][NST===>]  The question is not about the meaning of
"trump"; as a proper name, "Trump" has no meaning in that sense.  The
question is about the assignment of trump to the general, "dictator", and so
concerns the meaning of that general.  If we were to test by observation the
proposition that Trump is a dictator,  what tests would we employ.  These
tests, according to the maxim, are the meaning of the attribution.  

 is a conceivable effect, but, I for one, see no possibility of that
effectuating [NST===>] I don't think so.  What "unicorn" means to me has no
implications for the existence of unicorns.  

4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our
"conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object? 

[NST===>] I don't think so.  Increasing the number of people who think that
"unicorn" means "a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead" has no
implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns. 

5- If we have myriad enumerations does that mean "we" cannot possess a
conception of the object, merely multiple conceptions of caricatures of the
object?

I'm working on a paper with an epistemological focus and that brought me to
Pierce and prompted the above questions.

Another question for the evolutionists who are also pragmatists: why
pragmatism over "naturalized epistemology?"

[NST===>] I am not sure what a naturalized epistemology is.  Evolutionary
epistemology is the known that all knowledge arises through selection
mechanisms.  People will say, for instance, that both a bird's wing and a
jumbo jet's constitute knowledge about flight.  Well, I suppose.  

davew

============================================================

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv

Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe
<http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com>
http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com

archives back to 2003:  <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/>
http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/

FRIAM-COMIC  <http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/>
http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/attachments/20200219/a9e73712/attachment.html>