[FRIAM] alternative response

[Gary Schiltz]

If I am honest, which I at least usually try to be, most beliefs that I
have are only supported by the amount of effort I'm willing to put into the
endeavor of supporting them. I can rationalize this by saying that nobody's
brain, not even Einstein's, has (or had) the capacity to calculate and keep
track of all the assumptions necessary to support our beliefs. I do believe
this is true, even though it is more the result of my simply getting tired
of or bored with trying to do so. Maybe this has a lot to do with why
people have "faith", they just get tired of trying to figure it all out,
and it is so much easier to accept what a large group of your peers tells
you. I think true wisdom starts when one realizes those limitations.

On Wed, Jun 17, 2020 at 12:44 PM Jon Zingale <jonzingale at gmail.com> wrote:

> Nick,
>
> Spoiler alert, there is no *how best to think*. You say random, Gary says
> determined. Until you investigate the consequences of each you can't even
> know whether or not you are actually developing the same model ( like with
> the Church-Turing thesis). At the end of the day, deciding whether or not
> the universe is determined, indeterminate, random, etc.. is decidedly
> uninteresting. I try to hold 50 conflicting ontological commitments before
> breakfast. Alas, it appears that we have no interest in working with the
> commitments others make. In an effort to contribute to the banality I
> propose 2401 or perhaps whatever number you would construct the fifth time
> you follow Cantor's diagonal argument!
>
>
>
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