[FRIAM] Enamine

[Marcus Daniels]

EricS wrote:

< But extending NATO to frontier countries that you cannot practically defend without suicidal commitments, and whose offensive strategic value is not comparable to the defensive strategic loss of keeping your promise, seems like a template imprinted on a broad range of treaties by the MAD application.>

There are some defensive tools in Poland and Romania.  I think that’s part of what has been freaking Putin out.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/16/world/europe/poland-missile-base-russia-ukraine.html
https://news.usni.org/2016/05/12/aegis-ashore-site-in-romania-declared-operational
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/29477/lets-talk-about-the-post-inf-treaty-u-s-test-of-a-ground-launched-tomahawk-missile

One could certainly see an Aegis Ashore system ending up in Ukraine, and given recent events, putting Tomahawks in MK41 launchers at those sites.
Note the trailer configuration in the last article.   At least as useful as some MiGs.

Putin is like Trump and accuses the thing he is guilty.   So it seems appropriate to make his fear a reality.

Marcus

From: Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> On Behalf Of David Eric Smith
Sent: Friday, March 11, 2022 2:50 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam at redfish.com>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Enamine

What you have below is well-articulated, Roger; I understand.

In watching through the “Gravitas” link that Sarbajit forwarded — a good summary in short space, though it was a bit odd as the slide breezed by to see Sweden and Finland mislabeled — I was brought back to a comment Fiona Hill made in an interview somewhere, I think in The Atlantic.

Hill normally does not use metaphors, because she can say what she means by speaking in particulars.  But here she likened NATO to re-insurance, an industry that was on my mind decades ago in thinking about moving public policy about climate damage.

I like this analogy a lot, because it brings in the Black Swan literature and theme.  Black Swan, of course, is not about asserting the truism that unforeseen things happen, but rather about analysis of institutions meant to absorb risk when their design depends in essential ways on a model of the underlying events that can be mis-specified.

In listening to Sharma on Gravitas, in light of the large volume we have discussed here, and other reading from decades ago about RAND and MAD doctrine, I was struck at the singular role nuclear weapons had in creating a completely different paradigm for political re-insurance.  It doesn’t seem to me that maximalist responses were a norm in the era before post-WWII, of the kind that NATO Article V now is.  The notion of “using” buffer states — which I hate, by the way, as an attitude of consigning people and regions to disposability categories — as a way to allow graded responses and stalemates from which large bully-powers could withdraw, would have been the template for most alliance treaties.  MAD was reasoned out as working only if it was maximalist.  (The fact that we have not had a post-WWII nuclear exchange seems to be interpreted as evidence that the MAD reasoning is true, though I have reservations that correlation is not causation.)  But extending NATO to frontier countries that you cannot practically defend without suicidal commitments, and whose offensive strategic value is not comparable to the defensive strategic loss of keeping your promise, seems like a template imprinted on a broad range of treaties by the MAD application.

How did I get off on this tangent, I have to remind myself to mention.  It was Sharma’s (and many others’) assertion that, when the Warsaw Pact was disbanded, NATO should have been as well.  That led to the image that, when both large alliances existed, imprinting the nuclear template on them has at least some coherence of motive.  But with Warsaw Pact disbanded, and several national identities breaking away as often happens in the dissolution of empires, to have retained the MAD model of re-insurance for NATO looks increasingly weird.

I guess this is a thread-bend.

Eric




On Mar 9, 2022, at 5:47 PM, Roger Critchlow <rec at elf.org<mailto:rec at elf.org>> wrote:

Hi Eric --

Mearshimer ought to be persuasive, he's been doing this longer than I've been writing code.

I don't think he has any good ideas about what to do now.

The obvious point is that avoiding this outcome would have been much, much better for everyone involved.  Better to be alive than dead.  Better to have a home than a pile of rubble.   Better to be at a home than tramping around Europe exploring the wonderful world of refugee accommodations.   Better to be at peace than at war.  Better to not be trying to sanction Russia into submission and dealing with the domestic economic blowback of the sanctions.

And his second point is that given the balance of our actions and inactions in Ukraine, we created this outcome.  We encouraged the Ukrainians to thumb their noses at Russia and pursue integration with Europe.  Some people thought that was a "good" idea and worked it.

And the third point is that Russia resorting to force in this situation should not surprise anyone.  It should have been the first item on the list of possible contingencies.  What was the plan?  Shame them?  Sanction them?  Supply arms to the Ukrainians?   Much, much better for everyone involved to have avoided this outcome.

It's a limited frame, it doesn't address all the issues that might go into building a better world.  It's a frame for identifying worse worlds that you can try to avoid by acting prudently.  It's not a model of how the world should work, it's the record of what the great powers (eg, US) have talked themselves into doing in times of need and ways the eventually afflicted parties might have made things turn out differently.

I'm imagining a card game for apprentice diplomats.  Each card in the deck presenting a historical play in the statecraft playbook:  Gulf of Tonkin, Bay of Pigs, Urgent Fury, Iraqi Freedom, Desert Storm, The Enterprise, and so on (I had to google to find some of those).  Score points by identifying specific lies, evasions, and self-deceptions that were told to enable the play, and by itemizing the intended and unintended consequences of the play.

-- rec --

On Wed, Mar 9, 2022 at 6:58 AM David Eric Smith <desmith at santafe.edu<mailto:desmith at santafe.edu>> wrote:
It’s a good list of wrongdoings, Roger, and no argument can be sound that doesn’t keep it present and active.  Facts are facts.

I wasn’t saying I can’t follow Mearsheimer’s frame or its reasoning.  I was saying that the adequacy of working within the frame seems questionable and bothers me. To put in a metaphor where I am sure it would be better if I stuck to the particulars, it seems like a Baconian error to me: to suppose that (a subset of) the facts are self-interpreting.

You mention:
Mearshimer's point of view is not pretty, and fairness is not part of its calculus, but it's the way of the world that we, the United States of America, have made.  And when we screw up in our enthusiasm for truth, justice, and the amurkan way, we should not blame others for the consequences.

I agree, and I also understand that you didn’t say my summary included either the word or the theme of blaming anybody (while acknowledging that both the political and media rhetoric is full of that).  But I want to reiterate that apportioning blame and with it responsibility is the opening part of a discussion, but not obviously enough to say what to do next.  It seems to me that Mearsheimer’s argument does do an induction for what to do next, and it is a 19th-century induction, in which a small number of actors simply dictate what the world will do, and there should be some kind of US retreat, after which we can conclude (?) that the Russian government will pull back and return directly to what they were prioritizing in 2012 (broader-based prosperity, certain conditional integrations, etc., while still operating mainly as a partly-kleptocratic petro-state, an economic model that is not universal and that does bring in other biases in what kind of governance and social structure are most robust).  I guess also that Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia will recognize that they were duped and quickly withdraw from NATO to become more Finland-like buffer states, and that an even easier decision of that kind can be reached with respect to Poland and Hungary, since they were backsliders anyway.  (I am being absurdist here because, even if one thought Mearsheimer’s analysis of the optimal decisions in the past are different from those taken, I don’t see what paths to comparable outcomes are available now.)

Here’s one take, on whether there are other dimensions outside Mearsheimer’s frame that bear on its adequacy.  A mock-dialogue:

QUESTION: Does the Russian (either) annexation or destruction of Ukraine at this time move the world toward or away from a rules-based system of international constraint?  How does an analytic answer to that serve as a criterion for valuing the event and deciding what to do in response to it?
REJOINDER: Does not exist as a question because the U.S. has taken many actions that, by not being constrained, undermined the role of constraint, whether they were taken by being misguided or by being cynically self-interested.

QUESTION: There are these patches of geography, often referred to by non-IR-specialists as “countries”.  We believe there are people who live there, and by a kind of abduction, we imagine those people have preferences, about engaging in trade relations or military alliances.  Should decisions they adopt, through various internal negotiations — yes, in contexts also shaped by external actors — have some right of persistence?
REJOINDER: Does not exist as a question because the U.S. haas taken actions that undermine rules-based international relations.

One can try to make the argument that there really are no other questions, because there is only ONE QUESTION, which is the one on which Mearsheimer’s frame settles.  But I think that is a hard argument to make analytically.  I recognize the possibility that, with short-term and blunt-force choices, the identities of actors and their lack of trustworthiness may make this frame so dominant that it overshadows most else.

But in any case, if those other questions do exist, even in a world where the U.S. haas taken actions that undermine rules-based international relations, I imagine a discussion of them would include elements that arise in this:
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/08/podcasts/transcript-ezra-klein-interviews-fiona-hill.html

I don’t even know how to reason about the simplest things.  One could just baldly assert that a unipolar world has been inherently unstable, because there is no adequate force either within a country, or through diplomatic and economic alliances that a country can marshal, to stop US incursions and force this country to reverse some of its adventures.  That somehow a hoped-for era when China fills that role, through a combination of internal strength and diplomatic and economic influence, will be a less destructive one.  But when I look back to the geopolitical trampling, in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Americas during the US-NATO/Soviet-Union struggles, they seem damaging in similar ways and degrees to what the US was the main actor doing in many places during the unipolar era.  So it is not obvious to me that the rise of China brings us to a better place with a more constrained US, as opposed to just returning us to a destructive model that organized the NATO/Soviet bipolarity.

And of course, technology and ecology are both different now.

So, I don’t know.

Eric



On Mar 8, 2022, at 2:02 PM, Roger Critchlow <rec at elf.org<mailto:rec at elf.org>> wrote:

I found Mearshimer's argument a persuasive point of view.   What else has the US done that might make other countries anxious?   Engineered regime changes in Iran and Chile, supported failed regime changes in Cuba and Nicaragua, fought wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, intervened in Panama, Grenada, and Somalia, no-fly-zones in the Balkans and Syria, pursued economic sanctions against Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, and Russia, expanded NATO twice into eastern europe, training police and counter-insurgency forces god knows where.  That's just in my lifetime working from my eroding memory.  If you want to live in the US sphere of influence, you'd best not poke the eagle in the eye, you'd best adapt or mask your aspirations to the ones the US approves.

We protest that our interests are supporting democracy and providing humanitarian aid, because that feels good.  Pay no attention to those cozy contracts between occupied Iraq and the western oil companies.  That tasty piece of kleptocracy wasn't in any way a motivation for the completely made up reasons for invading Iraq.  (Rumsfeld knew that he knew that Iraq had oil reserves, it was a known known.)  And don't get all tedious counting the collateral casualties from our drone wars, we only bomb wedding celebrations when it's absolutely necessary, and we are sincerely sorry for your losses, so, please, stop crying over spilt milk, it really harshes the vibe.

Good for the goose is good for the gander.  Putin is enforcing Russian approved aspirations in Ukraine.   And Mearshimer's point is that Putin isn't making up his reasons, he's stated them often.  Until the Ukrainians capitulate, he will continue to level the country, one apartment block, school, hospital, university, police station, city hall, and factory at a time.  We can hope there won't be any accidents with nuclear power plants or hydroelectric dams.  There will be no Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea for British destroyers to visit in the future while flashing their bums at Sebastapol.  And we're going to fight him to the last Ukrainian standing, like we fought the Sandinistas to the last Contra standing, and we fought Cuba to the last Cuban exile standing on the beach at the Bay of Pigs.   There wasn't any air cover there, either.

Mearshimer's point of view is not pretty, and fairness is not part of its calculus, but it's the way of the world that we, the United States of America, have made.  And when we screw up in our enthusiasm for truth, justice, and the amurkan way, we should not blame others for the consequences.  And most especially when blaming the other is both politically expedient and a way of escalating the conflict that our enthusiasms created in the first place.  And mostest especially when we're escalating toward a tactical nuclear war in europe.

Broadwell's rebuttal was so ironic that I couldn't listen to it.  "We didn't do that.  We couldn't do that.  We would never do that."   Sure, Ray, we're pure as the driven snow, and anything we did or didn't do that helped "that coup" happen was an innocent mistake, which Putin should have laughed off.  But Putin isn't laughing.  In fact, he looks awful.

Marcus' observation that "what's the point of a huge defense budget if all you can do is cower?" might well be Putin's mantra.

-- rec --
On Tue, Mar 8, 2022 at 6:37 AM David Eric Smith <desmith at santafe.edu<mailto:desmith at santafe.edu>> wrote:
Yes, Mearsheimer’s POV is a hard one for me to get my head around, and to describe in some way that would be “fair”.

I don’t want to say it is entirely amoral or immoral.  I think, within his view that certain conclusions are foregone, he has a sense that ordinary people can work out some conditions of living under several different systems, with compensations that they decide work for them, of several different kinds.  And within that constraint, a first priority should be to avoid conflicts that kill them, destroy places to live and ways of living, etc.

But I also have a structural problem with the way he makes arguments.  In a way, one could use argument of that form to say that any time when any powerful actor is motivated and capable of impact, that motive takes on some kind of legitimacy simply by existing.  So legitimacy gets written out of the framing of questions.  On shorter, tactical timescales, I can see that in a way.  But on longer timescales, when structure can change, it seems like an inadequate and foreshortened frame.

I should try to say this by way of an example, to try to be more explicit about what I mean by “the structure of that kind of argument”.

CEOs like to piously worry about instability as a risk to their workers.  I largely view that as manipulation.  Workers can be retrained, as the Swedish mining industry has nicely illustrated.  To the extent that they have basic competence, some skills, and productive attitudes, they can move laterally among industries and be about as well off after the move as before.  Not exactly, not in all cases; but overall there is not a good argument that industries need to be locked forever into one form in order for workers to survive.  A society and economy that seeks to protect workers rather than specific job-roles can largely do so.  The ones whom there is not a need to transfer laterally are the CEOs.  Once, in the past, maybe they competed in some fair field, and by whatever combination of luck or skill or talents, won something.  But the river moves on, and someone who is very successful and lucky in one fair, novel event has no reason to expect to be comparably lucky in regular events afterward.  What changes is that they can dig into positions and become rentiers, as the 19th century economists used to cast it.  It is, as the Aesop fable says of the goat taunting the wolf, not they, but the roof on which they stand, that is the source of their safety.  So the main ones threatened by industry change are the ones who are shielded from competition and don’t want to go back.

Yet the Mearsheimer framing would say that, because the CEOs are highly motivated, because their motives can be articulated, and because they have the capacity for impact, that gives a kind of tautological legitimacy to their wishes to stay in power and freeze industries in place, no matter what the cost to those who wouldn’t share that choice.

A country is not one thing.  Russia has clearly identifiable four large groups (at least).  There are the former KGB, not necessarily ultra-wealthy but accumulating wealth to try to re-establish a past government where agency remains with them.  There are the oligarchs, who live as a kind of parasitic outgrowth of oligarchs worldwide, but in a less productive society.  Then there are the populist nationalists going around wearing Zs on their shirts.  And then there are the other several layers of society who could consider Boris Nemtsov a spokesman for them.  Mearsheimer’s expressions “Russia wants XYZ” are, in the sense of decision makers, "the KGB-cabal of Russia wants XYZ", and it can solidify a network of oligarchs and Zs to backstop and facilitate the decisions in which the KGB-cabal are the decisionmakers and prime movers.  That, to me, seems like a foreshortened notion of what “Russia wants”.

Of course, there is another sort of bizarre Louis XIV disease that has bothered me in those who love power and live in academic places as long as I have got to experience them directly.  Even if one wanted to fully adopt Mearsheimer’s frame, it is only sequitur if the next 100 years, ecologically and climatologically, will look more or less like the past 100.  That that will not be the case is the thing we can be surest of, in all this conversation.  But the power brokers, I think, haven’t internalized the view that there are things in the world bigger than them.  In some superficial cognitive way they have, maybe, but I feel like not really.

Eric




On Mar 7, 2022, at 5:05 PM, Marcus Daniels <marcus at snoutfarm.com<mailto:marcus at snoutfarm.com>> wrote:

I guess Mearsheimer would say this poor guy is brainwashed by his Western puppet masters, or an elite acting against the interests of his (non) countrymen?

From: Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com<mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com>> On Behalf Of Jon Zingale
Sent: Monday, March 7, 2022 1:15 PM
To: friam at redfish.com<mailto:friam at redfish.com>
Subject: [FRIAM] Enamine

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