[FRIAM] "analogies we live by"

Fri Jul 18 19:13:55 EDT 2025

      So, what the hell, right? Below is Perplexity's response when queried for background needed to start on an interdisciplinary program to do a competent literature review for a theory of metaphor. Obviously I started with the 10 post corpus and expanded from there. I feel like computational linguistics would at least partially cover what I said in the previous post. So to do a good job, we need expertise in philosophy of language, theoretical and computational linguistics, and neuroscience (and/or experimental psychology). I use Perplexity because she's never yet lied to me about references (and the others have lied to me … a LOT, the bastards). But these references are still poor quality for the most part, especially [3], which is just a conversation with ChatGPT. :face_with_rolling_eyes:

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      1. Foundational Compatibility: Quine, Carnap, and the Roots of Analogy/Metaphor

        Quine and Carnap

  * *Carnap*focused on the precision of language and the method of “explication”—replacing imprecise or metaphorical notions with clear, scientific language. To him, metaphors had psychological appeal but were obstacles unless rendered into rigorous terms; meaning was considered in relation to linguistic frameworks and their pragmatic use, not as a direct window into cognition or the body[1].
  * *Quine*rejected strict distinctions between analytic and synthetic (i.e., logically true versus empirically contingent), emphasizing/holism/: all knowledge—including logic and language—is interconnected and susceptible to revision. Metaphors like Neurath’s boat became models for how concepts are interdependent within a web of belief, but not in the same embodied or experiential way emphasized by cognitive linguists[1][2].

        Hofstadter and Lakoff

  * *Douglas Hofstadter*frames analogy as the “engine of cognition”—not merely a linguistic or literary device but the fundamental way humans think and reason. In his view, all concepts are “bundles of analogies,” and analogy-making operates at every level of cognition, above and beyond language[3][4].
  * *George Lakoff*, building from cognitive linguistics, sees metaphor as central to “embodied cognition.” Metaphors are not mere icing on language but are structuring principles of thought itself, rooted in bodily experience and sensory-motor systems (e.g., “Life is a Journey” shapes reasoning and behavior)[5][6][7].

        Synthesis and Limitations

  * While Quine’s holistic web of knowledge and Carnap’s framework-based philosophy help illuminate how conceptual systems allow meaning to emerge and shift, neither can fully ground Lakoff’s or Hofstadter’s theories. Both analytic philosophers were wary of metaphor as an explanatory tool—except in circumscribed ways—whereas Lakoff and Hofstadter make metaphor and analogy the/primary/fabric of cognition and meaning[3][5].

      2. Necessity of Broader Disciplines: Psychiatry, Neuroscience, and Linguistics

To robustly link logic/language (per Carnap and Quine) to contemporary accounts of metaphor (as in Lakoff and Hofstadter), engagement with additional disciplines is essential:

        Cognitive Science and Neuroscience

  * Neuroscience and experimental psychology have provided evidence that metaphor and analogy-making are rooted in neural processes. For instance, studies of right hemisphere processing and research on spatial and conceptual metaphors suggest that metaphoric and literal language involve overlapping brain circuits, challenging the older notion that metaphor is just secondary “ornamentation”[8][9].
  * Research supports Lakoff’s thesis that conceptual metaphors bridge physical experience and abstract thought, showing mappings between embodied actions and higher-level conceptual reasoning[5][8][9].

        Linguistics

  * The field of cognitive linguistics (where Lakoff’s work is foundational) has demonstrated empirically that metaphor governs pervasive patterns in language and thought, suggesting that the structure of logic in language is itself metaphoric to a surprising degree[6][7].
  * These insights go well beyond the analytic tradition’s focus on formal language and highlight the “embodied mind” as a nexus for logic, language, and metaphor.

        Psychiatry and Psychology

  * Psychiatry and cognitive psychology explore how metaphoric and analogical reasoning underpins memory, identity, conceptual development, and even psychopathology. This reinforces the view that metaphor is not epiphenomenal but structurally constitutive of mind[9].

      3. Comparative Table

Theory/Discipline 	How it Treats Metaphor/Analogy 	Foundation for Metaphor-Centric Cognition?
Carnap 	Seeks to expunge metaphors via explication; language as constructed framework 	Partial—offers logical clarity, not cognitive roots[1]
Quine 	Conceptual holism: metaphor as model for theory change; all knowledge interconnected 	Partial—highlights systemic flexibility, not embodiment[1][2]
Hofstadter 	Analogy as the “core of cognition,” encompassing metaphor 	No direct grounding in analytic philosophy—needs cognitive science[3][4]
Lakoff 	Metaphor as core structuring of thought, rooted in the body 	Grounded in linguistics and neuroscience[5][6][9][7]
Linguistics/Psychiatry/Neuroscience 	Metaphor/analogy as built into both brain and language, shaping cognition 	Essential—provide empirical and theoretical tools[8][9][5]

      4. Conclusion

  * *Quine and Carnap provide partial philosophical foundations*for thinking about how meaning and knowledge are systemic and context-dependent, but*neither grounds metaphor or analogy as central to cognition in the way Lakoff and Hofstadter envision*.
  * *Interdisciplinary perspectives—especially from cognitive neuroscience, linguistics, and psychology—are necessary to fully link the logic-language discussions of analytic philosophy to the metaphor-based frameworks of Lakoff and Hofstadter*.
  * The logic of language, as Carnap explored, gains new grounding and explanatory power when viewed through the lens of embodied, brain-based metaphor and analogy highlighted by cognitive science and contemporary linguistics[5][6][8][9][7].

[1]https://ejap.louisiana.edu/ejap/1997.spring/price976.html
[2]https://dornsife.usc.edu/scottsoames/wp-content/uploads/sites/191/2023/11/Quine_Carnap.pdf
[3]https://ditext.com/wordpress/2025/01/09/douglas-hofstadter-and-george-lakoff-on-analogies-and-metaphors/
[4]https://kobu.agency/the-lab-report/metaphors-look-beneath-the-surface/
[5]https://geometrymatters.com/cognition-and-the-embodiment-of-geometry-in-george-lakoffs-metaphors/
[6]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conceptual_metaphor
[7]https://terpconnect.umd.edu/~israel/lakoff-ConTheorMetaphor.pdf
[8]https://www.metaphorik.de/sites/www.metaphorik.de/files/journal-pdf/12_2007_goschler.pdf
[9]https://apcz.umk.pl/THS/article/view/ths.2002.002
[10]https://www.apperceptual.com/collected-quotes/analogy-and-metaphor
[11]https://worrydream.com/refs/Hofstadter_2001_-_Analogy_as_the_Core_of_Cognition.pdf
[12]https://www.reddit.com/r/cogsci/comments/b4z31/analogy_as_the_core_of_cognition_by_douglas_r/
[13]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8m7lFQ3njk
[14]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Lakoff
[15]https://www.jstor.org/stable/44084945
[16]http://mercercognitivepsychology.pbworks.com/w/page/61206434/Analogy Theory as the Foundation for Cognition <http://mercercognitivepsychology.pbworks.com/w/page/61206434/Analogy%20Theory%20as%20the%20Foundation%20for%20Cognition>
[17]https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/carnap/carnap-quine.html
[18]https://cs.uwaterloo.ca/~jhoey/teaching/cs886-affect/papers/LakoffJohnsonMetaphorsWeLiveBy.pdf
[19]https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1364661317301535
[20]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fluid_Concepts_and_Creative_Analogies

On 7/18/25 1:59 PM, glen wrote:
> I dug out 10 posts that I think provide the corpus for this discussion. Attached. And I may find the energy/desire to do some kind of work fleshing it out. But first, Steve's invocation of "explanation" (either in the xAI sense or the science/knowledge sense) reminded me of Melanie's article: https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.adt6140.
>
> In contrasting Hofstadter's conception versus Lakoff's, and in light of our (well, some of us) reification of LLMs as humans or humans as LLMs, the question that consistently emerges is What is the relationship between computation and body?
>
> I've expressed my stance several times, I think. That formal definitions of "compute", like the one Lee proposed awhile back (by Soare) [⛧] that requires computation be definite, do not exist outside or apart from bodies of some kind. So in the context of both Dave's brain-computer and Eric's actual-formal evolution, my stance is not Platonic (or Popper's World 3 ... or whatever). Even/especially things like code/proofs executable as software have bodies. To some extent, if it can't be executed, then it's not True/real, hearkening back to "effective procedures" or somesuch. But going back to Eric's question on 7/16/25 6:19 PM about what work is done by the theory itself, assuming some of these abstractions (analogies, computable expressions) are schematic, we can make them less semantic/bound/definite by making them polysemous/multiply[bound|defined]. So in Eric's case, the terms in the/a logic of evolution can be unbound and rebound to a new context (and maybe tested for 
> inference and fidelity after the rebinding). Or in Dave's (and Steve's and Melanie's), unbind our "language" about people and rebind them to LLMs. Then as in ALife, rebind evolution and maybe even brain-computer (given models like Beliefs, Desires, and Intention or other forms of agency). I'm too ignorant to understand [un|re]binding in RNA Worlds - but I assume something similar could be done, as Eric seems to suggest.
>
> So my answer to the relationship between computation and body, maybe resolving Hofstadter vs Lakoff, lies in this [un|re]binding of the "logic". And where such [un|re]binding fails, you can ratchet it back a bit. Maybe not *all* the terms in the logic can be [un|re]bound, but *some* can. To be clear, I'm also talking about functions being [un|re]bound/implemented, not merely atoms.
>
> To me, that sort of program would lead to a methodologically useful theory of analogy/metaphor. I feel like I've been infected with something like type theory in saying this. I can't help but think there is a cadre of people already doing this work. They just don't call it "theory of metaphor".
>
>
> [⛧] https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203100806-2/logic-modeling-logics-models-rudolph-lee
>
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