[FRIAM] "analogies we live by"

Sat Jul 19 09:48:42 EDT 2025

I’m not sure if I’m talking nonsense again (wouldn’t be the first time—my
metaphors have a mind of their own), but this really made me think of
*Sapiens*. Harari argues that the stories we tell—and choose to
believe—aren’t just entertainment or decoration; they actually shape how
human societies are built and run.

That got me wondering: could this idea connect to the “analogies we live
by”? Maybe the metaphors and analogies we use aren’t just ways of talking,
but actually shape how we think, act, and organize the world around us?

Or am I just mixing apples and ontologies again?

On Sat, 19 Jul 2025 at 01:15, glen <gepropella at gmail.com> wrote:

> So, what the hell, right? Below is Perplexity's response when queried for
> background needed to start on an interdisciplinary program to do a
> competent literature review for a theory of metaphor. Obviously I started
> with the 10 post corpus and expanded from there. I feel like computational
> linguistics would at least partially cover what I said in the previous
> post. So to do a good job, we need expertise in philosophy of language,
> theoretical and computational linguistics, and neuroscience (and/or
> experimental psychology). I use Perplexity because she's never yet lied to
> me about references (and the others have lied to me … a LOT, the bastards).
> But these references are still poor quality for the most part, especially
> [3], which is just a conversation with ChatGPT. :face_with_rolling_eyes:
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> 1. Foundational Compatibility: Quine, Carnap, and the Roots of
> Analogy/Metaphor Quine and Carnap
>
>    - *Carnap* focused on the precision of language and the method of
>    “explication”—replacing imprecise or metaphorical notions with clear,
>    scientific language. To him, metaphors had psychological appeal but were
>    obstacles unless rendered into rigorous terms; meaning was considered in
>    relation to linguistic frameworks and their pragmatic use, not as a direct
>    window into cognition or the body[1].
>    - *Quine* rejected strict distinctions between analytic and synthetic
>    (i.e., logically true versus empirically contingent), emphasizing
>    *holism*: all knowledge—including logic and language—is interconnected
>    and susceptible to revision. Metaphors like Neurath’s boat became models
>    for how concepts are interdependent within a web of belief, but not in the
>    same embodied or experiential way emphasized by cognitive linguists[1][2].
>
> Hofstadter and Lakoff
>
>    - *Douglas Hofstadter* frames analogy as the “engine of cognition”—not
>    merely a linguistic or literary device but the fundamental way humans think
>    and reason. In his view, all concepts are “bundles of analogies,” and
>    analogy-making operates at every level of cognition, above and beyond
>    language[3][4].
>    - *George Lakoff*, building from cognitive linguistics, sees metaphor
>    as central to “embodied cognition.” Metaphors are not mere icing on
>    language but are structuring principles of thought itself, rooted in bodily
>    experience and sensory-motor systems (e.g., “Life is a Journey” shapes
>    reasoning and behavior)[5][6][7].
>
> Synthesis and Limitations
>
>    - While Quine’s holistic web of knowledge and Carnap’s framework-based
>    philosophy help illuminate how conceptual systems allow meaning to emerge
>    and shift, neither can fully ground Lakoff’s or Hofstadter’s theories. Both
>    analytic philosophers were wary of metaphor as an explanatory tool—except
>    in circumscribed ways—whereas Lakoff and Hofstadter make metaphor and
>    analogy the *primary* fabric of cognition and meaning[3][5].
>
> 2. Necessity of Broader Disciplines: Psychiatry, Neuroscience, and
> Linguistics
> To robustly link logic/language (per Carnap and Quine) to contemporary
> accounts of metaphor (as in Lakoff and Hofstadter), engagement with
> additional disciplines is essential:
> Cognitive Science and Neuroscience
>
>    - Neuroscience and experimental psychology have provided evidence that
>    metaphor and analogy-making are rooted in neural processes. For instance,
>    studies of right hemisphere processing and research on spatial and
>    conceptual metaphors suggest that metaphoric and literal language involve
>    overlapping brain circuits, challenging the older notion that metaphor is
>    just secondary “ornamentation”[8][9].
>    - Research supports Lakoff’s thesis that conceptual metaphors bridge
>    physical experience and abstract thought, showing mappings between embodied
>    actions and higher-level conceptual reasoning[5][8][9].
>
> Linguistics
>
>    - The field of cognitive linguistics (where Lakoff’s work is
>    foundational) has demonstrated empirically that metaphor governs pervasive
>    patterns in language and thought, suggesting that the structure of logic in
>    language is itself metaphoric to a surprising degree[6][7].
>    - These insights go well beyond the analytic tradition’s focus on
>    formal language and highlight the “embodied mind” as a nexus for logic,
>    language, and metaphor.
>
> Psychiatry and Psychology
>
>    - Psychiatry and cognitive psychology explore how metaphoric and
>    analogical reasoning underpins memory, identity, conceptual development,
>    and even psychopathology. This reinforces the view that metaphor is not
>    epiphenomenal but structurally constitutive of mind[9].
>
> 3. Comparative Table
> Theory/Discipline How it Treats Metaphor/Analogy Foundation for
> Metaphor-Centric Cognition?
> Carnap Seeks to expunge metaphors via explication; language as
> constructed framework Partial—offers logical clarity, not cognitive
> roots[1]
> Quine Conceptual holism: metaphor as model for theory change; all
> knowledge interconnected Partial—highlights systemic flexibility, not
> embodiment[1][2]
> Hofstadter Analogy as the “core of cognition,” encompassing metaphor No
> direct grounding in analytic philosophy—needs cognitive science[3][4]
> Lakoff Metaphor as core structuring of thought, rooted in the body Grounded
> in linguistics and neuroscience[5][6][9][7]
> Linguistics/Psychiatry/Neuroscience Metaphor/analogy as built into both
> brain and language, shaping cognition Essential—provide empirical and
> theoretical tools[8][9][5] 4. Conclusion
>
>    - *Quine and Carnap provide partial philosophical foundations* for
>    thinking about how meaning and knowledge are systemic and
>    context-dependent, but *neither grounds metaphor or analogy as central
>    to cognition in the way Lakoff and Hofstadter envision*.
>    - *Interdisciplinary perspectives—especially from cognitive
>    neuroscience, linguistics, and psychology—are necessary to fully link the
>    logic-language discussions of analytic philosophy to the metaphor-based
>    frameworks of Lakoff and Hofstadter*.
>    - The logic of language, as Carnap explored, gains new grounding and
>    explanatory power when viewed through the lens of embodied, brain-based
>    metaphor and analogy highlighted by cognitive science and contemporary
>    linguistics[5][6][8][9][7].
>
> [1] https://ejap.louisiana.edu/ejap/1997.spring/price976.html
> [2]
> https://dornsife.usc.edu/scottsoames/wp-content/uploads/sites/191/2023/11/Quine_Carnap.pdf
> [3]
> https://ditext.com/wordpress/2025/01/09/douglas-hofstadter-and-george-lakoff-on-analogies-and-metaphors/
> [4] https://kobu.agency/the-lab-report/metaphors-look-beneath-the-surface/
> [5]
> https://geometrymatters.com/cognition-and-the-embodiment-of-geometry-in-george-lakoffs-metaphors/
> [6] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conceptual_metaphor
> [7] https://terpconnect.umd.edu/~israel/lakoff-ConTheorMetaphor.pdf
> [8]
> https://www.metaphorik.de/sites/www.metaphorik.de/files/journal-pdf/12_2007_goschler.pdf
> [9] https://apcz.umk.pl/THS/article/view/ths.2002.002
> [10] https://www.apperceptual.com/collected-quotes/analogy-and-metaphor
> [11]
> https://worrydream.com/refs/Hofstadter_2001_-_Analogy_as_the_Core_of_Cognition.pdf
> [12]
> https://www.reddit.com/r/cogsci/comments/b4z31/analogy_as_the_core_of_cognition_by_douglas_r/
> [13] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8m7lFQ3njk
> [14] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Lakoff
> [15] https://www.jstor.org/stable/44084945
> [16] http://mercercognitivepsychology.pbworks.com/w/page/61206434/Analogy
> Theory as the Foundation for Cognition
> <http://mercercognitivepsychology.pbworks.com/w/page/61206434/Analogy%20Theory%20as%20the%20Foundation%20for%20Cognition>
> [17] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/carnap/carnap-quine.html
> [18]
> https://cs.uwaterloo.ca/~jhoey/teaching/cs886-affect/papers/LakoffJohnsonMetaphorsWeLiveBy.pdf
> [19]
> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1364661317301535
> [20] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fluid_Concepts_and_Creative_Analogies
>
> On 7/18/25 1:59 PM, glen wrote:
>
> I dug out 10 posts that I think provide the corpus for this discussion.
> Attached. And I may find the energy/desire to do some kind of work fleshing
> it out. But first, Steve's invocation of "explanation" (either in the xAI
> sense or the science/knowledge sense) reminded me of Melanie's article:
> https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.adt6140.
>
> In contrasting Hofstadter's conception versus Lakoff's, and in light of
> our (well, some of us) reification of LLMs as humans or humans as LLMs, the
> question that consistently emerges is What is the relationship between
> computation and body?
>
> I've expressed my stance several times, I think. That formal definitions
> of "compute", like the one Lee proposed awhile back (by Soare) [⛧] that
> requires computation be definite, do not exist outside or apart from bodies
> of some kind. So in the context of both Dave's brain-computer and Eric's
> actual-formal evolution, my stance is not Platonic (or Popper's World 3 ...
> or whatever). Even/especially things like code/proofs executable as
> software have bodies. To some extent, if it can't be executed, then it's
> not True/real, hearkening back to "effective procedures" or somesuch. But
> going back to Eric's question on 7/16/25 6:19 PM about what work is done by
> the theory itself, assuming some of these abstractions (analogies,
> computable expressions) are schematic, we can make them less
> semantic/bound/definite by making them polysemous/multiply[bound|defined].
> So in Eric's case, the terms in the/a logic of evolution can be unbound and
> rebound to a new context (and maybe tested for inference and fidelity after
> the rebinding). Or in Dave's (and Steve's and Melanie's), unbind our
> "language" about people and rebind them to LLMs. Then as in ALife, rebind
> evolution and maybe even brain-computer (given models like Beliefs,
> Desires, and Intention or other forms of agency). I'm too ignorant to
> understand [un|re]binding in RNA Worlds - but I assume something similar
> could be done, as Eric seems to suggest.
>
> So my answer to the relationship between computation and body, maybe
> resolving Hofstadter vs Lakoff, lies in this [un|re]binding of the "logic".
> And where such [un|re]binding fails, you can ratchet it back a bit. Maybe
> not *all* the terms in the logic can be [un|re]bound, but *some* can. To be
> clear, I'm also talking about functions being [un|re]bound/implemented, not
> merely atoms.
>
> To me, that sort of program would lead to a methodologically useful theory
> of analogy/metaphor. I feel like I've been infected with something like
> type theory in saying this. I can't help but think there is a cadre of
> people already doing this work. They just don't call it "theory of
> metaphor".
>
>
> [⛧]
> https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203100806-2/logic-modeling-logics-models-rudolph-lee
>
> --
> ¡sıɹƎ ןıɐH ⊥ ɐןןǝdoɹ ǝ uǝןƃ
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