[FRIAM] Will it have free will?

Pieter Steenekamp pieters at randcontrols.co.za
Wed Mar 5 21:43:03 EST 2025


Consciousness? Sure. Free will? Not so much.
Science still doesn’t really understand consciousness, but I do think
humans are conscious. Free will, though? I don’t believe in it—it seems
more like a trick our minds play on us.

On Thu, 6 Mar 2025 at 04:34, Marcus Daniels <marcus at snoutfarm.com> wrote:

> Will it have consciousness?
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> *On Behalf Of *Frank Wimberly
> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 5, 2025 6:23 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam at redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Will it have free will?
>
>
>
> The real issue is consciousness.
>
>
>
> ---
> Frank C. Wimberly
> 140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
> Santa Fe, NM 87505
>
> 505 670-9918
> Santa Fe, NM
>
>
>
> On Wed, Mar 5, 2025, 7:20 PM Pieter Steenekamp <pieters at randcontrols.co.za>
> wrote:
>
> First, a quick note on biological computing—it’s a fascinating field. Note
> to self: keep an eye on its development.
>
> Now, back to the question: Will it have free will?
>
> I assume this question is based on the premise that humans possess free
> will. Personally, I doubt that we do (see the appendix below for Grok’s
> take on free will).
>
> However, if humans do have free will, then I believe both silicon-based
> and biological computers will eventually develop it as well. While I can’t
> prove it, I see no reason to believe that the human brain and mind possess
> some uniquely special quality that cannot be replicated—whether in silicon
> or artificial biology.
>
>
> Appendix, Grok's take on free will:
>
> Prompt: Please take a deep dive into  free will.
>
> Grok's reply: (https://x.com/i/grok/share/y64vGpfh7PGGYQlos6M7TjrUg)
>
>
> Key Points
>
>    - Research suggests free will is complex, with debates on whether we
>    can make choices independently of prior causes.
>    - Some believe free will exists and is compatible with determinism,
>    while others argue it’s an illusion if everything is predetermined.
>    - Neuroscience shows brain activity may precede conscious decisions,
>    but interpretations vary, fueling controversy.
>    - The concept impacts morality and law, with no clear consensus,
>    making it a deeply debated topic.
>
> Definition and Philosophical Debate
>
> Free will is generally seen as the ability to make choices not fully
> determined by past events or external forces. Philosophers are divided into
> two main camps:
>
>    - Compatibilists argue that free will can coexist with determinism,
>    meaning our choices are free if they align with our desires, even if those
>    desires are caused by prior events. For example, choosing ice cream because
>    you love sweets is free will, even if your love for sweets was shaped by
>    upbringing.
>    - Incompatibilists believe free will requires choices not determined
>    by prior causes. They split into:
>
>
>    - Libertarians, who think free will exists and determinism is false,
>       suggesting some indeterminacy allows free choices.
>       - Hard determinists, who say if determinism is true, free will is
>       an illusion, as all actions are the result of prior causes.
>
> Key arguments include the Consequence Argument, which says if determinism
> is true, we can’t choose otherwise, and the Origination Argument, which
> claims free will needs us to be the ultimate source of our actions, not
> external causes. Compatibilists counter with ideas like Frankfurt’s
> argument, showing moral responsibility without the ability to do otherwise,
> and Strawson’s reactive attitudes, suggesting our moral judgments persist
> regardless of determinism.
>
> Scientific Insights
>
> Neuroscience, particularly studies like Benjamin Libet’s, shows brain
> activity (readiness potential) often precedes conscious decision-making,
> suggesting decisions might be determined before we’re aware. However, this
> is debated: some see it as evidence against free will, while others argue
> we can still veto actions, preserving some freedom, especially for
> significant decisions. Recent research, like a 2023 study challenging
> Libet’s paradigm, suggests these findings may not fully disprove free will,
> as experimental procedures can influence results (Neuroscience News
> <https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/>).
>
> Implications and Conclusion
>
> The debate affects how we view morality and law—do we hold people
> responsible for crimes if their actions were determined? While no consensus
> exists, it seems likely that free will is a useful concept for society,
> even if its reality is uncertain. The evidence leans toward a compatibilist
> view for practical purposes, but the controversy ensures the discussion
> continues.
> ------------------------------
>
> A Comprehensive Exploration of Free Will: Philosophical, Scientific, and
> Societal Dimensions
>
> Free will, the notion that individuals can make choices independently of
> deterministic forces, is a cornerstone of philosophical inquiry, scientific
> research, and societal structures. This exploration delves into its
> definitions, historical debates, scientific findings, and broader
> implications, offering a detailed survey for those seeking a deeper
> understanding.
>
> Historical and Philosophical Context
>
> The concept of free will has roots in ancient Greek philosophy and has
> evolved through centuries of debate. At its core, free will is often
> defined as the capacity to make decisions not wholly determined by prior
> events or external influences, allowing for the possibility of choosing
> otherwise in identical circumstances. However, this definition varies,
> leading to divergent philosophical positions.
>
> Key Philosophical Positions
>
> Philosophers are broadly divided into compatibilists and incompatibilists,
> each with nuanced subcategories:
>
>    - Compatibilism: This view posits that free will is compatible with
>    determinism. Compatibilists argue that freedom lies in acting according to
>    one’s own desires and preferences, even if those are determined by prior
>    causes. For instance, choosing to eat ice cream because you enjoy sweets is
>    considered free, even if your preference was shaped by upbringing.
>
>
>    - Hierarchical View: Proposed by Harry Frankfurt, this suggests free
>       will involves a harmony between first-order desires (what we want) and
>       second-order desires (what we want to want). If these align, we have free
>       will, regardless of determinism (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
>       <https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/>).
>       - Reasons-Responsive View: John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza
>       argue that free will is present if an agent can respond to reasons for
>       action, such as deciding to walk a dog based on the need for exercise, even
>       in a deterministic framework.
>
>
>    - Incompatibilism: This stance holds that free will cannot coexist
>    with determinism, splitting into two camps:
>
>
>    - Libertarianism: Advocates believe free will exists and requires
>       indeterminism, suggesting that some choices are not fully determined,
>       possibly due to quantum mechanics. They argue for a non-physical aspect to
>       decision-making, allowing genuine freedom.
>       - Hard Determinism: This position accepts determinism and concludes
>       free will is an illusion, as all actions are the inevitable result of prior
>       causes, leaving no room for alternative choices.
>
> The debate hinges on definitions of freedom. Incompatibilists often define
> free will as the ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same
> circumstances, while compatibilists argue that “same circumstances”
> includes internal states, allowing for different choices if those states
> differ.
>
> Major Arguments
>
> To illustrate, consider the following table summarizing key arguments from
> both sides, drawn from philosophical literature:
>
> *Position*
>
> *Main Arguments*
>
> *Key Details and Examples*
>
> *References/URLs*
>
> Against Free Will (Incompatibilism)
>
> -
>
> Consequence Argument
>
> : If determinism is true, no one has a choice about the future (Section
> 4a).
>
> - Based on fixed past and laws of nature; uses modal operators ☐
> (necessary) and N (no choice); concludes no free will if determinism is
> true (e.g., Lincoln's assassination fixed).
>
> Ginet (1966), van Inwagen (1983)
>
> -
>
> Origination Argument
>
> : Free will requires being the originator of actions; determinism prevents
> this (Section 4b).
>
> - Valid argument: Premises 1 (free will needs origination), 2 (determinism
> means external causation), 3 (no origination if externally caused);
> concludes no free will if determinism is true (e.g., brainwashing vs.
> self-origin).
>
> Kane (1998)
>
> For Free Will (Compatibilism)
>
> -
>
> Rejecting Incompatibilist Arguments
>
> : Denies Origination Argument's premise 1 using hierarchical or
> reasons-responsive views (Section 5a).
>
> - Hierarchical view (Frankfurt, 1971): Free will is 1st/2nd-order desire
> mesh, compatible with determinism. Reasons-responsive view (Fischer and
> Ravizza, 1998): Free if responsive to reasons, e.g., Allison's dog walk
> decision.
>
> Frankfurt (1971), Fischer and Ravizza (1998)
>
> -
>
> Frankfurt’s Argument
>
> : Moral responsibility possible without ability to do otherwise (Section
> 5b).
>
> - Example: Allison decides to walk dog, chip ensures decision if she
> didn't, but chip unused; still morally responsible despite no alternative
> (Section 5b).
>
> Frankfurt (1969), Widerker and McKenna (2003)
>
> -
>
> Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes
>
> : Moral responsibility based on reactive attitudes, unaffected by
> determinism (Section 5c).
>
> - Reactive attitudes (gratitude, resentment) persist despite determinism;
> not undermined for moral agents (e.g., bumping into someone vs. being
> pushed); supports compatibilism.
>
> P. Strawson (1963)
>
> Pessimism
>
> - Free will impossible whether determinism or indeterminism is true
> (Section 3c).
>
> - If determined, no control; if indeterministic (e.g., reasons occur
> randomly), control still lacking, e.g., Allison's dog walk decision based
> on chance.
>
> Broad (1952), G. Strawson (1994)
>
> The Consequence Argument, for instance, uses modal logic to argue that if
> determinism is true, the past and laws of nature fix the future, leaving no
> room for choice (e.g., Lincoln’s assassination was inevitable). The
> Origination Argument adds that free will requires being the source of
> actions, which determinism undermines, as seen in cases like brainwashing,
> where actions are externally caused.
>
> Compatibilists counter with Frankfurt’s thought experiment, where an agent
> is responsible for a decision even if a device ensures the outcome, but
> doesn’t intervene, showing responsibility without alternative
> possibilities. Peter Strawson’s reactive attitudes further support this,
> arguing that our natural responses like resentment or gratitude persist
> regardless of determinism, maintaining moral responsibility.
>
> Scientific Investigations
>
> Scientific research, particularly in neuroscience, has added a new
> dimension to the debate. Benjamin Libet’s 1983 study, using
> electroencephalography (EEG), found that brain activity (readiness
> potential) precedes conscious awareness of deciding to move, suggesting
> decisions might be determined before we’re aware (Neuroscience of Free
> Will Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will>).
> This has been interpreted as evidence against free will, supporting hard
> determinism.
>
> However, criticisms abound. Recent research, such as a 2023 study by
> Dmitry Bredikhin, challenges Libet’s paradigm, finding that readiness
> potential may not correlate directly with decisions and that experimental
> procedures can influence results, suggesting Libet’s findings may not
> conclusively disprove free will (Neuroscience News
> <https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/>). Additionally,
> some argue that even if brain activity initiates actions, we can veto them,
> preserving a form of free will, especially for significant decisions like
> choosing a career over a trivial finger movement.
>
> Other studies, like Uri Maoz’s 2019 research, explored meaningful choices,
> such as deciding which nonprofit receives a $1,000 donation, finding that
> brain activity patterns differ for decisions with real consequences,
> potentially supporting free will in important contexts (The Johns Hopkins
> News-Letter
> <https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will>).
> Conversely, neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky argues comprehensively that free
> will doesn’t exist, viewing actions as the sum of biology and environment,
> with no room for independent choice (New Scientist
> <https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/>).
>
>
> Societal and Practical Implications
>
> The debate has profound implications for morality, law, and personal
> identity. If free will is an illusion, can we hold criminals responsible
> for their actions, or should we see them as products of their
> circumstances? Psychological experiments show that undermining belief in
> free will can increase cheating behavior, suggesting its belief is crucial
> for social order (The Atlantic
> <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/>).
> Conversely, believing in free will supports systems of reward, punishment,
> and personal responsibility, deeply embedded in legal and ethical
> frameworks.
>
> Quantum Mechanics and Beyond
>
> Some speculate that quantum indeterminacy, where events are probabilistic
> rather than deterministic, could provide a basis for free will, allowing
> for non-determined choices. However, this is debated, with critics arguing
> that randomness doesn’t equate to freedom, as it lacks control. This
> remains a speculative area, with no consensus, adding another layer to the
> complexity.
>
> Conclusion
>
> The question of free will remains unresolved, with philosophical arguments
> like the Consequence and Origination supporting incompatibilism, and
> compatibilist responses like Frankfurt’s and Strawson’s offering a middle
> ground. Scientific findings, while challenging, do not conclusively
> disprove free will, with recent research suggesting room for freedom in
> meaningful decisions. Given its societal importance, it seems likely that
> free will, even if partially illusory, is a valuable concept for
> maintaining moral and legal systems. The controversy ensures the debate
> will continue, reflecting humanity’s enduring quest to understand our
> agency in a potentially deterministic universe.
>
> Key Citations
>
>    - Free Will Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
>    <https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/>
>    - Free Will Is Only an illusion if You Are, Too Scientific American
>    <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/free-will-is-only-an-illusion-if-you-are-too/>
>    - There's No Such Thing as Free Will The Atlantic
>    <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/>
>    - Neuroscience of Free Will Wikipedia
>    <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will>
>    - A Fresh Look at Free Will: Challenging the Libet Paradigm
>    Neuroscience News <https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/>
>    - Science supports the existence of free will The Johns Hopkins
>    News-Letter
>    <https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will>
>    - Why free will doesn't exist, according to Robert Sapolsky New
>    Scientist
>    <https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, 5 Mar 2025 at 21:18, Marcus Daniels <marcus at snoutfarm.com> wrote:
>
> https://corticallabs.com/research.html
>
> .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. /
> ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-..
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe   /   Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom
> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam
> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
> archives:  5/2017 thru present
> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/
>   1/2003 thru 6/2021  http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/
>
> .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. /
> ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-..
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe   /   Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom
> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam
> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
> archives:  5/2017 thru present
> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/
>   1/2003 thru 6/2021  http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/
>
> .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. /
> ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-..
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe   /   Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom
> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam
> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
> archives:  5/2017 thru present
> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/
>   1/2003 thru 6/2021  http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/attachments/20250306/e90edb55/attachment.html>


More information about the Friam mailing list