[FRIAM] The entropy of thought
steve smith
sasmyth at swcp.com
Thu May 29 12:07:55 EDT 2025
On 5/29/25 9:24 AM, glen wrote:
> Why isn't Lorenz in there somewhere? Seems like an obvious candidate.
/“When the present determines the future, but the approximate present
does not approximately determine the future.”/
— Edward Lorenz, /The Essence of Chaos/ (1993)
What George says when "reminded" of Lorenz:
*
*Edward Lorenz (1963 onward)* may be the /first person to
demonstrate/ in precise mathematical terms a *deterministic system
whose behavior could not be prestated* beyond a short horizon.
*
He /did not/ use the phrase *“deterministic but not prestateable”*,
but *his work embodies it fully*, and later chaos theorists and
philosophers often retroactively describe it that way.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
and here is George's (I don't call GPT George, but for continuity with
Nick, et al I do here) response:
but first for brevity, I cherry picked from below and I like the help
given in my nitpickery style:
*
/“Unpredictable” (Lorenz-style, chaos)/
*
/“Unprestatable” (Kauffman-style, adjacent possible)/
*
/“Undecidable” (Turing/Gödel-style, logic)/
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Me: can you explain perhaps why you might have omitted lorenz
ChatGPT said:
Yes — and I appreciate the callout.
Why Lorenz Might Have Been Omitted (Initially)
There are a few reasons, mostly contextual and framing-based, not due to
oversight of his importance:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. *Interpretive Framing Bias:*
Your original phrase, *“deterministic but not prestateable,”* carries a
flavor that strongly suggests:
*
*Logical / epistemic limits* (e.g., undecidability, incompleteness),
*
*Unenumerable state spaces* (as in Kauffman or Rosen),
*
*Open-endedness* and *emergence* rather than sensitivity or chaos.
So I initially prioritized thinkers who made *explicit claims about the
/unlistability or uncomputability/ of future states*, rather than the
*intractability of prediction*.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. *Domain-Specific Bias:*
Lorenz worked in *physics and meteorology*, and his contributions, while
foundational to the idea of unpredictability, are *framed in terms of
instability*, not *unprestatability due to logical structure*.
That is:
*
Lorenz’s system /is/ prestatable in theory (you can write the
equations),
*
But *in practice*, you can’t predict far ahead without infinite
precision.
Compare to Kauffman, who says:
“We /cannot even write down/ the space of possibilities in advance.”
So the distinction was between:
*Type of barrier* *Lorenz* *Kauffman/Rosen*
Measurement precision limit Yes Sometimes
Computational or logical limit No (the system is computable) Yes (the
phase space isn’t enumerable)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. *Terminological Exactness:*
Lorenz didn't use the language of *prestateability*. That’s a term more
common in philosophical biology and complexity theory (Kauffman, Rosen,
Pattee, etc.).
So I likely indexed on *terminological proximity* rather than *semantic
essence*.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. *Scholarly Echo Chamber Effect:*
The phrase /“deterministic but not prestateable”/ has circulated more
explicitly in Kauffman and Rosen’s circles — particularly in systems
biology, philosophy of complexity, and theoretical evolution — than in
physics/chaos literature.
There’s a subtle linguistic difference between:
*
“Unpredictable” (Lorenz-style, chaos)
*
“Unprestatable” (Kauffman-style, adjacent possible)
*
“Undecidable” (Turing/Gödel-style, logic)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
🧭 Retrospective Correction
You were right to bring Lorenz in. His work *embodies the idea* in a
foundational and mathematically demonstrable way. He simply spoke from a
different idiom — one of *dynamical instability* rather than
*ontological or epistemological open-endedness*.
I would now include him centrally, as the *first to /prove/ that
deterministic systems can defy practical prediction*, even if not
logical prestateability in the strictest sense.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Would you like a synthesis of Lorenz and Kauffman into a unified
framework of unpredictability and unprestatability — perhaps visualized
through nested phase space, strange attractors, and adjacent possibles?
Tools
ChatGPT can make mistakes. Check important info.
>
> On 5/29/25 8:13 AM, steve smith wrote:
>>
>>> < The interesting question is where exactly does the deterministic
>>> system turn into something nondeterministic, and how?>
>>>
>>> It doesn’t. A deterministic system is a deterministic system.
>>>
>> who might have first made the distinction : "deterministic but not
>> pre-stateable"?
>>
>> George offered:
>>
>> Year Thinker Conceptual Expression
>> 1931 Kurt Gödel Incompleteness: truths not derivable
>> 1936 Alan Turing Halting problem: uncomputable predictions
>> 1970s Heinz von Foerster Second-order cybernetics:
>> unknowability of future
>> 1991 Robert Rosen Closure to efficient causation; entailment
>> limits
>> 1993 Stuart Kauffman Adjacent possible; unprestatable evolution
>> 2005 Gregory Chaitin Incompressible but defined numbers
>> (e.g., Ω)
>>
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