[FRIAM] Invasive species (was Metaphor... and more...)
Eric Charles
eric.phillip.charles at gmail.com
Fri Apr 10 18:17:31 EDT 2026
Ah... so they did not know if it was "invasive", because it wasn't
relevant... they were happy to "mitigate" the problem even if the cause was
native to the area đ
With "problem" defined in terms of some group's economic interests đ
I'm not sure exactly the context for the data you provided, but it sounds
like the 1.4% number is for intentionally introduced "biological control
agents", which would exclude species that were accidentally introduced
(escaped pets, etc.) and species introduced for other purposes (such as
africanized bees created in the hopes of increased honey yield). If that is
the case, 1.4% seems plausible... smaller than I would expect, but not by
so much as to make it not plausible.
And, of course, it's hard to talk about any of this for too long without
thinking about the classic Simpsons episode with the flying lizards
(initially beloved by the town for eating all the pesky pigeons): Bolivian
Tree Lizard cleanup plan <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9yruQM1ggc>
Best,
Eric
On Fri, Apr 10, 2026 at 10:43âŻAM glen <gepropella at gmail.com> wrote:
> In order to avoid as much hypocrisy as possible, I took some time to look
> into my use of "biological control", as a friend of mine argued that the
> term is problematic. But 1st I found *this* factoid remarkable:
>
> [U.S. conservation translocations: Over a century of intended
> consequences](https://doi.org/10.1111/csp2.394)
>
> "... only 1.4% (42) of 3,014 biological control agents released globally
> have caused ecosystem-level deleterious impacts. All of these were
> initially released before the 1980s and conservation-based practice and
> governance in recent decades have reduced off-target impacts from
> biological control practice."
>
> The extent of that success floors me. Even if they've flubbed the numbers
> a bit, deleterious effects down in the single digit percentages is amazing.
> Anyway, here's the terminology Consensus suggested:
>
> ⢠classical biological control (CBC)
> ⢠conservation translocation
> - reintroduction
> - reinforcement
> - assisted colonization, and
> - ecological replacement
>
> Of those, I think it's fair to say that CBC has resulted in *some*, but
> limited classifications of "invasive". But conservation translocation has a
> pretty good record. And just to complete the thought, here's a pass at the
> criteria for slapping "invasive" on the thing:
>
> ⢠Local abundance: high relative cover, biomass, or density compared with
> other species in plots or communities
> ⢠Spread rate: rate at which populations expand from the introduction
> point (e.g., distance or area increase per year)
> ⢠Geographic range size: total invaded area or number of occupied
> sites/regions
> ⢠Environmental (niche) range: diversity of environments (climates,
> habitats) where the species maintains populations
> ⢠Alien species richness = alien species / total species.
> ⢠Alien abundance = alien individuals or cover / total community.
>
>
> On 4/9/26 11:23 AM, glen wrote:
> > No, not really. They (the working scientists at the WADA) do not like
> the term "invasive" at all. Their job is to discover, mitigate, and advise.
> So it's less about being ordered, sorry for using that flippantly, to do
> their job than it is about discovering imminent threats to the economy (and
> ecology, but mostly economy). So they do a lot of scientific work. But when
> they do discover something, they really have no idea of its prevalence in
> the territory, much less whether they can call it invasive or not.
> >
> > As for the "thing", the "it" doing the replacing, again, no. Often it's
> better described as a phenomenon like aggressive death of some "thing"
> (e.g. colony collapse or a deformed crop). They don't know *why* that thing
> is dying. Most often, yes, it's due to an "it" like a parasite, often
> _introduced_. Even worse, sometimes that "it" is very large. But sometimes
> it's very very small. "It" can even take the form of a "pressure" from a
> constellation of many things like soil quality, rising temperatures,
> shifting microclimates, etc. Even if there is a singular "it", they won't
> call it "invasive" until they study the *effects*, its impact, the
> phenomena, of its presence. And that often takes awhile. If "it" has been
> _introduced_ in other places, there's usually a publication corpus. So if,
> say, that set of phenomena happened in California, Oregon, or British
> Columbia and *they* determined an "invasive" "it", then the WADA people
> will use that term. But if nobody else has seen that
> > array of phenomena, then they have a LOT of basic research to do before
> they'll call it that. Sometimes, it takes so long to come to that
> conclusion that, by that time, the "it" has become "naturalized" and
> neither "invasive" nor "introduced" are good terms for the present or
> future, only for talking about the past. They still do it, of course, in
> order to publish for the benefit of other territories. Such questions are
> especially important when deciding *how* to mitigate, sometimes even a
> statewide, purposeful introduction of a "biological control". And if they
> do that on purpose, they *definitely* don't then call the "it" they
> introduced "invasive" ... because they'd be fired, tarred, & feathered if
> they introduced an invasive thing on purpose.
> >
> > The point being, their practical work is ALL about features. Even when
> they identify an "it" (e.g. murder hornets), what they care about is the
> *effect* on the ecology and, especially, crops like commercial pollination.
> They really don't care much about the animal or organism. It's about the
> "relative rates of change" in the salient features.
> >
> > Words do have operational meaning. And using the wrong word gets you
> "blown off", especially people like me who can't stay in their lane.
> >
> > On 4/9/26 8:20 AM, Eric Charles wrote:
> >> Oh... huh... that's... huh....
> >>
> >> I mean... it was an invasive species... not an invasive function... and
> they were presumably trying to deal with the organisms that composed that
> species... so you can't focus on the "what /functions /is it replacing"
> without there being an "it" that is doing the replacing... can you?...
> but... at any rate...
> >>
> >> One thing I'm fascinated by is people's (in-general) failure to
> distinguish between a broad term and the subcategory of that term they
> particularly care about. It creates weird linguistic drift, as seen in
> modern discussions of "racism" and "discrimination", for example. In Glen's
> story we might or might not want to distinguish between "invasive species"
> and "invasive species we are highly concerned about because it seems likely
> to upset the entire ecosystem". Presumably any species that is expanding
> into new territory is "invasive"... it is invading a territory it did not
> previously have... so whatever pest is in question, IS invasive... right?*
> The question shouldn't be whether it is invasive, but rather whether the
> invasiveness is problematic**, and we should therefore do something to try
> to stop it, or at least mitigate its effects.
> >>
> >> While obviously future-ecosystem-wide-impact is necessarily
> speculative... I would assume one way to get at the distinction would be to
> know the place of origin of the invasive species. Are we talking about an
> event occuring at the intersection of naturally occuring ecosystems? For
> example, is a new species of newt that evolved in the Appalachian mountains
> starting to slowly expand down creeks that lead into the flat lands of
> Virginia? Or are we talking about wild boar from another continent that
> someone brought in as pets, but which are now running wild and expanding
> rapidly through the state? Probably the field of conservation ecology takes
> that into account, along with many other factors, based on research over
> the past several decades (it's a relatively young field).
> >>
> >> Apparently the people Glen was dealing with weren't the decision makers
> in that regard, as they had been "ordered" to come deal with the new
> species. But someone, somewhere, might have been able to give a very clear
> answer to that question.
> >>
> >> Heck, a local naturalist with enough experience might be able to give a
> fairly accurate expert judgement on that without the need for specific
> study, if they have been tracking the transition: "Oh, yeah, them...
> well... I first saw that spotted newt up on Rupert's Peak over 40 years
> ago, and old Nell from over in Union County said he saw them in the high
> mountains during the summers when he was a kid. They have been coming this
> way for a long time, and don't seem to be causing much trouble." (I knew a
> handful of the local naturalists when I lived in Altoona, Pennsylvania, but
> haven't really known them in other areas where I have lived, and this is
> exactly the kind of thing they would tell you... whether you asked about it
> or not...***)
> >>
> >> In any case, still "invasive".
> >>
> >> * Assuming the researchers are correct that it wasn't there before.
> >> ** "is problematic" = "we think it should be viewed as problematic for
> reasons" because obviously something can only be "problematic" in relation
> to an implicit or explicit belief about how things should be
> >> *** I assume Nick will now object that HE was a local naturalist in
> Worcester gosh darn it!... but I didn't really interact with him in that
> capacity đ
> >>
> >> Best,
> >> EricC
> >>
> >> <mailto:echarles at american.edu>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Wed, Apr 8, 2026 at 11:04âŻAM glen <gepropella at gmail.com <mailto:
> gepropella at gmail.com>> wrote:
> >>
> >> I feel like I'm going to regret this post. But what the hell, eh?
> >>
> >> I was down with an unordered:
> >> ⢠collection of features
> >> ⢠measurement method
> >> ⢠successive execution of the method
> >> ⢠relative rates of change
> >>
> >> So at the end of EricS' post, including the parse of "cause", I
> felt like I was stable. But then EricC goes on about "animals change",
> "species change", and "organisms". OK, to be fair, EricS did use
> "generations" and "reproductive". So there's an implicit ... what? ...
> unit, atom, ... thing in there that we all agree is doing the _generating_
> [â§]. And it's common for that sort of thing to be entirely latent, occult.
> But I took EricS' primary criticism as pointing out that it *is* occult,
> and speculation about the generator(s) has to take a particular form
> (namely relative frequency and rates of change of the features given the
> measurement method). I.e. any conjecture about the generator has to be
> grounded in that.
> >>
> >> And as anecdotal evidence that "field biologists" aren't unfamiliar
> with this, I accidentally ran across a bunch of WA state Dept of Ag field
> workers having a conversation about some pest they've been ordered to
> mitigate. After my introduction as an ultracrepidarian, I asked them how
> confident they were that this pest was "invasive" or merely slowly,
> beneficially swapping out with some other species, performing the same
> "function"? (There's a word for that they used ... but I've forgotten it.
> Give me a break. This conversation happened more than a year ago at the
> pub!) All 4 of them admitted there is no reliable measure to determine
> that. Over time, they can estimate its tendency to take over more and/or
> different "function" than the one it's replacing in the niche. But the more
> time that takes, the less it looks "invasive". So, at least these
> particular government bureaucrats are grounded in the "relative rates of
> change between the featuers" and barely committed to the
> >> concepts of "animals", "species", and "organisms".
> >>
> >> As always, sorry for my incompetence. But I'm, as always, grateful
> for any generous clues.
> >>
> >>
> >> [â§] And now for something mostly different. [2026 Sanders Prize in
> Metaphysics](
> https://dailynous.com/2026/04/08/2026-sanders-prize-in-metaphysics-winners-announced/
> <
> https://dailynous.com/2026/04/08/2026-sanders-prize-in-metaphysics-winners-announced/>).
> I can't express how excited I am by the phrase "... truthmaker semantics
> can be used to explain how logically complex sentences can be meaningful
> (and true) despite there being no logically complex propositions for them
> to express." Will I actually read the paper? Maybe! ... Prolly not. 8^(
> >>
> >> On 4/7/26 10:23 PM, Eric Charles wrote:
> >> > "I can come up with a story about why these should or might
> matter to reproductive success and through it to frequency change, and
> because I can describe some mechanism, my story will be built up around
> that mechanism."
> >> >
> >> > I can come up with a story about why these should or might
> matter to reproductive success, and through it to frequency change, and
> because I can describe some mechanism..... I can carry out experiments, and
> observational studies, in the well established traditions of the field
> biologist, ethologist, biological anthropologist, etc., to confirm the
> viability of that theory, and thereby increase my confidence that I have
> correctly identified the crucial way in which the organisms under my study
> fit their environment. And when I do so, I will not sweep under the rug all
> the background knowledge (in terms of comparisons with other species and/or
> engineering principles) that led to the initial hypothesis.
> >> >
> >> > The connection to empirical field research is critical. The
> pure-math approach is viable in its self-contained world (and I have read
> enough early statistics work, including Fischer, to deeply appreciate that
> world), but it mentally disconnects those discussing the topic from the
> wild world in which the organisms live. Yes, obviously everything you say
> about regressions is true, but the question for Darwin wasn't whether or
> not animals change over time; due to fossil evidence, the scientific
> community at large already agreed that species change. The question was WHY
> do certain traits become more prominent in future generations. The
> regression, at best, shows which traits are corresponding to reproductive
> success ("at best", because of all the well understood challenges of
> ascribing causality to that math, which we don't need to rehash in this
> setting). Testing the hypothesis in the field can confirm (or refute) our
> intuitive notions (our stories) regarding why certain
> >> traits
> >> > should be favored over others, and that includes sometimes
> refuting the causality a researcher wishes to imply by displaying a very
> pretty regression analysis.
> >> >
> >> > Nick... why did you reopen this conversation after EricS nodded
> sagely at my prior post? You really, really don't know how to take a win.
> >> >
> >> > Also, why the hell do you keep sending your old papers? If there
> is a warm body willing to read anything, you should be sending out the
> draft manuscript!
> >> >
> >> > EricS... if you are willing to read anything, I would greatly
> value your reading some of the book-in-progress, which incorporates exactly
> the papers Nick keeps sending you... but... as an added benefit, the book
> draft is more focused on the overall argument, and less stuck to 40-60 year
> old literature. I would happily send you the current draft, and direct you
> to the parts corresponding to the papers Nick recently shared, if you would
> be willing to take a look.
> >> >
> >> > Best,
> >> > Eric
> >> >
> >> > -
> >> > <mailto:echarles at american.edu <mailto:echarles at american.edu>>
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > On Tue, Apr 7, 2026 at 10:35âŻPM Santafe <desmith at santafe.edu
> <mailto:desmith at santafe.edu> <mailto:desmith at santafe.edu <mailto:
> desmith at santafe.edu>>> wrote:
> >> >
> >> > Nick, you are a sundew.
> >> >
> >> > Was that a metaphor? Maybe more of a taxonomic
> classification.
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > There are two things at work here, both of which I will fail
> to impact by whatever I write below:
> >> >
> >> > 1. A large part of the mismatch is the degree to which
> reading you is, for me, like reading a literal text translation into
> contemporary English of something written in the 5th century. There were
> plenty of priests at that time, as smart as anybody alive today, who would
> have insisted that things they said were meaningful. But knowing they
> would say it, and that they were smart, doesnât enable me to see it that
> way. Nothing I write will make that the source of that mismatch visible to
> you, for the simple reason that the one thing none of us can see is the
> back of his own head. I no more than you.
> >> >
> >> > 2. A lot of this is about what different people feel like
> thinking about. Nothing I can say below will have any effect on what you
> feel like thinking about. So your discourse will continue unrefracted,
> like neutrinos or dark matter, along its present course. And thatâs, of
> course, COMPLETELY FINE. If that werenât the point of freedom, what would
> be?
> >> >
> >> > All this I know. Iâll annoy the list and break my own word
> anyway, in the hope that whatever I leave in the record of the list was as
> good an effort as I could make to say something that seems coherent and
> correct to me, now and later if I ever see it again.
> >> >
> >> > Iâll also note that the chatbotâs summary of my position is
> incorrect in its points 2 and 3. But thatâs not a big deal either. The
> bots prioritize, in this order: 1) gracefulness; 2) inclusiveness of
> coverage of their inputs, if that is convenient; and 3) semantic coherence,
> if they get lucky and it works out that way. It broke a bit at 2
> (inclusiveness, since I never said I think statistics is complete and
> mechanistic analysis non-contributing), and coherence at a meaning level
> starts off already impaired in that way. The chatbotâs point 3 is just
> flatly wrong. But whatever; itâs fine. We know they do that, and we make
> allowances.
> >> >
> >> > All the same, the chatbotâs synopsis layer is fine to work
> within â a lot more graceful than my writing â and your sending it is good
> faith.
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > So, then, what?: Whatâs at issue in all this
> back-and-forth?:
> >> >
> >> > 1. What can you vaguely wave around at, and what do you
> need to mean something fairly definite about?
> >> >
> >> > 1.a. If the job is to account for changes in the
> frequency-of-attestation of features in some population, then their
> relative rates of change through reproductive generations is the brute
> mechanics producing those changes. I think if we believe in
> non-hallucinatory observation of populations, we are stuck with this much.
> You donât get to choose this, or to fudge it, or to hem and haw and waffle
> and dart into the fog. You have to commit to something. NOTE HERE PLEASE
> that I explicitly used a very general, observational-type term that I did
> not define â ârates of change through reproductive generationsâ â and I DID
> NOT USE SOME JARGON-TERM (such as âreproductive successâ, which I also
> didnât define), because if one has to treat this part 1.a carefully, then
> one canât just waffle around in informal English. (Unless you _want_ the
> conversation to be incapable of ever resolving by going in some definite
> directionâŚ.) Itâs a pity that Fisher was such a jerk, while
> >> Sewall
> >> > Wright was, by all accounts, a complete gentleman his whole
> life. But Wright wasnât a statistician, and neither were the others
> working at the lead-in to the 1930s. And the way the rest of them were
> trying to describe these things could have gone around in circles for
> centuries more. So, jerk or no jerk, and whatever the other limitations of
> his method, Fisher cut out the incoherence and set down some methods that
> enabled the field to be definite about how it was quantifying various rates
> of change from observations, and thus to make commitments about what its
> causal models were hoped to account for. Thatâs why I keep coming back to
> him. There is a specific piece of this that involves defining the
> observable topics for scientific inquiry, and any possibility of meaning
> for any other elements is contingent on doing that first one coherently.
> >> >
> >> > 1a.i: Now clearly, the frequency of attestation of a feature
> in a population can change by a variety of processes, some of which you
> want to attach to individuals and others to population states (all of
> these, â obviously â in context of other environment boundary-condition
> contexts), some of which you expect might be explicable in terms of parent
> properties, and others of which you donât think should be predictable at
> all within this scope (sampling noise). This is why you donât get to just
> offhand-conflate change in frequency of attestation of features with
> âreproductive successâ, unless you want people to blow you off. You need
> to define what you are going to mean by âa contribution from `reproductive
> successâ â, and other contributions from other things (mutation,
> environment-dependent plasticity in how the feature expresses, novel
> functional aspects of what the feature _is_, still sampling noise, and on
> and on). âReproductive successâ itself might get
> >> decomposed
> >> > into attributes sensibly attachable to an organism and
> others that would not make sense if attached in that way (maybe they only
> make sense if attached to the interaction of mating pairs of organisms).
> This bullet-point-here (1.a.i) is the one behind my remark to Frank that
> âreproductive successâ is only one component of change in frequency of
> attestation, because I know this will be obvious and second-nature to him.
> It will also be obvious to him that a decomposition of a total-change
> statistic into different components can be checked for being well-defined,
> while at the same time there may be some conventional choices in how the
> decomposition is done, and one can debate whether they were good or poor
> choices.
> >> >
> >> > 1.a.ii: Do you understand that _I really donât care_ what
> you call these things, as long as you will tell me what you are using and
> then stay with it. If you donât like that Fisher called a certain
> component âfitnessâ, then You do You. I donât care. What I do care about
> is that the quantity we are talking about has mechanical roles that we
> donât get to dictate, and so we are bound by those.
> >> >
> >> > 1.b. After we accept that we are bound by 1.a., everything
> else is up to us in what we think the explanatory problem is. Here, I
> think, is where you want to claim there is a there there for a certain
> point of view, and I am not moved. We have two examples: Your parable of
> the shirts below is one. Similar is EricCâs history-anchored
> characterization of the Parrots and Large Ground Finches et alia, which he
> began with the sentence opening: Fitness = How well the organism fits the
> environmentâŚ. Now, if you asked me (which you didnât) how I would
> summarize the content of those passages, in operational language that I
> find meaningful, my summary would be: I can come up with a story about why
> these should or might matter to reproductive success and through it to
> frequency change, and because I can describe some mechanism, my story will
> be built up around that mechanism. Okay. If you want there to be a term
> âfitnessâ that unpacks to these sorts of âI can come up
> >> with a
> >> > storyâŚ.â passages, then that choice will allow you to make
> statements like: "the amount of money made by the shirt-wearer is just not
> what is meant by the fit of the shirtâ (Nick, through the parable); or "We
> expect fitness to predict survival (to reproductive age) and reproductive
> success, but there is no guarantee that it does in any particular caseâ
> (EricC, with not quite the same meaning, and a meaning that admits an
> interpretation much more compatible with Fisherâs statistical
> decomposition). Since EricC was not so specific that I know what he meant,
> let me keep the tar brush away from him. He could have meant (and his
> "Fitness = How well the organism fitsâ would be consistent with having
> meant) that âI had a story that it should matter, but it turns out not to
> have mattered as I expectedâ, but he could also just have been referring to
> the difference between a single stochastic trajectory and the average over
> a distribution of such trajectories, which
> >> would be
> >> > totally normal, or that the Price equation contains
> additional terms beyond Fisherâs covariance, which would also be normal.
> But Nick, insofar as he will ever hold still on a meaning if it looks like
> he is about to be held responsible for it, does seem to mean âI had a story
> that it (this or that fashion element of shirt measure) would show up in
> reproductive success (wealth), but it didnât.â
> >> >
> >> > 1.b.i: Now, you are welcome to try to come up with a term
> that unpacks to âI can come up with a story for whyâŚ.â, so that you can
> make such sentences. But I wonât join you in doing that. âI can come up
> with a story for whyâŚ" sounds to me like a hypothesis, which has the great
> holy virtue that it can be wrong. To try to take the same thing and make
> it the foundation for a definition looks to me like running headlong into
> the brambles. Please go ahead, but I will stay here.
> >> >
> >> > 1.b.ii: The fact that the chatbot has re-glossed one of the
> senses you want for a term âfitnessâ as âadaptational adequacyâ, which you
> hate, should be informative. I told you in an earlier email that all these
> terms, âfitnessâ, âadaptationâ, etc., are not in any sense interchangeable
> for me. I can unpack âadaptationâ on its own with measures of deviation of
> a realized outcome from some null hypothesis. (And I do formalize it that
> way.) That leaves the poor word âadequacyâ hanging out there exposed,
> where all can see that you havenât said anything about how you will assess
> what is adequate and what is not. Because, of course, there is either the
> fact that it shows evidence of producing frequency change through
> reproductive success, which is (I say) the hypothesis we wish to test, and
> (you say) is this disappointing tautology, or else there is some other
> meaning like "Nick finds this _so_ compellingâ, which I donât think works
> for definitions.
> >> >
> >> > 1.c: The various sub-points of 1.b are harped on to argue
> that hypotheses and definitions are not interchangeable. _Of course_, I am
> not averse to all sorts of pattern recognition, classification,
> abstraction, etc. In my lexicon: An âabstraction" never violates the
> instances _of which it is a classification_. So first get straight what
> features do result in changes in their own frequencies, what empirical
> evidence you have for that, and how they do so. That will remain correct
> after you classify cases, if it was correct before you did the
> classification. If you can find more general patterns in the relations
> that lead to feature-frequency change, then great; add to the interpretive
> richness of evolutionary theory.
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > So does this help?
> >> >
> >> > Iâll give you one last example of what I mean when I say
> that you write things that sound 5th-century to me, and then explain what I
> think a modern could put in its place that wouldnât sound that way.
> >> >
> >> > A few days ago, you wrote "Well, if we do believe that the
> relative success of every genetic type of organism is systematic then it
> has a cause.â In informal speech, I can go along with this, when we are
> broadly in agreement. But to write that after you have just written things
> like "The essence of D's theory is that success causes fitness, and that
> fitness causes success.â, I know there is going to be a big mess because
> you havenât said what you want âcauseâ to mean, and are likely to run off
> into the fog if I try to pin you down about it. So thatâs where you sound
> like a Scholastic, or a pre-Leibnizian, responding to the forms of
> sentences without being serious about the need for a semantic grounding.
> >> >
> >> > Here is what I would say Glymour, Pearl, and others would
> put in place of your sentence about â⌠it has a cause.â Rather: âThis
> certain pattern of systematic correlations, including the impacts upon them
> of changes in environmental conditions (Pearlâs âDOâ operator) is eligible
> to be _what we mean by_ `cause' for this class of problems.â
> >> >
> >> > I didnât go in thinking âcauseâ was just a term I could
> use. Thus, when you toss it off in a sentence about how two other things
> that you also havenât defined cause each other (even in a virtuous
> feedback), not only can I not attach a meaning to the terms in the
> sentence; I canât even tell what kind of a sentence it is supposed to be.
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > All best,
> >> >
> >> > Eric
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >> On Apr 8, 2026, at 5:24, Nicholas Thompson <
> thompnickson2 at gmail.com <mailto:thompnickson2 at gmail.com> <mailto:
> thompnickson2 at gmail.com <mailto:thompnickson2 at gmail.com>>> wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> DES, et al.,
> >> >>
> >> >> I have called in george as a mediator:
> >> >>
> >> >> Here is my prompt:
> >> >>
> >> >> */George, I need your help with communication. I am
> corresponding with a mathematician, complexity theorist,
> mathematics-of-life guy, who says he's unable to understand my point of
> view. He is a very bright guy, so this is embarrassing to me. I think my
> view on the relation between fitness and natural selection is at LEAST
> cognizable. Can you please play the role of mediator here, stating the two
> positions and then finding points of agreement and articulating real points
> of disagreement./*
> >> >>
> >> >> Here is his reply
> >> >>
> >>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> >>
> >> >> /*Let me try to restate both positions, then separate
> agreement from disagreement.*/
> >> >>
> >> >> /*DES, your position (as I understand it) is that
> evolutionary theory already has a clear and effective framework for dealing
> with selection. We can identify traits, observe changes in their
> frequencies, and use statistical tools to analyze those changes. In that
> framework, âfitnessâ functions as a quantitative characterization of
> differential reproductive success (or closely related model variables). It
> is not intended to name a single underlying causal essence, and explanation
> proceeds through ordinary empirical and statistical work linking variation,
> context, and outcomes.*/
> >> >>
> >> >> /*NST, your position is that this framework, while valid,
> leaves out something essential if âfitnessâ is identified with reproductive
> success. You want to distinguish between (i) the fact that some organisms
> leave more offspring and (ii) the organismâenvironment relations that tend
> to produce that outcome. For that second notion, we can use the placeholder
> adaptational adequacy. Your concern is that if fitness is defined only in
> terms of realized reproductive success, then evolutionary theory lacks an
> independently characterized concept for those relations and risks becoming
> purely retrospective.*/
> >> >>
> >> >> /*Crucially, NSTâs view is not that this second notion is
> mysterious or inaccessible. It is studied through established biological
> methods â especially comparative approaches that examine the form,
> behavior, and physiology of organisms in relation to their environments
> across cases. By identifying recurring patterns in how particular traits
> function in particular contexts, these methods aim to build a body of
> knowledge about which kinds of organismâenvironment relations tend to
> promote success. On this view, adaptational adequacy is not a single formal
> variable, but a structured empirical domain that supports informed
> expectations in new cases.*/
> >> >>
> >> >> /*With that clarification, there is substantial agreement:*/
> >> >>
> >> >> * /*Both of you accept that differential reproductive
> success can be measured and analyzed rigorously. */
> >> >> * /*Both of you accept that explanation requires
> empirical investigation of traits in context. */
> >> >> * /*Both of you accept that there is no single simple
> causal essence underlying all cases of success. */
> >> >>
> >> >> /*The real disagreements are these:*/
> >> >>
> >> >> 1. /*Meaning of âfitnessâ
> >> >> DES uses it as a statistical characterization of
> reproductive success.
> >> >> NST holds that this collapses a distinction and leaves
> no term for the organismâenvironment relations that may explain success. */
> >> >> 2. /*Role of comparative biological knowledge
> >> >> DES treats the statistical framework as sufficient for
> evolutionary explanation.
> >> >> NST holds that comparative and functional studies
> provide an additional, indispensable layer: they identify patterns of
> adaptational adequacy that are not captured by outcome measures alone. */
> >> >> 3. /*Prediction vs. retrospection
> >> >> DES is satisfied with explanation grounded in analysis
> of observed outcomes.
> >> >> NST emphasizes that biology also develops expectations
> about new systems by drawing on accumulated knowledge of how organisms
> interact with environments. */
> >> >>
> >> >> /*A possible way forward is to keep these roles distinct.
> âReproductive successâ (and its statistical representations) can remain the
> outcome variable analyzed by population genetics. At the same time,
> comparative and functional biology can be recognized as developing
> knowledge of organismâenvironment relations â NSTâs adaptational adequacy â
> that help explain and sometimes anticipate those outcomes.*/
> >> >>
> >> >> /*Framed this way, the statistical framework remains
> intact, while NSTâs point is preserved: evolutionary explanation involves
> not only measuring success, but also building a body of knowledge about the
> kinds of relations that tend to produce it.*/
> >> >>
> >> >> *
> >> >> *
> >> >> I would contest George's mediation on one point. Words
> cannot be dragged from their ordinary language meanings too far or too fast
> without creating mischief. Everybody knows that the fit of a shirt has
> something to do with how it sits on the body, and while a man with good
> fitting shirts may make more money than a man with ill-fitting shirts, the
> amount of money made by the shirt-wearer is just not what is meant by the
> fit of the shirt. I can imagine all sorts of well fitting shirts that the
> wearing of which would not make me wealthy. I can also imagine poorly
> fitting shirts that might make me rich. As long as I can even imagine such
> combinations, shirtfit does not mean wealthy.
> >> >>
> >> >> I think that this is where you all will find me most
> irritating. I /*should*/ be willing to accept George's ugly neologism,
> "adaptational adequacy", and concede fitnes to the enumerable contexts in
> which reproductive success is found. I am not! That I continue to be
> irritating in this way should not hide the fact that we seem to agree on
> almost everything else.
> >> >>
> >> >> All the best,
> >> >>
> >> >> Nick
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> On Mon, Apr 6, 2026 at 8:07âŻPM Santafe <desmith at santafe.edu
> <mailto:desmith at santafe.edu> <mailto:desmith at santafe.edu <mailto:
> desmith at santafe.edu>>> wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> Thanks Nick,
> >> >>
> >> >> I will have to read your longer-form work. Your use of
> all this is so far from my own, and so far from any literature and user
> community that I work with or in, that I donât even know what you mean
> different words to be doing in your sentences, and thus what you believe
> yourself to be asserting. (If I could track that much, I could then come
> back to whether I think the assertions âgo throughâ, or under what analysis
> one would make such a judgment.)
> >> >>
> >> >> Clearly this is going to be a matter of just blanking
> my mind (giant magnetostimulation of the brain) and submerging in your
> writing for a while, to try to âget a feelâ for your language usage. Then
> come back to these short forms and see if I can follow them any better.
> >> >>
> >> >> Eric
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>> On Apr 6, 2026, at 7:42, Nicholas Thompson <
> thompnickson2 at gmail.com <mailto:thompnickson2 at gmail.com> <mailto:
> thompnickson2 at gmail.com <mailto:thompnickson2 at gmail.com>>> wrote:
> >> >>>
> >> >>> DES -- One urgent point. I asked George to look at
> our correspondence to see what I was missing. He caught one thing
> immediately "Fitness causes selection, selection causes fitness" is not
> necessarily a tautology nor do i think of it as such. Its a virtuous
> circle, or "spiral" so long as */selection and fitness can be independently
> known. /*
> >> >>> */
> >> >>> /*
> >> >>> I apologise for wiring text that was open to that
> misinterpretation.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> N
> >> >>>
> >> >>> On Sun, Apr 5, 2026 at 5:39âŻAM Santafe <
> desmith at santafe.edu <mailto:desmith at santafe.edu> <mailto:
> desmith at santafe.edu <mailto:desmith at santafe.edu>>> wrote:
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Hi Nick,
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Iâm kind of relieved that I posted âI promise I
> really will shut upâ on Apr 1, before Gilâs brief blast of exasperation,
> which I kind of get. I think I should keep my word, as much as possible
> without being obnoxious.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> At the same time, thank you for taking the time to
> reply, including what I actually wrote, and responding to it in-frame.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Your two papers are attached to the later email,
> too, so we have them. I will read if and as I am able. The abstracts
> sound like they make a much more normal reference to the routine work that
> people actually do, than many of the post-string here have (to me); so that
> is hopeful.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> I tried a couple of times to come up with some
> kind of reply, and decided it is hopeless. There is a perfectly good
> language to address the problem that, after we have identified and
> characterized traits, and observed that sometimes they change frequencies
> in populations, we donât generally know at the outset whether there is
> something about the traitsâ functions in organismsâ lives (in their
> population contexts) that is eligible to be a âcauseâ of that change in
> frequency. We would like to know, for which traits in what settings,
> variations in trait parameters result in variations in function performance
> that (through the vast noise of everything else that is going on too) poke
> through to result in changes in trait frequency. There are no tautologies
> in the statistical reduction that defines different components of change
> (among which one is fitness, though its definition is partly by
> convention), and there are no other problems than the ordinary
> >> problems
> >> >>> of functional characterization and statistical
> analysis in figuring out which variations in trait parameters and functions
> correlate with changes in trait frequency robustly enough to be candidates
> for cause of the change in frequency. Itâs all so terribly ordinary and
> understandable.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Meanwhile, you have a program: to assert that
> there are some tautologies and some ambiguities etc. Therefore I
> understand that, since we can observe a field of people who get from
> problem statements to answers, by completely ordinary and conventional
> steps with standard methods, without tautologies, whatever those people are
> doing is simply irrelevant to your program.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> I will admit, so that it doesnât just seem
> irritating, that at a half-dozen points below, I am sure that you are just
> throwing up verbal chaff and playing word games to try to make something
> that is actually completely ordinary and orderly âlookâ all mangled and
> messed up. But it doesnât look that way to me. At every one of these, I
> trip over some string of words that looks like complete nonsense, which
> doesnât make the idea we were on âlookâ like anything; it just veers away
> from the track of that idea to put a word game in its place. (An example:
> "success causes fitness, and that fitness causes success") It was after
> trying to call out two or three of these that I realized i need to just
> give up. I suspect you could follow an ordinary mathematical argument
> about as well as the next guy, and you just donât want to. Thus anything I
> try to reply will just yield another round with the same form as this one.
> I will add to irritating the list, which is
> >> what
> >> >>> I wanted to cut away from doing earlier.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> I appreciated your introduction of placeholders,
> and of course I am quite open to that kind of thing. Not so open to the
> Chalmers kind, which is defined as having _no_ added content from what our
> ordinary, understandable language, is already doing. I donât know why you
> think you see a non-Chalmers-like placeholder here; but okay.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> So, is it the English who say: Please Proceed.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> I do hope you will be able to push through to the
> book you were writing. We accumulate all these unfinished efforts, and it
> is a shame if they canât get to some safe harbor in some output.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Eric
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> On Apr 4, 2026, at 14:23, Nicholas Thompson <
> thompnickson2 at gmail.com <mailto:thompnickson2 at gmail.com> <mailto:
> thompnickson2 at gmail.com <mailto:thompnickson2 at gmail.com>>> wrote:
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> DES -- I hate to drag you back into our den
> and maul you some more but your last post was fascinating to me and so akin
> to difficulties we have had with Elliott Sober and difficulties I have had
> understanding entropy (ugh) that I want to pursue them with you further
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> */--for me, âfitnessâ is a name given to
> (something like) the units (or dimension) in which reproductive success is
> measured, or quantified. Not sure âunitsâ is quite the right term, but the
> point is that itâs about defining a quantification program for observed
> outcomes, or the model variables that we try to fit to them. I had taken
> the state of modern work to show that this is the only actual meaning the
> term was ever given. /*
> >> >>>> I am happy to have a variable with a name to
> represent that dimension. I just think "fitness" is an appalling name for
> it. Call it selectedness. Call it success. Just don't call it fitness or
> adaptedness or anything that might confuse a reader into thinking that
> you have any information about the morphological or behavioral synchrony of
> the organism with its environment. The essence of D's theory is that
> success causes fitness, and that fitness causes success. If one calls
> oneself a Darwinist it must be because those connections between the two
> ideas are empirical, not logical.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> */â are you two claiming otherwise; that my
> supposition is not at all the case? That there are biologists for whom
> there is some other meaning, instead of or in addition to the one I gave
> above, about being a measurement unit? /*
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> Indeed, we are
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> */Something like: âfitnessâ is a name for âthe
> cause of reproductive successâ. As if to say: Well, thereâs this thing
> with the form of a name, so there must be something it names, that is a
> kind of causal force responsible for generating what we witness as
> reproductive success. And since there is one name, there must be some one
> kind of causal force it names./*
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> Well, if we do believe that the relative success
> of every genetic type of organism is systematic then it has a cause. Now I
> suppose that it's possible that each instance of success has a different
> cause, in which we would have reduced Darwin's theory to, "whatever causes
> an animal's sucess causes its success". But I think even FW would rate
> that a tautology. To escape that bind, we have to find some class of
> relations that leads to success which is other than the class that leads to
> failure. And to be a proper Darwinian you have to at least be able to
> entertain the possibility that selection would produce something other than
> fitness and vice versa.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> */â to me, an interpretation like that is so
> bizarre, it would never have occurred to me to that there is anyone making
> it. /*
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> Well, here we are. We stand before you. I have
> been making such a claim in print for 56 years, so either I have managed to
> pull the wool over many editors' and reviewr's eyes, or it has some
> resonance somewhere among biologists. I hope calling it "bizarre" isn't the
> first step toward putting your fingers in your ears and shrieking.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> .
> >> >>>> /*It seems very similar to taking an expression
> like âelan vitalâ, and saying that, since it has the shape of a name, there
> must be something it names. */
> >> >>>> /*
> >> >>>> */
> >> >>>> Well, exactly! The example I like to use is the
> "dormitive virtue"..Years ago, before the dinosaurs, Lipton and I wrote a
> paper in which we talked about such expressions that purport to be
> explanatory but which include a reference to the explanandum within the
> explanans as "recursive". (eg. life is caused by the Life Force) The
> dormitive virtue was a place-holder for what came to be known as the very
> specific chemical properties of morphine. The Moliere play makes fun of
> people who imagine that the assignment of a placeholder has solved the
> problem. We thought of these place holders as serving to keep the goal in
> sight while scientists looked for it. Science consists a lot in filling in
> or dividing up these place holders. The progress in the identification of
> the AIDS virus is a wonderful example. See, if tempted, Comparative
> Psychology and the recursive nature of filter explanations <
> https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url <https://
> >> linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url>?
> >> >>>> a=https%3a%2f%2fcommons.clarku.edu <
> http://2fcommons.clarku.edu
> >%2ffacultyworks%2f66%2f&c=E,1,k4G28ruXzTMikjk22fWt55DQZBrY8oTBaFPZetykCEmKkrdW7Zgm_InoVrTc91PCgHYC1XjdS7pzs2zz_HaX2PnsGuZtad3L3YiDf1g2E2bBiY5y9m0Lp_g,&typo=1>
> >> >>>> /*
> >> >>>> */
> >> >>>> /*To me, those are strings of words that satisfy
> rules of syntax and that donât have any semantic referents at all. They
> may as well be Chomskyâs âcolorless green dreamsâ or something. I would
> not have imagined that there was anything anyone expected, beyond the
> working out of the mechanics of lots of cases of
> how-lifecycles-play-out-in-*//*contexts, which can fill out some vast
> taxonomy that has no singular âessenceâ underneath it. That could well be
> my lack of empathy for how many other people think, like my lack of empathy
> for their thoughts about God (along with my ignorance about who is in the
> world). */
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> Indeed. That would explain a lot. Please
> understand that I am a lifelong unbeliever. I am not even an atheist. My
> family had no interest in religion whatsoever. You might call me a
> religious Ignoramist. I have never been cuffed on the ears by nuns.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> */â I guess, since there are people who continue
> to talk about Strong Emergence, and Philosophical Zombies, and who sound to
> me much like people who talk about God today, and maybe like people who
> would have talked about Elan Vital some generations ago, I should have
> right away imagined this reading of what you were writing./*
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> Again, that explains a lot of our difficulties.
> But I beg to suggest that there is a more generous reading.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> /*the above is what you were claiming, it would
> explain why my long Emily Litella-like replies seemed like a tiresome
> recital of what population geneticists already do (Nickâs point that âall
> that would be left is EricSâs 2a and 2bâ), which everybody already knows
> anyway, and which isnât interesting and wasnât to your point. So, were you
> claiming that there are biologists operating that way*/? */And are there
> really biologists operating that way?y /*
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> Indeed there are. They are called comparative
> biologists, comparative anatomists,comparative ethologists, comparative
> physiologists, anybody who studies the form of classes of organisms in
> relation to their circumstances. Natural design didn't get eliminated by
> Darwinism; it got partially, and incompletely and in some cases wrongly
> explained by it. Some effort needs to be expended in finding out the
> degree to which natural design actually accounts for natural selection and
> vice versa. Please see Toward a Falsifiable Theory of Evolution <
> https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fcommons.clarku.edu%2ffacultyworks%2f67%2f&c=E,1,uEqHnsI2N6agATrwVIuvnLowDECLxZG4KT5Za_GJiyC2lUxcNNve9iY0ZctgPVn2cXHp3MIF_4h0exfyKRO9KdPS6nCz0uerbqjb5nNIWBw,&typo=1
> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?
> >> a=https%3a%2f%2fcommons.clarku.edu
> %2ffacultyworks%2f67%2f&c=E,1,uEqHnsI2N6agATrwVIuvnLowDECLxZG4KT5Za_GJiyC2lUxcNNve9iY0ZctgPVn2cXHp3MIF_4h0exfyKRO9KdPS6nCz0uerbqjb5nNIWBw,&typo=1>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> Nick
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> On Fri, Apr 3, 2026 at 2:17âŻPM Nicholas Thompson <
> thompnickson2 at gmail.com <mailto:thompnickson2 at gmail.com> <mailto:
> thompnickson2 at gmail.com <mailto:thompnickson2 at gmail.com>>> wrote:
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> DES -- I hate to drag you back into our
> den and maul you some more but your last post was fascinting to me and so
> akin to difficulties we have had with Elliott Sober and difficulties I have
> had understnding entropy (ugh) that I want to pursue them with you further
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> --for me, âfitnessâ is a name given to
> (something like) the units (or dimension) in which reproductive success is
> measured, or quantified. Not sure âunitsâ is quite the right term, but the
> point is that itâs about defining a quantification program for observed
> outcomes, or the model variables that we try to fit to them. I had taken
> the state of modern work to show that this is the only actual meaning the
> term was ever given.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> â are you two claiming otherwise; that my
> supposition is not at all the case? That there are biologists for whom
> there is some other meaning, instead of or in addition to the one I gave
> above, about being a measurement unit? Something like: âfitnessâ is a name
> for âthe cause of reproductive successâ. As if to say: Well, thereâs this
> thing with the form of a name, so there must be something it names, that is
> a kind of causal force responsible for generating what we witness as
> reproductive success. And since there is one name, there must be some one
> kind of causal force it names.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> â to me, an interpretation like that is so
> bizarre, it would never have occurred to me to that there is anyone making
> it. It seems very similar to taking an expression like âelan vitalâ, and
> saying that, since it has the shape of a name, there must be something it
> names. To me, those are strings of words that satisfy rules of syntax and
> that donât have any semantic referents at all. They may as well be
> Chomskyâs âcolorless green dreamsâ or something. I would not have imagined
> that there was anything anyone expected, beyond the working out of the
> mechanics of lots of cases of how-lifecycles-play-out-in-contexts, which
> can fill out some vast taxonomy that has no singular âessenceâ underneath
> it. That could well be my lack of empathy for how many other people think,
> like my lack of empathy for their thoughts about God (along with my
> ignorance about who is in the world).
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> â I guess, since there are people who
> continue to talk about Strong Emergence, and Philosophical Zombies, and who
> sound to me much like people who talk about God today, and maybe like
> people who would have talked about Elan Vital some generations ago, I
> should have right away imagined this reading of what you were writing.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> If the above is what you were claiming, it
> would explain why my long Emily Litella-like replies seemed like a tiresome
> recital of what population geneticists already do (Nickâs point that âall
> that would be left is EricSâs 2a and 2bâ), which everybody already knows
> anyway, and which isnât interesting and wasnât to your point.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> So, were you claiming that there are
> biologists operating that way?
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> And are there really biologists operating
> that way?
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> On Wed, Apr 1, 2026 at 5:15âŻAM Santafe <
> desmith at santafe.edu <mailto:desmith at santafe.edu> <mailto:
> desmith at santafe.edu <mailto:desmith at santafe.edu>>> wrote:
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> Can I ask one last question? after which
> I promise I really will shut up:
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> The content of EricCâs note below (about
> the key in a lock), reflecting back on things Nick said in the early posts
> about selectionâs being a tautology, which got me started digging a hole,
> have bothered me through the night, and made me wonder if I can understand
> how I have been missing both-of-yâallâs point. Was it something like the
> following:?
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> â for me, âfitnessâ is a name given to
> (something like) the units (or dimension) in which reproductive success is
> measured, or quantified. Not sure âunitsâ is quite the right term, but the
> point is that itâs about defining a quantification program for observed
> outcomes, or the model variables that we try to fit to them. I had taken
> the state of modern work to show that this is the only actual meaning the
> term was ever given.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> â are you two claiming otherwise; that my
> supposition is not at all the case? That there are biologists for whom
> there is some other meaning, instead of or in addition to the one I gave
> above, about being a measurement unit? Something like: âfitnessâ is a name
> for âthe cause of reproductive successâ. As if to say: Well, thereâs this
> thing with the form of a name, so there must be something it names, that is
> a kind of causal force responsible for generating what we witness as
> reproductive success. And since there is one name, there must be some one
> kind of causal force it names.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> â to me, an interpretation like that is
> so bizarre, it would never have occurred to me to that there is anyone
> making it. It seems very similar to taking an expression like âelan
> vitalâ, and saying that, since it has the shape of a name, there must be
> something it names. To me, those are strings of words that satisfy rules
> of syntax and that donât have any semantic referents at all. They may as
> well be Chomskyâs âcolorless green dreamsâ or something. I would not have
> imagined that there was anything anyone expected, beyond the working out of
> the mechanics of lots of cases of how-lifecycles-play-out-in-contexts,
> which can fill out some vast taxonomy that has no singular âessenceâ
> underneath it. That could well be my lack of empathy for how many other
> people think, like my lack of empathy for their thoughts about God (along
> with my ignorance about who is in the world).
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> â I guess, since there are people who
> continue to talk about Strong Emergence, and Philosophical Zombies, and who
> sound to me much like people who talk about God today, and maybe like
> people who would have talked about Elan Vital some generations ago, I
> should have right away imagined this reading of what you were writing.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> If the above is what you were claiming,
> it would explain why my long Emily Litella-like replies seemed like a
> tiresome recital of what population geneticists already do (Nickâs point
> that âall that would be left is EricSâs 2a and 2bâ), which everybody
> already knows anyway, and which isnât interesting and wasnât to your point.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> So, were you claiming that there are
> biologists operating that way?
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> And are there really biologists operating
> that way?
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> As always, I appreciate whatever patience
> or indulgence,
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> Eric
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>> On Mar 31, 2026, at 15:47, Eric Charles <
> eric.phillip.charles at gmail.com <mailto:eric.phillip.charles at gmail.com>
> <mailto:eric.phillip.charles at gmail.com <mailto:
> eric.phillip.charles at gmail.com>>> wrote:
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> I'm a bit confused here...
> >> >>>>> The initial dog pile on Nick seemed (to
> me) to have as one of its main points something like "Look, old man, once
> you formalize something mathematically we don't need to care what any of
> the words might mean or imply in any other context, it is just math, stop
> thinking that the words matter!"
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> And now there have been several posts by
> EricS, at least one by Glen, and I think Marcus and Frank are in there
> somewhere as well, claiming that the words are crucially important and we
> need to take them much more seriously.
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> So.... where does that leave us? Is
> everyone now onboard with the metaphors mattering quite a bit?
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> I'll also note that "function" can't do
> the work on its own to explain evolution. We still need to know why some
> functions are favored by selection and others are not. EricS seemed to
> indicate that we assess "fit" by determining if animals are "happy".... but
> the metaphor of "fit" is like a key in a lock. To explain evolution you
> need the matching of form-and-function-to-a-particular-environment. That
> matching *sometimes* increases reproductive success, and *sometimes* the
> traits in question are hereditary.
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> Population genetics combined with field
> research can be very powerful along those lines, but the math of population
> genetics on its own, floating out in the ether, can't do it at all.
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> Best,
> >> >>>>> Eric
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> <mailto:echarles at american.edu <mailto:
> echarles at american.edu>>
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> On Tue, Mar 31, 2026 at 6:10âŻAM Santafe <
> desmith at santafe.edu <mailto:desmith at santafe.edu> <mailto:
> desmith at santafe.edu <mailto:desmith at santafe.edu>>> wrote:
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> Hi Nick,
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> Two smaller replies to what have
> become two sub-threads:
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> > On Mar 30, 2026, at 15:42,
> Nicholas Thompson <thompnickson2 at gmail.com <mailto:thompnickson2 at gmail.com>
> <mailto:thompnickson2 at gmail.com <mailto:thompnickson2 at gmail.com>>> wrote:
> >> >>>>> >
> >> >>>>> > DES, EPC, FW
> >> >>>>> >
> >> >>>>> > So far as I understand, the
> argument flowing from Fisher makes no claims about the kind of trait that
> produces reproductive success other than that it is the kind that produces
> reproductive success. FW, if that's not a tautology, it's a pretty tight
> circle.
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> As usual, letâs decamp to more
> neutral ground in the hope of having an ordinary negotiation.
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> Suppose that, in your overweening
> pursuit of the study of metaphor, you never noticed that there is a
> once/4-year gathering called The Olympics. Also never learned what any of
> its so-called âeventsâ are, what they are about, how they work, and how one
> differs from another. My hypothetical here is meant to define a condition
> of having âvery little prior informationâ about some phenomenon that we
> can, nonetheless, still reasonably unambiguously circumscribe.
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> But a quick inspection shows that a
> subset of the participants (who all together seem to be called âathletesâ)
> are given metal disks and stand on some kind of 3-tiered podium, while
> other athletes do not. Being a statistician â a skill so helpful in the
> study of metaphor that it was worth taking the time out to learn â you
> immediately recognize that this is a kind of marking that can be used to
> partition the athletes. Taking notice, for the first time, of some of the
> conversation in the society around you, who seem not nearly so devoted to
> metaphor and thus have time to do other things, you gather that these
> marked people seem to be called âwinnersâ (or better, âmedalistsâ, this
> âwinningâ thing is a finer sub-partition; Iâll mis-use âwinnerâ to label
> the most salient marking for this little parable). Itâs handy to have such
> a term, for use in later sentences, so they become less tedious than the
> ones I have been typing so far.
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> You also note that while there is
> only one 3-tiered podium and metal-disk set per one âeventâ, there seem to
> be many such distinct âeventsâ, so some kind of event name gives you a
> second kind of marking you can put on the athletes. Moreover,
> interestingly, the âeventâ label is again a proper partition (or at least
> seems to be; this one is less cut-and-dried than the observation that
> everyone carrying a metal disk is not someone not-carrying a metal disk, so
> we are wary; the event label seems to be a bit more abstract): every
> athlete is in some âeventâ set, and it appears that no athlete is in more
> than one of them. As with the âwinnersâ label, you learn that there are
> conventionalized names for the events, and you can find a look-up table if
> you need one or another of them.
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> Now, I can make a list of statements
> that seem to be of two different kinds (scare quotes here indicate my
> statisticiansâ attribute labels; in my condition of very little prior
> knowledge, I donât claim I have any more semantics for them than I listed
> above):
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> 1. Every âwinner" is someone marked
> as having won something.
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> 2a. Every winner in the
> âgymnasticsâ event is shorter than the average over all the participants;
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> 2b. Every winner in the âhigh jumpâ
> event is taller than the average over all the participants;
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> ⌠(we could presumably look for
> other such summary statistics that seem to be unusually regular and to
> carry different values in different âeventsâ).
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> I would say sentence 1 is âa
> tautologyâ, or close enough to it for the purpose of this negotiation.
> Maybe I should use EricCâs good, and slighly more flexible term, âtruismâ.
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> Now you may write a protest email:
> But the sentences 2a, 2b, have not told me what constitutes âcompetitionâ
> in these âeventsâ: âgymnasticsâ and âhigh jumpâ, and given me the rule book
> for scoring them. Okay. And they didnât cook your dinner and do the
> dishes afterward either. Life is hard. And more a propos (breaking my
> little 4th wall here), the path to a fully-adequate âcausalâ theory through
> statistical inference is like the Road to Heaven: narrow, tortuous, and
> inadequate to many things one can rightly want to know. Thatâs what other
> sciences are then for.
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> But if you claim: The sentences 2a
> and 2b didnât give me _any information_ about these âeventsâ, and couldnât
> have, because they are tautologies, I would say you made an error. Of
> course, the real Nick would not say that, so we are all safe.
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> The above parable is, of course,
> about selection. I didnât say anything about heredity. But if I had
> happened to note that height is a fairly heritable trait, I could have spun
> out a much longer story, and defined some Bayesian-posterior conditional
> probabilities, which would be shown to have properties such as: the
> posterior probability, under various ceteris paribus conditions, for a
> child of a high-jump winner to turn out another high-jump winner is higher
> than for that child to turn out a gymnastics winner, and so forth. The
> amalgamation of both of those stories would go in the direction of Fisherâs
> fundamental theorem. It would leave out all the stuff that Fisher left out
> of emphasis in his mad pursuit of his covariance term as an analog to the
> thermodynamic 2nd law (a non-valid analogy, as it turns out to be easy to
> show), and that Price included didactically (and here, to EricCâs answer):
> that I didnât even mention that the tall
> >> people
> >> >>>>> might get drafted into wars and put
> into an infantry to fire rifles over tall dijks, while the short people
> might be drafted into Special Forces and sent on missions to attack through
> underground tunnels, and so the number of survivors could depend on many
> factors about which war their country had started, in what theater, and
> against what opposition, etc. These are the world of everything-else that
> Fisher lumped together into âdeterioration of the environmentâ, as Steve
> Frank (and I think also Price) lays out. They are probably not
> well-analogized to âmutationâ, but in genetics, mutation also goes into the
> same bin in the Price equation â _outside_ the term of Fisherâs fundamental
> theorem â as the âdeteriorationâ effects. The accounting identity is
> flexible enough that we donât need analogies to use it; we can formulate a
> version for whatever statistics our phenomenon-of-interest supplies.
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> Anyway; at issue: Seriously, do we
> have a problem in scientific work, of people being unable to gain partial
> knowledge about phenomena through sentences of the kinds 2a, 2b, because
> they canât tell the difference between those and sentence 1? In the world
> where I live, I donât see evidence for this mistake.
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> Eric
>
> --
> ÂĄsÄąÉšĆ ×ÄąÉH ⼠É××ÇdoÉš Ç uÇ×Ć
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