[FRIAM] Dogs, Computers, Joy

[Frank Wimberly]

Glen did not invent the word predicative.

See https://iep.utm.edu/predicat/



---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

On Tue, Jul 28, 2020, 1:03 PM <thompnickson2 at gmail.com> wrote:

> You are pushing me hard, here, but I think the up/down thang is orthogonal
> to the predicativist position.  (You invented that word, right?)  We
> Predicativists need only assert that there is a before and after: i.e.,
> BEFORE we can say whether a thing is, we have to have said, up front, what
> it would be for that thing to be.  We can take it back soon as we see where
> it leads.
>
> Nick
> Nicholas Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
> Clark University
> ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com
> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> On Behalf Of u?l? ???
> Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 12:47 PM
> To: FriAM <friam at redfish.com>
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Dogs, Computers, Joy
>
> Hm. I appreciate an attempt to cleanly separate the predicative parts from
> the impredicative parts. But you don't seem to be allowing *any*
> impredicative parts. Your push to the universal foundation *smells* like
> predicativism to me, especially when you go off into monism la-la land.
>
> My claim would be that Doug is correct that the words (or concepts even)
> are never *defined* because they cannot be defined in the way the
> predicativists want. This perspective is anti-foundationalism. It's not
> turtles all the way down. It IS that there is no such thing as *down*.
>
> On 7/28/20 11:33 AM, thompnickson2 at gmail.com wrote:
> > I saw you coming!  My bottom line is not predication but the
> explicitness of whatever predications one makes.  What could, of course
> define consciousness as "whatever humans do that seems to me conscious" or
> "Whatever is produced by a human brain".  But, after trying to do science
> with such definitions, I think most would realize that these definitions
> are incapacitating.  At that point, a scientist relinquishes those
> definitions and begins to seek others, definitions that actually direct one
> toward the possibility of finding answers.  Thus, I stipulate that
> definitions are part of the dialectic of discovery.  Neither I, nor Frank,
> is allowed to say M is the meaning of P for all time; we are only allowed
> to say that for some set of purposes, in some context, M is the meaning of
> P.  Are we constantly pressing a head toward the most universally
> applicable definitions?  You bet!  Do we ever get there?  Not yet!
>
> --
> ↙↙↙ uǝlƃ
>
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