[FRIAM] WAS: P Zombie Couches

[Eric Charles]

I would say that Peirce is concerned with determining what is true in this
actual world. That water decomposes into hydrogen and oxygen in a certain
ratio under certain experimental conditions, is the type of thing we will
(presumably) continue to agree about until the end times, i.e., it is
"true". (That ratio isn't exactly 2 hydrogen for every 1 oxygen, but it is
reasonably close.)

Can we imagine a world in which water decomposes in some other fashion? I'm
not sure exactly what that discussion is. Would we say something like:
Sure, but then it wouldn't be "water"

Or would we say something like: Yes, that could definitely be a possible
world, but their "water" wouldn't be exactly the same as our water.

At any rate....

The Philosophical Zombie Problem is the type of thing that is faux deep,
and I thought it deserved to be ridiculed, and I think it makes as much
sense when talking about couches as when talking about people. So... I was
mostly just trying to make that point. (Ditto with the "Stomach in Jar"
entry mocking the "Brian in a Vat" thought experiment.) There might be a
conversation something like it that would have a bit of depth, but instead
it is almost entirely linguistic trickery masquerading as deep thoughts.

-----------
<echarles at american.edu>


On Sat, Nov 20, 2021 at 9:39 PM Jon Zingale <jonzingale at gmail.com> wrote:

> "As an experience-monist, I believe either that all worlds are possible
> or no worlds are possible. Also, as an experience-monist (but not as a
> behaviorist) I am allowed to experience the world in a variety of ways,
> as present, as past, as future, as fantasy, as dreams, and, as possible,
> or impossible."
>
> I gather that you mean something like, "Any experience is possible", but
> I am not sure that this coincides with the usage of "possible worlds" as
> it occurs in EricC's Wikipedia reference, *possible worlds* in the sense
> of Kripke. In Kripke, "possible worlds" logic is used as a kind of foil
> for speaking about a priori and a posteriori truths. Kripke distinguishes
> between those propositions which are necessarily true (in that they are
> true for every possible world) and those propositions which are possibly
> true (in that they are true for at least one possible world). As far as
> I can reason at present, your ontological commitments are to "Peircean
> Truth" wherein propositions are only "true" if they are true for every
> possible world, i.e., necessary truth. Those propositions which are
> unstable, or vary across "worlds", I imagine for Peirce, are nothing at
> all. How poorly do I understand your position relative to this context?
>
> .-- .- -. - / .- -.-. - .. --- -. ..--.. / -.-. --- -. .--- ..- --. .- - .
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn UTC-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
> un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
> archives:
>  5/2017 thru present https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/
>  1/2003 thru 6/2021  http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/attachments/20211120/31486e41/attachment.html>