[FRIAM] WAS: P Zombie Couches

[thompnickson2 at gmail.com]

Or as Peirce would say, “Simply a matter of the arrangement of words.”

 

N

 

Nick Thompson

 <mailto:ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com> ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com

 <https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

From: Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> On Behalf Of Eric Charles
Sent: Saturday, November 20, 2021 9:49 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam at redfish.com>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] WAS: P Zombie Couches

 

I would say that Peirce is concerned with determining what is true in this actual world. That water decomposes into hydrogen and oxygen in a certain ratio under certain experimental conditions, is the type of thing we will (presumably) continue to agree about until the end times, i.e., it is "true". (That ratio isn't exactly 2 hydrogen for every 1 oxygen, but it is reasonably close.) 

 

Can we imagine a world in which water decomposes in some other fashion? I'm not sure exactly what that discussion is. Would we say something like: Sure, but then it wouldn't be "water"

 

Or would we say something like: Yes, that could definitely be a possible world, but their "water" wouldn't be exactly the same as our water. 

 

At any rate....

 

The Philosophical Zombie Problem is the type of thing that is faux deep, and I thought it deserved to be ridiculed, and I think it makes as much sense when talking about couches as when talking about people. So... I was mostly just trying to make that point. (Ditto with the "Stomach in Jar" entry mocking the "Brian in a Vat" thought experiment.) There might be a conversation something like it that would have a bit of depth, but instead it is almost entirely linguistic trickery masquerading as deep thoughts. 


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On Sat, Nov 20, 2021 at 9:39 PM Jon Zingale <jonzingale at gmail.com <mailto:jonzingale at gmail.com> > wrote:

"As an experience-monist, I believe either that all worlds are possible
or no worlds are possible. Also, as an experience-monist (but not as a
behaviorist) I am allowed to experience the world in a variety of ways,
as present, as past, as future, as fantasy, as dreams, and, as possible,
or impossible."

I gather that you mean something like, "Any experience is possible", but
I am not sure that this coincides with the usage of "possible worlds" as
it occurs in EricC's Wikipedia reference, *possible worlds* in the sense
of Kripke. In Kripke, "possible worlds" logic is used as a kind of foil
for speaking about a priori and a posteriori truths. Kripke distinguishes
between those propositions which are necessarily true (in that they are
true for every possible world) and those propositions which are possibly
true (in that they are true for at least one possible world). As far as
I can reason at present, your ontological commitments are to "Peircean
Truth" wherein propositions are only "true" if they are true for every
possible world, i.e., necessary truth. Those propositions which are
unstable, or vary across "worlds", I imagine for Peirce, are nothing at
all. How poorly do I understand your position relative to this context?


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