[FRIAM] Does Dusty Love Dave, and VV.

[glen]

It still seems backwards to me. The anecdotes about inter-individual interactions don't indicate consciousness at all. [1] The move to self-consciousness would be more appropriate. For example, my cat clearly exhibits a (or several) feedback loop(s) when grooming a grass burr out of his fur. (Or a dog walking in circles for a full minute before finally lying down.) This is a marker for a very high order consciousness. An indicator for lower (but still quite high) order consciousness is the lengthy consideration of the water bowl as he decides whether or not it's quality is proper or if he should go drink out of the ditch. [2] Such reflection is a hallmark of consciousness for me. And it's founded in, composed of, lower order feedback loops of interoception.

In fact, I'd go so far as to argue that consciousness is only indirectly relevant to inter-individual phenomena at all. We can get a full panoply of complex behavior out of collections of very stupid individuals. To study consciousness, you need a cohesive system capable of exhibiting allostasis. Using 2 such individuals in such studies explodes the variables you need to consider, obscurum per obscurius.

[⛧] Witness concepts like "mansplaining" and "cringe", inter-individual interactions denying (some aspect of) the subjects' consciousness, yet confirming the observers' consciousness. Trans-agent phenomena are ripe for abuse and imputation. This is why the Turing test was designed the way it was. It blurs the analogical replacability requirements across simulation, emulation, and authenticity. Were we to be scientific about this, we'd try to control for/against simulation and emulation, which means eliminating inter-individual contexts to the extent we can.

[2] These are not anthropomorphic. I have no idea or projection onto what he's thinking when he does these things. However, I do engage in anthropomorphization when I see him trying to decide whether to stay inside or go outside when I open the door. I imagine some heuristic weighting between interactions with the other animals in the house or those outside the house.

On 7/18/24 18:10, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> All,
> 
> I want to move things along here, but  not sure movement would be.   Our shared anecdotes would seem to suggest that we think that these animals we are in interaction with are conscious.
> 
> Jochen seemed to disagree.  So Jochen, and you all, what should we do about that?   I regard it as a state of tension, and I am led to want to resolve it.    Am the only one of us who wants a resolution?
> 
> Then, I would lke to pass on to self-consciousness.  For me;  the heartland of self-consciousness would be an awareness on the part of an agent, that  A is one of those  that others are.  I am trying to think what sort of anecdote would elicit such an experience.

-- 
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